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A CRITICAL STUDY OF LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
especially in relation to his Theories of Perception and
Memory, in "An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding",




1. The excuse for this study is a belief that the
account given, or implied, of the Self or Personal
Identity in any piece of systematic thinking, is
crucial in evaluating it.
2. This question i.e. "What is Self, or The
Self?", appears to me to be the one question which
cannot be left "open" while the investigator proceeds
with some other topic which might be alleged to be not
related to the status of the investigator himself.
3. Logical enquiries are frequently taken to be,
par excellence, topics which are thus unrelated to the
2-
status of the logician. This appears to me to he a
mistaken view, since a logical activity which proceeds
without establishing the status of the logician, makes
as a presupposition, either ultimate or provisional,
one (i.e. of a Self — the logician's own) which may
not legitimately be accepted as ultimate since the
presupposition itself is of, or contains, a concept
(i.e. such a self with at least the relative continuity
implied by the grammatical structure of the language
he uses) which is, to some degree at least, amenable to
further "logical" analysis through the application to
the successive states contained in it of the Law of
Identity -- as by, for example, Hume.
4. On the other hand, such a presupposition cannot
be accepted as provisional^, because, even if the attempt
is made to assert that, whether there is a Self or
Subject that knows it or not, the proposition "A is A"
* It might be maintained that from the point of view
held by R.G. Collingwood, whose terms I have borrowed
here, any question asked about the "nature of the Self",
would be, strictly, a "nonsense question". It would be,
that is to say, from his point of view, a piece of
"pseudo metaphysics", since the question purports to
elicit a prepositionally formulated answer concerning the
Self as included in the "realm of Pure Being" (i.e. since
it is an "onto!ogical" question, it would be, for Colling¬
wood, a "nonsense question"). From this point of view,
I take it, the only real question that could be asked
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is true -- "Ten if the proposition, or what it expresses,
is never a datura to any suh.iect whatever — then that
attempt evidently in itself involves the use of the
concept of a specific sort of Self either, positively,
when it is that to which a proposition or what it ex¬
presses is a datum and is that which has, therefore,
sufficient continuity to "hold together" the terras of
the proposition in their relation, when it "is known",
or, negatively, when it is the correlative concept
(antithetical or limiting) which must he (is) used When
the proposition or what it expresses is spoken of (or
thought of) as being not a datura to any subject i.e.
when it is spoken of (or thought of) as "not known"'*-.
5. This is to say that it is impossible to assert
concerning the Self would be one which was intended to
elicit as an answer the formulation of a relative
("provisional") presupposition underlying a purely
psycho!ogical account of the Self, and this would be
allowed as a legitimate piece of "metaphysical analysis".
However, I wish to make it clear that I am using
Collingwoodfs terras only as an expositorial aid and ray
usage does not imply an acceptance of his dismissal of
the possibility of an Ontology.
** Likewise, such a concept is inescapably used when
there purports to be reference from something known "to"
(in any sense) something which is not known or which is
"unknowable".
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the proposition "A is A" as unqualified by the condition
of some subject, making or knotting the proposition.
Therefore the philosopher has the prior task of establish¬
ing the nature of these conditions i.e. of the Self,
before he can legitimately regard his propositions as
categorical.
6. In other words, whereas the logician may not, on
the one hand, leave the nature of his own subjectivity,
or ageticy in logical process, as "provisional" (i.e.
ontologically unspecified), because the conceptual and
linguistic apparatus he uses requires, as above, the
presupposition of a Self of specific nature -- specific
in so far as it implies continuance within the limits
of e.g. one act of inferring -- and thereby asserts that
such a presupposition is not "provisional" while, at the
same time, the proposition of the existence of such a
self is not self-evident, although it is allowed,
apparently, to be prior to other propositions (e.g.
"A is A") admitted as self-evident; on the other hand,
he cannot make his o^vn continuing subjectivity an
"ultimate ' presupposition, because it contains a concept
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of some degree of complexity, and that complexity can
be analysed by the application of more primitive
(though not, apparently, prior) concepts 3uch as that
of identity — such identity, for example as that of
the "remembered" and "remembering" selves of successive
states of a process of inference"1, or, possibly, as of
the concrete identity of what may be in abstraction
discriminable within an instantaneous cognition -- for
example an instance of "self consciousness"; and even
if it is maintained that the sort of identity asserted
of two or more successive states of the self S. at time
ti. and time tii, i.e. the identity of si. and sii.
is not the sort of identity asserted in "A is A", the
application of this latter, more primitive but apparently
posterior concept is required to know si. and sii. as
self-identical or self-existent i.e. to know that si.
is si. and sii. is sii., which is a condition of the
"presupposed" identity of si. and sii. in S. (See
below, para. 12).
^ Cf. butler, "Analogy? Dissertation I, para.ll" in
Gladstone's edition.
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7. This is, it must "be emphasised, not to assert
the identity of Logic with the psychology of the
logician (See below, para.13), but it is to assert
that the attribution of "logical validity has the
pre-requirement of a definitive statement of the
ontologlcal status of the logician -- "logician"
being used to indicate whoever it is that conceptualises
a situation or, to beg fewer of the questions at issue,
whatever is the focus, so to speak, of any situation
conceptualised.
8. If it is urged that the apprehension of the
necessity of the proposition "A is A" is, as a matter
of psychological fact, instantaneous and non-durational
i.e. that "A is A" is merely the literary extension of
what is, experientially, A-as-it-is-now, presented in a
cognitive state which is without internal succession
of other diversity, so that the problem does not arise,
it must be pointed out that if this were so, any con¬
tinuity of consciousness would be impossible; for if
the apprehension of the self-fdentity of a thing is so
confined to an unextended moment, then the identity of
-7-
the content of every rnoment of consciousness with itself
is apprehended in this manner, so that, the content of
every nowent "being apprehended in isolation from that of
any other, consciousness could not extend over even two
such successive moments whose contents night "be what
would ordinarily be called "identical". Therefore,
since we are here enquiring into matter of psychological
fact, wa must conclude that since we do have continued
consciousness, the apprehension of what is expressed in
the proposition "A is A", is not as suggested in the
objection; and the i>roblem remains.
9. There is, however, another side to the problem
viz. that however much it may'be the case that the
propositions shout th° nature of the Self presupposed
by logical terminology -- and, indeed, by any language --
are not self-evident, it is, nevertheless, the case that
the existence of "self" is iri some sort immediately and
necessarily "known.
30. It is admitted that there are, at least, conscious
states — which is not a matter of "doubt" or question.
-8-
The Pyrrhonist does not attempt to deny primordial
consciousness; it may, indeed, be in any or every sense
illusory and unconnected, but, as such, it ij3. This is
the admitted frontier of scepticism. Likewise it is
not didputed that some, if not all, such states occur
under the qualification "as being known by" or "as pre¬
sented to" a Subject, That the Subject to which they
refer is illusory, and the qualification of reference
itself illusion, might be the case; that does not
remove or alter the qualification as constitutive in the
consciousness.
11. We appear, then, to have this double problem;
that x-diatever the nature of any primordial conscious
state may be -- and the denial that there are primordial
conscious states, or that there is a primordial conscious
state, is admitted on all hands to be unmeaning — in or
throughout such a state there is an awareness of "self",
but, while this is so, that every attempt to describe,
define, analyse, or in any way communicate about that
state involves the use of a terminology which contains as
a structural necessity and principle of use, a concept of
-9-
Self in a first sense (as at least the presumed continuant
giving coherence to one act of inferring or one recognition
of e.g. Identity), which is not the Self in a second sense
(i.e. of immediate awareness) whose existence is at all
indubitable or necessary, e^en although such a conceptual¬
ised self, i.e. "self" in the first sense, is made the
precondition of alleged necessary" propositions.
1?. We might put the matter thus:- that cognitive
state which is the recognition of the necessity of the
proposition "A is A" can in principle be analysed (because
it has temporal extension - see above para.8) into the
series of consifcious states si sn. These states
would be, for example, the apprehension of each term (the
"terms" being A-now,.A-"now", however brief the
interval), of both terms, of their relatedness etc. So
that as presented, si. i_s si., sii. is sii., sn.
is sn., but the proposition "si. - sn. is the identical
self S. ! (i.e. that which "holds together" the terms of
the original pi-oposi tion in that relation which is their
identity") is not of the same sort as "A is A" or, more
importantly, as "si. is si." even although it would seem
that it mast be a necessary proposition if the identity
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of the terms of the proposition which expresses the
content of the cognitive state, or of the constitutive
conscious states with themselves, is to "be "identity"
or necessary.
13. The point might then he made that there ijs some
confusion here between a "psychological" and a "logical"
use of "identity". "But this is not so. The series
si. - sn. is, we have remarked, as presented, "si. is
si., sii. is sii sn. is sn." and that which is
propounded in these propositions is of the same status
as that which is propounded in the original proposition
with the apprehension of whose necessity they are in¬
volved, and if the apprehension of the original pro¬
position is to have sufficient, unity for it to he an
apnrehension of "identity", then the relation of the
constitutive series "si. - sn.) and the apprehending
Self which it constitute^, must he proponible in a form
of the same sort as that of the original proposition,
and this does not appear to be possible. That the
series si. - sn. may, as a succession, constitute from
another point of view a "psychological fact" in the
"history" of some self, may he the case, hut it is
irrelevant. This may "be to assert an equivalence, at
least, 'between Psychology so called, and Logic; but it
is not from this point of view a confusion.
14. On the other hand, if we were to regard the
resolution of the given cognitive state into the series
si. - sn. as an "abstracting" process whereby we came
merely to regard the elements of the series ass "concrete
particulars", then the assertion of the identity of their
sum as "concrete particulars" with a "concrete universal"
i.e. the self S., might remove the difficulty. I wish,
however, to reserve thi3 point, since we shall be con¬
cerned chiefly with the difficulties which arise from
what is generally regarded as an "atomistic" account.^-
15. if, now, we look at the matter from another point
of view, viz. from that of those wishing to pursue ethical
Such an "atomistic" account would be regarded from the
point of view we are touching on here as an attempt to
resolve the states of the Self, or the contents of a
Self's experience, into a group of "abstract particulars"
and as such it would be, from this point of view, at the
best illusory, and negligible.
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discussion, it appears evident to me that for the
traditional accounts at least of what Ethics is, the
establishment of the nature of the self is crucial.
16. In accepted parlance such terms as Obligation,
Punishment, Motive, Disposition, Desert, etc., involve,
on any analysis, the notion of a specifically continuant
Self (as we shall see from Butler's and others' animad¬
versions upon Locke), and the terms Good and Evil, in so
far as Ethics requires their application in an inter¬
personal context, are subject to the same condition
in use.^
17. For these, more recently enunciated, kinds of
Ethics, which emphasise agency rather than cognition,
the problem would seem to remain; for, although the
exponents of thi3 view may be less concerned with the
nature of the epistemic 3ub.ject, their own emphasis on
the "personal" nature of morality suggests that for them
1
If it is admitted that the concept of the Self is of
first relevance for Ethics, it wil" follow that it will
be of relevance in those "Social sciences" which are, in
general, derivatives of, or substitutes for, it.
"actions' or instances of agency" cannot fee series of
discrete events ('Which are, indeed, maintained to fee the
antithesis of actions - "E.g. Professor Facmurray' s views)
feut that "agency" implies ar. identical and identifiafele
agent.^ And with the continuity at least of the Self
as Agent, as well as the Self as Subject, we should fee
concerned.
18. For those writers upon Ethics who appear to fee
trying to reduce Ethics to language and/or logic, or to
make of ethical discussion an anthropological enquiry
into how, in fact, "ethical" terras are, or have "been,
used, the difficulty afeout the Self is, again, t'rat of
the contradictory presuppositions we noted in earlier
paragraphs. That their difficulty is not in any way
specifically "ethical", fn the traditional sense, does
not remove it.
19. Since the existence of these problems constitutes
a destructive criticism, here preferred as the primary,
^
From this point of view, indeed, it is the epistemo-
logical "atoraisation" of the experience of a Self into
"mental events" that leads traditional morality into
paradox.
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epistemological criticism, which applies to all utter¬
ance, it applies a fortiori to all discursive systems
and, again a fortiori, to the present enquiry ' and in
consideration of the second of these apparent conse¬
quences it would "be (at least ideally) part of the purpose
of the present thesi3 to furnish "by some "oblique method
since direct exposition stands condemned ah initio) a
formula which might "be used to expand the present apparent
limitations upon utterance, while, in consideration of
The first, it might he illuminating to frame such an
attempt within an historical examination of some received,
doctrine of Personal Identity.
20. In choosing the historical locus of such a frame
or context, the division of philosophers into Empiricists
and Rationalists is no more than convenient, for in them
all the crux noticed in the previous paragraphs sooner
or later becomes apparent, the summary accounts of the
solutions offered ranging from flume's classic: "When I
enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat
or cold, light or shade,love or hatred, pain or pleasure.
-15- J
1 never catch myself at any time without a perception,
I
and never can observe anything "but the perception",
designated by James i'errier a 3 'perhaps the hardiest
assertion ever hazarded in philosophy"i to Kant's:
"In the original, synthetic unity of apperception, I am
conscious of myself neither as I appear to myself, nor
as I am in myself, I am conscious only that I ami'
PI. Since, however, the distinction between the
conceptualised self implied in all systems of termin¬
ology, and that which in experience it purports, although
distortingly, to express, appears due to the analyses
of the British Empiricist writers, I have chosen to
*
examine, principally, the vi^ws of one of the most
illustrious of them.
ii.
The matter we have to consider, then, in the first
instance historically, is that which finds expression in
the conflict between two views of the Self, and this con¬
flict is, I have suggested, at least aggravated by if not
grounded in the structure of our language.
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26. The Pure TCg© Theory immediately involves us with
concepts either of a continuant particular which underlies
all, or a timeless particular which is present in each
(and in every element of each) experienced series.
Hither, that is, the Self is that continuant which is
identically present in successive conscious states in
such a way that the succession i_s a succession by being
and being "known as the experiences of "one person" through
a life history, or the Self is an ultimate, timeless
particular, present in occasions of consciousness, to
which empirical events and their qualities are in a
unique relation, but which is itself neither relation
(only) nor quality, and which does not "contain" relation
or quality (i.e. is not internally diverse), being,
presumably, monadic. It is, I think, sufficiently
apparent that this latter view is not merely a re¬
statement of the former and does not involve the notion
of the Self as "continuant" and therefore in time, because
the relation between two or more elements in one instance
of consciousness (e.g. the relation between a memory
image - involving pastness - and a set of "present"
presentations both in one specious present) is not
necessarily the same relation or set of relations
-18
{""being remembered and compared and contrasted with Now")
at that relation in which both, as elements in a "present"
total conscious situation, stand to the particular which
is the Self — which latter relation is, on the hypo¬
thesis, sui generis. On this latter -view it would appear
that there is a sense in which T could be said to know
my "self" (the ultimate particular) in a manner different
from that in which I know my own life history (the
empirical relata).^
2?. In brief, then, the Self on the Pure Ego Theory
r
is either a "subject element" which is successively and
literally present in the conscious states that make up
the biography of ort^ person, or it is a monad to which
certain series of empirical data stand in a unique relation
and which cannot meaningfully be spoken of as itself having
a "biography".
28. On either of these views of the Self the immediate
difficulties which arise are those involved in the question
of the nature of our knowledge of such a self. Can we
have empirical knowledge of it? i.e. has it empirical
3
And this may be what is suggested in the Spinozistic
doctrine that we experience our own vternity.
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qualities? In the latter case, ex hypothesi, we cannot
and it has not; and in the former, although, as Sr. Broad
hag pointed out"^ the fact that we do not perceive any
empirical quality does not necessarily mean that such a
Self could not have empirical qualities, it remains true
that to introspection no empirical quality is indeed per¬
ceptible. And it is the appeal to introspection (or
"self examination" since the term introspec ion" is
currently suspect) for the purposes of establishing the
nature of the Self, which leads us, through a consideration
of the empirical content of examined experience, to the
second or Constructional view of the Self, and althoughit
would be to beg too many questions to assert that the
examination of this content constitutes the sole avenue
to knowledge of the Self, the content which requires
examination on this view is certainly of an importance in
extent, immediacy, and (prima facie) authority, to make
necessary that at least it should be weighed in any account
of the Self.
29. The presupposition of this Constructional view is
"The Kind 8: its Place in Efature".
20-
that the content of all conscious experience is resoluble
into either sensation (in tha classical sense) or sensations
and some analogue of sensation (if, indeed, we can compass
the notion of such an analogue). it i3 maintained that
the "subject term" required in the contrasted theory
remains permanently elusive and that all that is left to
examination and, indeed, to discursive enquiry, is a
pattern, collection, or series of discretely diversified
sensation and, perhaps, its analogues. The Self, that
is to say, ijs composed of the series of conscious states
(in the last analysis "sensational") which is its "bio¬
graphy, and there is no remainder. The locus classicus
of the expression of this doctrine is that passage from
Hume which can, I think, "bear a repetition: "I may
venture to affirm ..... that they are nothing hut a "bundle
or collection of different perceptions which succeed each
other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual
flux and movement."
30, The answer, on this view, to the question: "What
account, then, is to bo given of the experienced apparent
continuity of consciousness which is over and above the
mere summation of its parts i.e. that which qualifies an
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experience as "mine; and qualitatively uniform in tnat
respect with its orsdecessorsT" is that, within any
specious present there may "be present discrete empirical
data (in the last analysis sensational or para-
sensational) which are some sort of memory- or quasi-
memorial images together with others simultaneously and
differently experienced as "present , and that is all --
the observed' high degree of internal complexity of such
presents accounting for the strength of the conviction
about a "self".
31. How there are, as vn have already seen. con¬
siderable logical difficulties involved in this view,
but we are not presently concerned with rigorous
criticisms of either view, but only with giving a
summary account of what is involved in both.
32. ¥e must now turn to the examination of the
account of Personal Identity in Loclce's "Essay". This
has been chosen for examination both because, even on a
cursory reading it appears that som^ elements in it are
consonant with the first of the general views contrasted
above, while others appear consonant with the second, and
■because, in spite of this, the "Essay" is often regarded
as the origin from which was developed an "atomistic"
(and often sensationalist) theory of knowledge which has,
as part of it, the sort of "constructional" view we out¬
lined. And, as -we saw, it was from this point of view
that some of the problems about Personal Identity became
most obvious.
Whether the historical developments of Locke's views
were, in general, founded on a misinterpretation of the
"Essay", and whether, in particular, the view of Personal
Identity they contain is a consequence of such a misinter¬
pretation -- and it is a view which leaves us in the end
with nothing better than the sceptical resignation of the
Appendix to Plume's "Treatise" -* are matters which will
concern us in the present study, as well as criticisms
*
of Locke's account from other points of view involving
some form of the "Pure Ego" theory.
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II.
"This brings us to the consideration of Locke's
Theory of Personal Identity -- a theory which ha3 passed
into a "byword of philosophical contempt, and which has
been regarded only as an example of the absurdities into
which genius may be betrayed."
-- T.E. Webb ("The Intellectualism of
Locke").
THE GENERAL NOTION OP IDENTITY IN LOCKE'S ESSAY.
33. Historically, evaluations of Locke's theory of
Personal Identity have ranged from those of his near
contemporaries and their successors down to the middle
of the 19th century, which were for the most part of a
nature fully to justify Webb's remark, to the more
measured approbation of his most recent expositors such
as Professors Gibson and Aaron, e.g. Professor Gibson
writes ("Locke's Theory of Knowledge" Camb.1917 pp.118-9):
"Locke's treatment of the question of the identity of the
self is, in some respects, one of the most original and
revolutionary of the positions developed in the Essay.",
and Professor Aaron ("John Locke" Oxford 1937 p.140):
"Locke's examination of this matter (personal identity),
in a chapter added in the second edition, contains some of
the closest thinking in the Essay."
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34. Among Locke's hostile critics, however, evaluation
of this theory (as is the case with some others) is a
good deal commoner than minute exposition of what the
theory is. Ve must, therefore, try to produce an adequate
exposition in the following sections, and one properly
related to the other relevant doctrines enunciated in
the Essay.
35. First of all, in regard to the notion of Identity
at its most general, it seems reasonable to infer that this
was not one of the matters which Locke found most per¬
plexing in his own mind, from the fact that the chapter
specifically on Identity and Diversity was added to Book II
only in the second edition and at the importunity of
'
olyneux; Locke having previously, it appears, been
satisfied with the more summary statements in IV.i.4 and
the genetic account of the idea of Identity in I.iii.4-5.
35. Molyneux, however, being more concerned than Locke
with the metaphysical status of the "principium individu-
ationis", elicits from him in this chapter the round
assertions "From what has been said, it is easy to
discover what is so much enquired after, the principium
-25-
individuationis; and that, it is plain, is existence
itself " (II.xxvii.4).
37. How whether or not this is, in a sense appropriate
in metaphysics, adequate, is a matter which notoriously
can he disputed; hut w° are at present less concerned
with assessing the value of metaphysical arguments, as
such, as between (say) Leibnifc's and Locke's, than with
establishing as accurately as possible what Locke's views
were: consequently we are concerned with the "what has
been said" in the quotation above.
38. And in this chapter, xxvii of II, which purports
to be his succinct account of the relation of Identity,
he says: when considering anything as existing
at any determined time and place, we compare it with
itself existing at another time, and theron form the ideas
of identity and diversity. When we see anything to be
in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it
what it will) that it i3 that very thing, and not another...."
These things, then, of which identity may be predicated, are
things spatially and temporally determined. Again he says:
"In this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed
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to, vary not at all from what they were that moment
wherein we consider their former existence, and to which
we compare the present; for we never finding nor con¬
ceiving it possible that two things of the same kind
should exist in the same place at the same time, we
rightly conceive that whatever exists anywhere, at any
I
time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself
alone." And again; "That, therefore, that had one
beginning in the same thing; and that which had a
different beginning in timn and place from that is not the
same but diverse." (IT.xxvii.1-3.)
39. This, then, is "what has been said". Identity is
a certain relation between terms originating each in its
own place and seen not to vary on repeated observation.
Such terms, when related, constitute a thing identical
with itself— in duration♦. And this seems to be Locke's
principal contention; but it must also be noted that, in
the quotations above, something else is implied viz. that
apart from the identity of something in. duration, there is
another identity, the identity of simple individua which is
immediately discerned without the condition of non-variation
in time. Locke says, as above; "When we see anything to be
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in any place in any instant of time, we are sure ..... that
it is that very thing, and not another...."
40. This point is of some importance, as the ignoring
of it leads T.H. Green into making a criticism of Locke's
doctrine which, speciously acute, would indeed be damaging
if this distinction were not noted.
41. Green's criticism (Works Vol.1 pp.60-6°) is pre¬
cisely that Locke fails to distinguish between identity
(in time) and "mere"identity . Emphasising those passages
which refer to the identity of a continuant, Green points
out, quite correctly, that even if the identity of a
continuant requires the discernment of non-variation between
the appearances of a thing at different times, this does
not account for the identity of a thing with itself at a
single Instant, and this implies that we can never discern
the identity between the terms which are the appearances of
the "identical" thing at disparate times, because at both
of the instants which are those different times, we have
no way of knowing the t^rms (appearances) as self-identical,
if identity is, and is solely, the sort of relation discerned
in the identity of a continuant -- or which would be dis¬
cerned if this were possible. Green writes: "When it is
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said that the idea of identity is formed upon con¬
sideration of things as existing in a certain way, this is
naturally understood to mean that the things are
first known as existing, and that afterwards the idea of
the relation in question is formed Hither then the
'things® upon consideration of which the idea of identity
is formed, are not known at all, or the knowledge of them
involves the very idea afterwards formed on consideration
of them."
42. Now, it seems to me that this assertion of Green's
that Locke confuses rather than distinguishes !tmere"unity
of individua in an instant with identity in difference of
time, is wrong. For one thing, it leaves out of account
the sentence from Il.xxvii.l already twice quoted (paras
18-9 above) and, for the rest, it fails to take account of
what Locke says in Bnok IV and elsewhere in Book II on the
same matter. And this failure, it seems to me, shews both
the minor point that Green does not take sufficiently into
account the circumstances in which the "hssay" was composed,
and the more important one that he misunderstands Locke's
method of exposition which, as we shall see at greater
length later (e.g. para.95 below), involves our keeping in
mind several different accounts at the same time.
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4*5. It seems hard to believe that Locke did not in fact
distinguish between these two sorts of identity, however
lax his phraseology in this pa -ticular chapter, when one
takes into account his assertion at IV.vii.4? "It is the
first act of the mind (without which it would never be
capable of any knowledge) to knox* every one of its ideas
by itself, and distinguish it from others." or, again,
his assertion at II.xxix.6: "Por, let any idea be what it
will, it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it
to be, and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes
it from all other ideas, which cannot be other i.e.
different, without being perceived to be so." And., again,
at IV.i.4.: "A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has
them in his mind, that the ideas he calls white and round,
are the very ideas they are, and not other ideas which he
calls red and square."
44. Again, to reinforce the distinction he is making
between these two senses of identity, we may observe how
in Book IV.iii Locke make3 the two statements:
i. "that the extent of our knowledge comes not only
short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of
our own ideas" and,
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ii. "in thi3 way of agreement or disagreement of
our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as
i
our ideas themselves; and there can "be no idea in the mind
which it does not, presently, by an intuitive knowledge,
perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any
other."
45. Now, th°se statements which appear incompatible,
would in fact be incompatible, if Green's version of the
theory were correct. But Locke is here making a dis¬
tinction very much in point, a distinction between
"knowledge" proper, which is in discernment of relations
between our ideas ("Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing
but the perception of the connection of and agreement, or
disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas." - IV.i.l)
and which is consequently less extended than the number of
ideas we may merely have unrelated, and that species of
"intuition" which is involved in our simply having ideas
which subsequently we may relate, and thereby come by
"knowl edge".
46. The identity, then, of individua in any one instant
is something discerned, I think it is quite plain, by a
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species of intuition, while the identity of a continuant,
as something our acquaintance with which involves the dis¬
cernment of relation between temporally diverse terms, is
a matter concerning which we have "knowledge".
47. How, we are not so much concerned with xvhether or
not we do, in fact, have this sort of intuition of the
3elf-identity of individua, as we are with establishing
what was Looke's opinion on the matter, and my objection
to Green's criticism is that he denies to Locke the making
of a distinction which he plainly enough makes, and at¬
tributes to Locke a confusion of his own making. (Ho doubt,
had Locke had the opportunity of reading Green's difficulties"
about the identity of individua, he would have dismissed
the whyte's Professor with a story about the T'onkey and
his oyster.)
48. Green, it appears, was sufficiently acquainted
with the passages I have used to counter his view, but
he employs them only to confound his confusion. He writes
(Works Vol.1 pp.20-21): "The primary knowledge is that of
identity -- the knowledge of an idea as identical with
itself. 'A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has
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them in his mind, that the ideas he calls white and round,
are the very ideas they are, and not other ideas which he
calls red and square.' Now, as Rime afterwards pointed
out" says Green, "identity is not simple unity. It cannot
"be predicated of the "idea" as merely single, "but only as
a manifold in singleness. To speak of an idea as the
'same with itself' is unmeaning unless it mean 'same with
itself' in its manifold appearances, i.e. unless the idea
is distinguished, as an object existing continuously, from
its present appearances. Thus, 'the infallible knowledge'
which Locke describes in the above passage, consists in
this, that on the occurrence of a certain 'idea' the man
recognises it as one, which at other times of its occurrence
he has called 'white'. Such a 'synthesis of recognition',
however, expressed by the application of a common term,
implies the reference of a present sensation to a permanent
object of thought, in this case the object thought under
the term 'white', so that the sensation becomes an idea
of the object."
49* This appears to me to be a misdescription of the
situation, and for reasons why it is so, we may turn to
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Locke. Amplifying the rebuttal of Green, we can start "by
noting that he is himself making the confusion of which he
accuses Locke on pages 60-63 of his "Introduction".
Appealing to Hume, he makes the point that simple unity
and "identity" are not the same thing. Locke, as I have
shewn, makes the point himself with sufficient clarity i.e.
demonstrates that there are two senses of "identity" relative
to this distinction. "Simple unity" is the identity of
anything with itself in any one instant. The "identity"
of a thing with itself in duration is it3 identity with
itself in its "manifold appearances". And it is now Green
who is confusing the t\*o. It is simply untrue to assert
that it is unmeaning to predicate identity of an idea unless
it is "distinguished as an object existing continuously,
from its present appearance." . Because what is presented
as self-identical .is "it3 present appearanceWhat
happens when a man "infallibly knows" that he lias a self-
identical idea, is that, on the view Locke is maintaining,
the idea is presented as itself and before it is "recognised"
as one "which at other times of its occurrence he has called
'white1" i.e. as a novel psychic occurrence quite undeter¬
mined in content. Admittedly it may be recognised (as e.g.
"white") and named according to the name of some universal
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(of whatever kind)? and the recognition" of it and its
inclusion under a general name with other ideas "the same"
is a matter which involves "identity in manifold appear¬
ances", "but it is a different matter, and one which is
distinct from the apprehension of an idea as itself. (The
predilections which lead Green to mis-read Locke are, of
course, made plain enough in the latter part of the
quotation.)
50. There is a further consideration which comes
readily to mind in any attempt to establish Locke's views
on identity viz. how his views on this fit in with his
views on the mods of duration -- with which at least one
sort of identity he deals with is clearly involved. It
is perhaps to be t ought strange that Green, who insists
on making Locke's view of identity solely the discernment
of a relation between temporally diverse terms (e.g. "Locke
shows that he really thought of the identical body under a
plurality of times."), should have failed to give closer
consideration to this, and it is a failure which we may
usefully remedy at this point.
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51. For Locke, the idea of duration is a "sort of
distance, or length, the idea whereof we get from the
fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession."
And these fleeting and perpetually perishing parts are the
idea3 which pass in succession in our mind3. He writes in
II.xiv.4.: "That we have our notion of duration and
succession from this original viz. from reflection on the
train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another
in our own 'finds, seems plain to me, in that we have no
perception of duration hut hy aonsidering the train of ideas
that take their turns in our understandings." This argu-
%
meat is illustrated hy the common example of the man who,
concentrating on one specific thing as hard as may he,
fails to have a varied succession of ideas and consequently
finds the time "shorter than it is". Algain he writes
(ibid): " ... it is to me very clear, that men derive their
ideas of duration fDom their reflections on the train of
ideas they observe to succeed one another in their own
understandings; without which observation they could have
no notion of duration, whatever may happen in the world,"
51. Locke observes further, II.xiv.9.: "This appearance
of theirs (the ideas) in train, tho?. gh perhaps it may be
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sometimes faster and sometimes slower, yet, I guess, varies
not very much in a waking man : there seem to he certain
hounds to the quickness and slowness of the succession
of these ideas one to another in our minds, "beyond which
they can neither delay nor hasten." And this observation
leads him to a point which I think is of some importance
in the maiter of the identity of individua viz, his de¬
scription of what we mean hy an "instant" i.e. that single
instant" in which we know a thing as identical with itself
and not as identical in its own manifold appearances in time.
53. He writes, instancing the case of a "cannon-bullet"
that passes through a room, II.xiv.10.: "Such a part of
duration as this, wherein we perceive 110 succession, is
that which we call an instant, and it is that which takes
up the time of only one idea^ in our minds, without the
succession of another; wherein, therefore, we perceive no
succession at all."
54. How, the importance of this passage in an
examination of C-reen's criticism of Locke, is this?
For what is involved in our having "only one idea", see
the very important considerations noted in paras 80-84
below.
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according to Green, as above, Locke confines the notion
of identity to the discernment of a relation, the terms
of which are states or aspects or appearances of a thing
in succession. Identity, that is to say, in his account,
necessarily involves duration, and this being so, we could
never know the terms of the required relation, since we
could never know them as self-identical at the instants in
which they exist as temporally diverse states or appear¬
ances of an identical thing. But in making thi3 inter¬
pretation, Green ignores the point that it is highly un¬
likely that this is what Locke actually had in mind — on
the grounds that such a description of identity does not
take account of his description of duration. According to
Locke, as above, duration involves the experience of
succession, of succession of ideas i.e. duration i3 a
sijccession of "instants", and an "instant" is that which
contains one idea, is that within which there is no
succession of ideas. STow, if it were not possible for
us to intuit the identity of such a one idea with itself,
and not in relation to anything else, then it would not be
possible for us to experience duration, since there would
be no experience of "instants" to form the succession which
is the prerequisite of "duration"; in other words, the
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duration which is required "by Green's interpretation would,
on that same interpretation, never exist as that in which
the terms of the relation he posits could "be held as diverse.
And in such case no such relation would be possible. This
is further evidence that Locke disMnguisfaes the identity
in "a is a", intuited as such, and the identity of a con¬
tinuant . The distinction is essential to his Theory of
Time, and this strengthens the rebuttal of Green's charge
that he has confused the two; a charge which in any case,
as I have demonstrated above, is a misreading of Locke.
It is unfortunate that Green, having himself Raised what
turns out to be the hazardous matter of the identity of an
individuum "at an instant", did not pause to consider what,
for Locke, is involved in "instant" and "duration".
"N
f
55. It would;1 however, be disingenuous to leave the
matter at that and without t noticing a further relevant
consideration raised by Locke's account of duration, even
althcu gh Green does not concern himself with it. And it
is this: alt hoi gh Locke's account of duration is of it as
a sum of successive, unitary instants, the units of the
sum are, as "instants , qualitatively different from the
units of a mere arithmetical sum (Cp. Gibson, op. cit. p.76.).
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Locke writes II.xv.9.: "Bvery part of duration is duration
too, and every part of extension is extension." Instants,
that is to say, which are the units which make up the sum
which is duration, are themselves, in some sense, "durations"
too;, and it might seem from tills that we would "be compelled,
paradoxically, to apply Green's analysis of Locke's account
of identity to the sort of recognition of identity ("at an
instant ) which we are maintaining is to "be distinguished
from it. Because, if there is to be duration "within the
instant", then the identity of the idea which is the content
of the instant must, presumably, be the relation of identity
between the parts of the idea, which are its appearances
within the duration of the instant. And this, appearing
contradictory, might be taken as making Locke betray our
defence of him.1
56. I think, however, that the reasonable Interpretation
of this, and resolution of the apparent difficulty, is that
Locke regards his instant as a "specious present". And
this view is strengthened and I think justified, by his
observation at II.xiv.9.; that "This appearance of theirs
(ideas) in train, thai gh perhaps it may be sometimes faster
and sometimes slower, yet, I guess, varies not very much
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in a waking man." If, now, Locke's "instant'' is to be
taken as a "specious present", then, within trie duration
of that specious present, the identity of the idea which
is its content, will be apprehended by both means. That
is to say it will be apprehended in, so to speak, a "first
orderr duration, which is duration 'within the instant",
and in this the identity of the idea will be apprehended
both as the relation of identity between its discriminable
aspects as, in the one instance, a novel psychic occurrence,
and in the other instance, as its apprehended content, and
also as the intuition of thesa terms 'simultaneously pre¬
sented; and this presentation is called "simultaneous"
because (see next paragraph) this "specious present" is
the minimum, unit of duration. And the double apprehension
will constitute the content of the instant or specious
pres nt which, with others of its kind, constitute in their
3^31 the "second order" duration in which the identity of
a continuant can be apprehended.
5'?* I do not see that this interpretation initiates a
regress or 3imply "pushes the problem one step further
back"; for i'f an instant (specious present) is that which
contains "one idea" and no succession of ideas, them, on
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Locke's view, it is the minimum which can be presented
to the nind if consciousness is to continue; and in
that case the twofold apprehension which must be assumed
to account for Locke's assertion that "every part of
duration is duration too", must be, even if twofold,
simultaneous, and, indeed, I can see no way in which, in
this application, any attribution of relative priority
could be meaningful.^ That this double and simultaneous
presentation in consciai sness is not confined to the
matter of duration and identity in Locke's account, we
shall see more fully later (see paras 92 & 157 below).
We shall find, indeed, that it pervades the whole
"plain, historical account", and a recognition of this
is of prime importance in interpreting Locke. It is
failure to observe this -- particularly, as again we shall
see later, in regard to Substance -- partly obscured s,s it
may be by the copious and well observed detail of Locke's
analysis, that leads to the historically impostant mis¬
interpretations of his doctrine.
58. It may be as well to reiterate at this point that
we are less conoerned with what, in fact, is the origin
of knowledge -- with whether it is the sort of judgement
*
kor a further study of this point see para.95 below.
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Green would have us accept, or the sort of intuition of
an idea's identity with itself that Locke would have us
accept -- than we are with establishing what Locke's views
on the matter were. The criticism of Green's inter¬
pretation i3 that as an account of Locke's views it is
highly misleading? and we seem, from the foregoing, to
have established that, for Locke, identity is both the
relation apprehended by the mind between successive
ap earances of a tiling in duration, and the intuition of the
identity of an idea with itself (subject to the conditions
of "instantaneous" apprehension described above); and
that which is the ground of the identity of those things
which are apprehended as identical by either or both of
these means (since, as we have seen, there is an important
sense in which they are simultaneous "within the instant"),
is given a3 "existence".
59. But before we can leave these questions which are
still only a necessary preliminary to the examination of
our subject proper, personal identity, we must ask the
question: what does Locke mean by"existence"? i.e. what
is the status of these sorts of thing whose 'existence"
is given as their "principium individuationis."?
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III,
HOW LOGIC! USES '"HE TEEM' "ETIGREECE" ,
60. If, in "beginning the enquiry into Locke's doctrine
of "existence", we recollect that, as we have already found,
"existence" is the Principium Individuationis -- that which
gives each thing its identity and that, of the ways in
which things nay be "identical" with themselves, subject to
this principle and without reference to the sense in which
they my be said to "exist", we have so far found in Locke
two sorts (viz. "as individua" and "as continuants"), we may
expect to find, corresponding to these two sorts of identity,
two sorts or orders of existents; and this indeed is the
case. In IV.zvii.8 h--* writes: "Every man's reasoning and
knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind;
which are truly, every one of them, particular existences
but again in Il.ii.S; he writes: "When ideas are in our minds,
we consider tham as being actually there, as well as we
consider things to be actually without us; which is that
they exist, or have existence." Shortly, that is: there
are at least two orders of existents — "ideas" and "things".
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61. Now, notoriously, the relation between these two
orders of Existence causes perplexity to Locke's readers;
and the perplexity is aggravated by every attempt to
examine his analysis either, as is almost unavoidable,
mainly from the point of view of "ideas", or mainly from
the point of view of "things". Locke does not appear
himself to take ideas as an order of existence very
seriously; the knowledge that we have that an idea exists,
either as a natural fact about a mind, or in the sense that
its content is self-identical, is "trifling" and un-
instructive. Nevertheless, since we shall, I think, be
as much concerned with ideas as "existences" as with things,
in our special enquiry into Personal Identity -- and to
remark this we must anticipate the argument — I shall
attempt to elucidate the doctrine of existence in general
by examining T.H. Green'3 critique of this doctrine,
starting, with him, with ideas as existents.
62. Green starts his criticism by noting that, for
Locke, the idea of existence itself is one of those which
"convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of
sensation and reflection" (il.vii.l), and then with
reference to the quotation already made above (para.60)
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ja *.» writs ^i«para#i;y;! -me two con31aerations Here
med, of 'ideas as actually in our minds' * of 'things
Lly as without us', are meant severally to represent
to ways of reflection and sensation, by whieh the
of existence is supposed to he suggested. But
;ion, according to Locke, is an organ of 'ideas', just
ih as reflection. Taking his doctrine strictly, there
> 'objects' hut 'ideas' to suggest the idea of existence,
»r by the way of sensation or by that of reflection,
> ideas that are not 'in the mind'". Now this is not
r promising start, for it seems to me to be an obvious
-erpretation. Green is attempting to short-circuit
s argument by producing the equation: idea *
iion * idea « reflection, therefore there is only one
of existente and that is ideas as natural facts
•ing in minds. That this is unacceptable as an
it of Locke's meaning we can see even from his initial
lent on "ideas" as well as from his subsequent usages,
i Introduction to the Essay he writes: "It (idea)
that term which, I think, serves best to stand for
ever is the object of the understanding when a man
, I have used it to express whatever it is the mind
employed about in thinking? and I could not avoid
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frequently using it." In other words, Locke avers that
his intention is to produce a phenomenology of mind, and
among its phenomena will "be included images, percepts,
notions, c ncepts, phantasms etc , and he admits that any
phenomenon is liable, at his convenience, to be referred
to as an "idea". But this does not mean that the
.phenomena- are of a uniform ' ind. They are all the same
perhaps in that each is a phenomenon in experience, but
they may and do differ in form and content. To emphasise
the diversity of the phenomena to be included under the
✓ i
term "idea", we may go on to notice his painstaking
discrimination between those phenomena which are "ideas of
reflection", and those which are "ideas of sensation".
In Il.vi.l he names such things as "remembrance", "dis¬
cerning", "judging1, "knowledge", "faith", as instances of
reflection. Ideas of sensation, on the other hand, are
such things as "yellow", "white", "heat", "cold", "soft",
'hard'1, "bitter", "sweet" (II.i.3), and these are "distinct
perceptions of things" i.e. the ideas of sensations carry
with them, or may do so, a reference to external objects.
How, whether or not these ideas of sensation do actually
car -y this reference with them is, for the present, quite a
different matter. Clearly enough Locke is of the opinion
-47-
that they do. Consequently it i3 not legitimate to slur
over this distinction among the phenomena of experience
which he has "been at pains to males. An idea of reflection
is e.g., a "remembering" (of whatever the remembrance may
be), or a "reasoning" (about whatever the reasoning may be),
or a "discerning" (no matter what is discerned), whereas
an idea of sensation is e.g., an experience of the colour
"green" visually (which is of, or in, or caused by a
specific object), or of the taste called "bitter" gustatorily
(which is of, or in, or caused by a specific bitter thing)
etc.. Among the distinctions Locke is trying to make is
this, that these two sorts of idea differ in respect of
their content. The contents of ideas of sensation are, in
a sense, the more stable, since they refer always beyond
themselves to those things which they are "of"; con¬
sequently their contents are limited by the range of the
order of things which is revealed through them -- those
elements, extrinsical to the mind in which the ideas have
their "own" natural existence, which constitute the universe
or "nature". And this, of course, is why the mind has no
control over the series of ideas of sensation presented to it.
In II.ii.2 Locke writes: "The same inability will everyone
find in himself, who shall go aboiat to fashion in his
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understanding one simple idea, not received in Ms senses
from external objects, or "by reflection from the operation
of hi? own mind about them." Cp. also 11.12.
64, The contents of ideas of reflection, on the other
hand, are, from the same sort of view, less stable. Such
contents are "reasonings'' or "discernings" etc. on the part
of the subject? they include every activity which can fall
under the two most general headings (ll.vi.l) of Perception
and Volition, An idea.of reflection may be the mind's
"reasoning about" the redness and sweetness of a fruit, or
the mindfs "choosing between" eating it or refraining from
eating it. The content of the idea ?nay be altered by the
nature of the content of the ideas of sensation "about
which" the reasoning is, and the limitation of the range of
these ideas "about -which" we reason, which we noticed above,
and whatever limits there may be on the conative or
ratiocinative potential of the mind, may set a limit to the
possible content of ideas of reflection, but they (the
contents) are still less stable than those of ideas of
sensation in that the order of their occurrence is not
determined as is that of sensation. I may choose to eat
the fruit or merely to admire it, I may reason about it in
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thia way, or in that, or I may not reason ahout it at all.
The second order of existents does not control the suc¬
cession of ideas of reflection, because no p rt of their
contents is a thing extrinsical to the trdnd in which they
occur.
65. If this is so, and I believe it properly represents
Locke's view, then although it may he possible to say that
all ideas are the same in that they are experienced phen¬
omena, it is not possible to reduce one order of them to
another. That is to say, an idea of sensation is not the
"same as" an idea of reflection, on Locke's view, because
the idea of sensation, itself a natural fact, has a content
which reveals (by whatever means) an object, while an idea of
reflection, also itself a natural fact, has a content which
reveals (by whatever means) a mind. Merely to say, ignoring
these considerations, that they are the same thing and that
therefore there is only one order of ©xistents, and to do
this in the first paragraph of a discussion which is pre¬
cisely concerned with whether there ijs more than one order
of existents, is moat assuredly to beg the question.
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66. In amplification of this criticism, Green continues
by accusing Locke (1.30 et seq.) of failing to distinguish
between the meaning of existence as simpl° consciousness
(i.e. ideas existing as natural facts), and its meaning as
"reality , and his argument runs thus: existence is given
(on Locke's showing) in every act and mode of consciousness.
It is inseperab e from mere feeling. Yet it is at the same
time a distinguishable, simple idea. (Fore about this anon —
meanwhile I shall only state Green's contention less tortu¬
ously, I hope, than it appears in the original). Of this
distinct simple idea it is impossible to say anything. It
is present together with all objects of consciousness and is
never absent so that it can be distinguished from all other
objects of consciousness by its absence. It is not given
through one of the senses rather than the others, nor in any
of them as distinct from the s-nsual presentation itself.
It has no separate determination. (One might have expected
Green to remark, by the way, that there is implicit in this —
and his account here is sufficiently correct -- an anticip¬
ation of uegel's observation about the relation of Pure Being
and Not-Being; but he does not do so.) Every idea, whether
of a rose, a centaur, or the Law of Gravitation, exists.
Yet, complains Green, we find Locke distinguishing "between
ideas that "have a conformity with the existence of things"
and other ideas which have no such eonformity. How, his
question ih, is this distinction to "be squared with the
attribution of existence to every idea?
67. The only answer, he correctly maintains, is that a
distinction has supervened in the meaning of "existence".
In one case reference is to what Locke calls "real actual"
existence, and in the other to the indefeasible ""xistence"
of the idea as a natural fact; having, as above, taken the
precaution of denying the possibility of such a distinction
»
it i3 not surprising that Green finds the contradiction
irresoluble.
68. The substance of this criticism from two different
important aspects, though remaining based on the same
illicit assumption, appears in the continuation of Green's
argument viz, a) in a consideration of complex ideas as
distinct from simple ideas, and b) in a consideration of
the complex idea of cub3tance. (Op. cit. para3 31-39).
69. In dealing with the first, consideration, Green
notes that in Boo1" II Locke makes the "grand distinction"
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between those "complex ideas which are the workmanship of
the mind'' and the "simple ideas which are all from thing3
themselves, and of which the mind can have no more or other
than what are suggested to it." He eledts to attack the
problem this time from the side of complex ideas and, in
particular, of bodes. He notes that "modes", "substances",
and "relations", as enumerated by Locke (lI.xii.4-5) are not,
as described by Locke, mutually exclusive classes but are
variously interdependant (loc. cit.), without considering
the possibility that Locke is, inconsistently if you like,
compelled to deal with them seriatim owing to the natural
recalcitrance of what he was trying to write about viz. the
phenomena of experience, and not owing to ineptitude. In
criticising the doctrine of modes, Grem fixes firmly on to
the "workmanship of the mind" of the quptation above. If,
he says, simp]g modes are complex ideas, then they are the
workmanship of the mind. Yet Locke 3ays that the ideas of
such simple modes as sound, or colour, or (more importantly)
space, are given. They are among the data of experience.
And this antithesis, says Green, between what the mind "makes"
and what it takes from "existing things", must binrply be
left. If, he argues, the simple modes are taken from
"existing things' then, indeed, they are simple and our ideas
of them are simple ideas. But Locke's account of tnem
is that they are made up of "different combinations of the
same simple idea without the mixture of any other." If
our ideas of simple modes are so compounded, then they are
"fictions of the mind", and must necessarily be so since
their composition involves relation (e.g. the conjunction
of "parts" of space), and relations are "fictions of the
mind"j therefore as such they exist only as "ideas" exist;
if they were, in the required sense, simple, and "taken
from existing things" then perhaps they would belong to
another order of existents, o£ at least make veridical
reference to it, although even then as "taken from
existing things", they would refer to these "things" as
causes and be causally related to them, and since "cause"
just as much as other relations is a fiction, there would
still not be, a3 suits Green's interpretation, any other
order of existents,
70. In passing to a consideration of our complex idea
oi substance, in which his argument (still in essentials
the same) is most fully developed, Green notes that in the
fundamentals of our knowledge, the "existing tilings" which
are being supposed by Locke as the condition of our
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experience, it is the fiction-raaking activity of the
mind in relational thought, in discernment of causal
relations, and most of all, in the apprehension of
substance, that 3hews itself, and ''things of the mind"
(i.e. ideas existing only as natural facts) keep ousting
"real existence"*
71. This version of Green's argument runs thus:
according to Locke there are two distinct stories about
our idea of substance. In the first instance, he tells
us (ll.xxiii.l) that this idea is formed by our taking
notice that certain of the great number of simple ideas
presented to us either in sensation or by reflection
constantly "to together". And to these complexes we,
"for quick despatch" give a name, tending to think of that
which is so named as one simple idea, whereas i6 can be
analysed into many constituents. And this is so because
we "cannot imagine how" these ideas can exist by themselves
and consequently suppose a substratum for them to rest in,
from which they obtain a sufficiently stable individuation
for them to be so named.
7^. There is, however, another and rather more com¬
plicated account of the idea, which is given in the course
of the controversy with Stillingfleet which arose out of
this chapter. And according to this a distinction is to
"be raa.de between two usages of the term "substance". In
the first place there are ideas of "distinct substances"
e.g. of "man", "horse" etc.; and in the second, there
is the general idea of substance. How, in I^.xxiii.l
he must be talking about the first sort of substance e.g.
the various ideas that "go together" to make up what is
named "horse", "man" etc., which cannot be imagined as
existing only in themselves as ideas only as members
of the first class of existents. Ho ;, then, about the
general idea of substance? How do we come by it?
73. As has been seen, the idea of a particular sub¬
stance is got by noting how certain ideas go together to
make or signify named "things , but, among those ideas
that so go together, according to Locke, the "first and
chief" is that of a "substratum which we accustom ourselves
to suppose" i.e. precisely the general idea of substance.
How, Green points out, we are in the position of having
~~he general idea of substance as prior to any particular
idea of a substance. Eut, on the other hand, Locke seems
to suggest that it i3 the general idea of substance that
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is formed gradually "by the observation that certain
groups of simple ideas do go together. That is to
say, the general idea of substance is derived from the
observation of sets of simple ideas united in or issuing
from substances, by abstraction: but before even such
sets of ideas can be so observed, the general idea of
substance must have already been formed i.e. the general
idea of substance is to be derived from particular ideas
of substances which cannot exist unless what Locke purports
to derive from them, as posterior, is instead prior to
them as a condition of their existence. Either the
argument is perfectly circular, or the two ideas of
substance are obtained by two processes which, according
to Green, Locke sometimes identifies and at others regards
as independant. "But by whatever process .we try to
account for the complex idea of substance, whether
particular or general, there is a main objection yet to
come, and it is the same as that which Green nas used on
the ti^o previous occasions.
• This time the objection takes the form of a
consideration of the abstraction" by which the idea of
substance is formed. It is pointed out (Op. cit. para 39)
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that for Locke "abstraction" means the "separation of
an idea from all other ideas that accompany it in its
real existence." (il.xii.l). And in the reference of
this to the question of substance, Green quotes from
the first epistle to Stillingfleet that the "general
indetermined idea of something is by the abstraction of
the mind derived from the simple ideas of sensation and
reflection." Wow, if abstraction is as in Il.xii, and
if the idea of substance (i.e. either of the ideas of
substance) is derived by abstraction from the simple
ideas of sensation and/or reflection, then it is certain
that t he idea of substance must be given with such simple
ideas in order that it may be separated from them. But
in that case the simple ideas of sensation and reflection
are not simple at all but compound. (This "simplicity"
-- about which more anon -- is King Charles's Head for
Green.) Apart from that consideration, however, what is
the difference to be between the idea of substance "as
given" in the (apparently deceptively) simple ideas, and
the idea of substance "as abstracted" therefrom? If it
is given among or through the data of experience, why should
it be made again by "abstraction and recomplication"?
Yhat is implied, once again, in the question is, of course,
this: if the idea of substance is "given" at the level of
sensation, then substance, that which gives reality to
"things", is only an idea of the same order as ideas of
sensation and as such "exists" only in the first order
of existents -- ideas as natural facts -- and there is
no other order of existents; whereas, on the other hand,
if the idea of substance obtained by "abstraction and
recomplicatlon" is an artifact or fiction of the mind,
then likewise, like all other complex general ideas, it
"exists" only at the same level i.e. the first order of
existents and, once again, there is no other order. And
Locke's descriptions, whether they will or no, are fitted
into Green's schema which is controlled by the pre-
assumption which we noted abova (para.62).
75. When he comes to sum up his rather repetitive
argument in paras 50-51 of his "Introduction", Green
catalogues the following contradictions, as he finds
them, in Locke's doctrine of existence, particularly
with reference to the version concerned with Substance:
I. A. mhe idea of'substance is an abstract
general idea not "given" but "invented"
but B. the ideas ("given") from which by "Ab¬
straction" it is "invented", are only
real as ideas of "something" (« substance),
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therafore, the "invented idea'' is pre¬
supposed in the given.
IT. A, The general idea of substance being
"invented" by "abstraction", it must ba
given in. con junction with the other
ideas from, which it is abstracted,
but B. in such conjunction the idea "as given"
is constitutive of the ideas of particular
substances which are subsequent to the
general idea,
therefore, what must be subsequent must
also be prior to the "invention"•
III. A. The "given" experience from which the
"abstraction" is made i.e. "particular
substances', is, as such, constituted by
relations which must, then, be "given" too,
but 33. what is "given" is "real existence" precisely
opposed to "inventions of the understanding"
such as relations.
IV. A. The "giiren", as simple ideas made for and
ttot bjr us, is really existent, and general
and complex ideas are the "workmanship of
the mind" which consists in the separation
of ideas from each other and from that to
which they are related as qualities,
but B. since, in order that this "workmanship" may
operate, the general Idee, (that to which
ideas are related as qualities) and the
complex idea of "qualities of something"
must previously exist (be given), then it is
the general and complex which is "real" and
'feiven 'I f
therefore, once again, the idea is both
given and constructed.
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76. So much, then, for an account, as straightforward
es way "be, of Green's critique of Looks's doctrine of
existence? and it seems formidable. Fortunately, however,
for Locke's thesis and our patience, Green's arguments are
founded on a radical misconception about Locke's theory
of knowledge .-♦« a misconception which, we might note, is
not singular to Green but which is shared by the tribe of
Locke's less discerning critics e.g. Bugald Stweart,
Hamilton, Cousin etc.. And this misconception — for
which there is very little excuse in Locke's text — is
concerned with the nature and origin of those phenomena
of experience which Locke calls (a) "simple", and (b)
"complex" or "compound" ideas.
77. Green has noted (l. p-ra.34) that, in his inter¬
pretation, the attempt to br^ak out from the isrder of ideas
to the order of things is haunted by the spectre of our
t
"complex idea of substance" which will not be exorcised,
and the point of the problems raised, by this inimical
haunting is, as we have seen above, that the idea of
substance, to be derived from ideas, must first be given
with the id»a3, so that the ideas from which it is derived
can never be "simple" ideas, and Locke says that they are
"simple" ideas. This is the mainspring of Green's criticism.
78. It must "be admitted that Locke is less than
ideally clear in the expression of his opinions on just
this point which is shrouded in the celebrated
ambiguities in his use of "idea" ~~ but then, as one
might be tempted to remark with feeling, Green is not
in a good position from which to impute blame to others
for obscurity of expression." However, apart from such
a "tu quoque", the point is to be made that Locke's
usages suggest that he was unaware of the sort of
difficulty his critics were to find. By this I mean
that although Loo'-e does not at any one point state:
"There are two usages of the term 'simple idea' viz.
a...... and b % he may genuinely have thought that
a distinction between the sorts of thing he was describing
was sufficiently made in his description as it stands --
as, indeed, I think it is. A fair amount of "ambiguity"
is accounted for, I think, by lack of attention on the
part of some of his readers, and although I would not lay
that particular charge against Green, who is conscientious
with the text, he does shew the same determination,
amounting to perversity, to accept the mere verbal contra¬
diction of phrases, preposterously insulated from their
context, as refutations of elaborately argued, positions,
which is displeasingly characteristic of the trivial
logomachy of Hamilton and the ITrenehaian Cousin. To
make the ©Large more precise, we must notice that a
radical distinction is to "be made between Locke'3 simple
idea as the "atom" of epist.emic analysis, and his simple
idea as the "given".
79. Admittedly, Locke does not say this in these
words* if he had, we would be without those inter¬
pretations of the history of philosophy which describe
Locke's doctrine as leading to Berkeley's idealism or
that position which Hume at least sometimes held, from
which the only refuge is, in the steps of the master,
historical studies and backgammon. In other words, it
is the ignoring of this distinction — which I think
Locke makes sufficiently plain -- that leads to the
epistemological "atomism" which is, much more than
Locke's "cdtaplex idea of substance", the unappeasable
shade that haunt3 and unnerves empiricist discussion
even till the era of the sense-datura.
30. But even if Looka did not make the distinction as
summarily as I do at the end of para.7 8 above, he says
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plainly, I think, the same thing in effect. The crux
of the matter is this; the "simple idea" as the
"epistemologist's atom" is not the same as the simple
ideas whioh are furnished to consciousness as its
primordial d&ta. The content of a simple idea as "given"
may he to varying degrees diversified. I shall hope to
shew that the "simple"idea as datum must have a diversified
content and that the simple idea as an "atom" is non-natural
and must he made hy abstraction -- and that, as Locke
says, this abstraction, as a matter of fact, is only
partially possible.
81. In Il.xii.l. Locke writes; "As simple ideas are
observed to exist in several combinations united together,
so the mind has a power to consider several of them united
together as one idea." How, let us be careful with the
grammar of this sentence. Locke is saying that EVEH AS
some ideas do go together "as given", SO THEST the mind
can consider other ideas as "going together". In other
words there is a distinction between data of diversified
content, and constructs of diversified content which we
may make for ourselves; and to emphasise the distinction
Locke writes at the end. of the succeeding paragraphs
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"But when it (the mind) has once got these simple ideas,
it is not confined "barely to observation, and what offers
itself from without' it con, "by its own power, put
together those ideas it has, and make new complex ones,
which it never received so united." But, it might he
said, hare Locke is talking avowedly about complex ideas
and not about simple ones. This is so? nevertheless the
point is to be made that, according to Locke, simple ideas
exist in "combinations united together" and they apparently
can be "received so united". In other words simple ideas
as (abstractly) "atona", are, as* data,, given "as compounded";
whereas the same simple ideas as (abstractly) "atoms" trhen
recompounded by the creative imagination are "complex"
ideas; and, as the distinction is sometimes put, these
latter are made "by" us, and the former "for" us. If it
is still said that this is concerned only with "complex
ideas and answers no questions about simple ones, it must
be pointed out that it is necessary to begin here both to
shew Locke's distinction between "the given" and the elements
into which subsequently it may be analysed, and to vindicate
his description against the extravagance of such criticisms
as Green's which attempt to foist upon him an impossible
atomism , e.g. such criticisms as this of Green's; (I.
para.65) "The particular existence which he instances as
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i
'testified to' is that of 'such a collection of simple
ideas as is wont, to "be called man'. "But, these ideas can
only be present in succession. Lven the surface of the
man's body can only be taken in by successive acta of
vis ion and, more obviously, the 3tat.es of consciousness
in which his qualities of motion and action are presented
occupy separate times. If then sensation only testifies
to an existence present along with it, how can it testify
to the co-existence (say) of an erect attitude, of which I
have * present sight, with t"e risibility I saw a minute
ago? How can the 'collection of' ideas wont to be called
nan", as co-existing, be formed at all? and, if it cannot,
how can the pre ent existence of an object so-called be
testified to by sense any more than the past.w This sort
of criticism, as I say, could only be produced by someone
who has not read, cr who is determined to ignore, what
Locke plainly states about the data of experience? nor
does Ireen palliate this Particular extravagance by his
references to II.vii.9 and. xiv. "• in support of the merely
successive occurrence of ideas for only if "simple" ideas
were what Locke does not say they are, but what Green
assumes they are, would thesn passages be any support.
Certainly our ideas, as the data of experience, are
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successive, and Locke say3 so; "but that is not the same
as sayi"ng that 'there is, and only is, a succession of
I
atoms." (That no moment 01* instance of experience could
ever he of a simple "atomic" idea alone, remains to he
demonstrated below.)
81. To amplify our thesis that Locke sufficiently
distinguishes the idea as datum and the idea as atom, on
the line started by the quotation in para.80 above, we
should note that not, only does Locke say that certain
phenomena, which can subsequently and analytically be
regarded as "atomic" ideas, do in fact "go together",
but also that certain of them are in immutable combination.
For example; in II.xii.25 "the idea of extension joins
itself inseparably with all visible and most tangible
qualities." Again in Il.iii.l we r^ad of "Simple ideas
suggested to the understanding by all the ways of Sensation
and Reflection." Again, in II.vii.2 and 3 "delight1 and
"uneasiness" ",foin themselves to" and are "concomitant"
of ."almost ail our ideas both of sensation and reflection."
Or, even more pertinently, in II.vii.7: "T5xistance and
unity are two other ideas that are suggested to the under¬
standing by every obeect without and every idea within."
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Again, in II.yii.8j ''Power is another of these simple
idea3 which we resolve from sensation and reflection."
Again, in IT.xiii.26: ''There is not any object of
sensation or reflection w ich does not carry with it the
idea of one." And as to "number", in Il.xvi.l he writes:
Lyery object our senses are employed about, e^ery idea in
our understanding, every thought of ovr mind, brings this
idea along with it." rn II.xiv.2: "As for toe idea of
finite, there is no great difficulty. The obvious
portions of extension that affect our senses, carry with
thy;.', into the mind the idea of finite ..." And, to finish
off, we may repeat the quotation from ll.vii.7 with which
Green, for opposite purposes, commences his argument:
"When ideas are in our minds we consider them as being
actually there, as well, as wo consider tilings to be actually
without us, which is that they exist or have existence;
and whatever we consider as one thing, whether a real being
or an idea, suggests to the understanding the idea of unity."
a
83. If, against the contention that, as Locke makes
clear above, simple ideas are not experienced as such, in
t' 3ir 3imp11 city, but always in combinations in one or
various of the senses and together with such necessary
concomitants as ideas of existence, unity, etc., and are
in fact only experienced rn their simplicity after and
"by means of the analysis of the percepts, images, concepts,
etc.ra which, in'another vocabulary, make up f oe phenomena
of experience, it is urged that in II.ii ,1 Locke distinctly
says: ''And there is nothing can he plainer to a ran than
the clear and distinct perception he has of these simple
ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains
in it nothing "but one uniform appearance, or conception
in the mind, and is not distinguished into different ideas."
then the answer is that this says, in fact, nothing against
the present contention. The crucial phrase, as I see it,
is ''one uniform appearence." But what are these "uniform
appearances"? If we look at the context of this passage,
we fine" that what is being talked about is the set of ideas
of sensation, which may be present simultaneously through
different senses, of one object e.g. the vmrrath and softness
of a piece of wax or, more generally, the motion and colour
of something. Yet, says Locke, these ideas though united
IH presentation are perfectly distinct, but it is not
suggested that they are presented singly, atomically, and
"distinctly". "hat is presented is not the "coldness" of
ice, or the "hardness" of ice, but the "cold-hard ice";
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not the "perfume ' of a lily and the "whiteness" of a lily
in succession, hat the "white, perfumed lily". Admittedly
the "whiteness", the "perfume , the 'hardr >S2!i, the "cold¬
ness" can he considered apart art distinct from the rest of
the datum e.g. we can distinguish the "hardness" of ice
as an 'atomic'' idea, provided that the "cold-hard ice"
continues to he presented to us. Indeed, all this
•
passage does is to underline again the crucial distinction
'between "simple" as "given and simple as "abstraction".
34. Shirther to this, we might fall to the speculation —
and it is one which might have profited Green and others --
"what possibly could, a completely "simple" idea he? and how
could it he experienced?" .'hat, for instance, would, ha
the completely simple idea of sensation called "green" as
expert enced? If' we do what in ordinary language is
called "locking at a coohing apple' we have, ccording to
this sort of analysis, an idea, among others, of green.
"here is presented to us a complex, one element of which
is the Idea of sensation "green". The complex is made up
of this idea together with others. But what of the
"simple" idea of "green" i.e. of green" or this green"
as an epistemologioal atom? "This green" is, we seem, com¬
pelled to say. a "patch" of a specific dolour or an "area"
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of it. It is a piece of, or a superficies of, "gre^n"
extending to left and right and up and down, or from north
to south and east to west, or at lea.it in relation to some
spatial coordinates. And. this is precisely the point.
The simple idea of green is, as presented, (whatever it may
be in abstraction), extended green, or it is nothing. But
if it is, then it cannot be the simp!o idea "green" after
all, because there is diocriminable in it, colour and
extension. Therefore the completely glmple idea of green
is never given? nor did Locke ever suggest that it was.
Likewise with ta.ct.ua! sensation; the smoothness of the
cooking apple must be presented as extended, or it is
nothing. The simple idea "smoothness" is never presented.
No simple idea which has a visual or tactual content can
ever be "simple" as an epistem logical atom would have to
be simple? it can only be presented with and, through the
mode of extension. In the case of simple ideas (in the
sense of data) whose content is not visual or tactual but
is e.g. auditory, although the idea may not have to be
presented with s.nd through the mode of extension (thereby
destroying its abstract "simplicity"), it does have to be
presented with and through the sister mode of duration,
or it is nothing? nd if its duration and auditory content
are diecriminable, then it is not simple as an atom is simple,
nor could it "b« experienced as such# ..likewise, as Loc^e
very properly roints out, with 'existence". uot only
does my "simple idea" of gre^n (as a datum.) have a content
diversified into colour and. extortion, hut a. so into
col our, extension, and what in abstraction can be dis-
cr:rainated 0.3 its existing now. If t is is not so, then
T a- involved in saying "I now have an idea of green which
T do not have." And this remark does not seem to require
further comment.
85. For all of this there is, as we have seen above,
ample warrant in Locke's text. "he conclusion, roundly,
is that according to Locke no moment of consciousness is
or can be solely occupied by any "simple" idea in its
simplicitySo far from being an 'atom'', locke's simple
idea (a3 datu®) has tae foliowing minirnum concomitants --
at least as refers to simple ideas of sensation — s
a discriminable sensual content,
a modal vehicle of extension and duration
an idea of its existence as a natural fact,
and nothing less is, or can be, experienced# These are
"j ' """ ' ' " " ' ' ' ~
-hat, indeed, we may have, during the ratiocinative
activity of abstraction, is a simple idea of reflection
(sea para.c6 be': ow) part of the content of which is the
"abstracting" itself as ob.ject, but not a simple idea of
what ''is abstracted".
what must be present in. any datura. Loche contends that
other things are, sometimes, also presents but that remains
to be considered.
86. So far we have been considering the simple idea
as datum principally from the side of simple ideas of
sensation. If we turn now to the consideration of them
from the side of simple ideas of reflection, we can see
that, obviously, the minimal condition of presentation in
the mode of extension will not apply. A simple idea of
reflection is, as we have seen, of a "reasoning" or
"believing" etc., and it is "of" such an operation as an
object, (II.i.8): "th e understanding turning inwards upon
itself, and ma>lng its own operations the object of its
own contemplation." The content, then, of a simple idea
of reflection is the "operation" as an operation and distinct
from the material operated upon end from any other phenomena#!,
having an independant existence perhaps after analysis,
which may be generated by or during the operation. But,
as such, it must, lilre all other simple ideas as data, be
presented in and through the simple mode of duration and
with +he simple idea of existence. That it must be subject
to the mode of duration, as presented, follows from the fact
that a "reasoning , for example, involves the passage of
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awareness from one phenomenon to another in the course of
a. discursive activity -- and Locke is at pains to establish
that t!i-o mind "con compare" — which at the sane time holds
the matter of the reasoning, diverse as successive* together
in the operation which is the obiect of the simple idea
of it. If it is objected that, this might not apply to
such a simple idea of reflection as "discerning we must
revert to the analysis given much earlier (para.56 above)
where it, wa seen that even to know the identity of a single
idea with itself "within the instant , there was, involved,
on Locke'• v^ew of the simple node of duration, a second
order succession within a specious present; which only
emphasises the present thesis that any simple idea of re¬
flection cannot, in presentation, he "simple" as the ab¬
straction "'an atomic idea" may be considered to be simple.
87. Sow, as we must keep in mind, the whole purpose
of this present argument is to rebut Green's charge that
for Locke there can be only one order of existente viz.
ideas as natural facts, a criticism grounded on the
contention that the simple ideas from combinations of
which Locke purports to derive information about other
orders of axistents ('things" and "minds"), -re not simple,
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ond that therefore the analysis is wrong. Co far we have
established that Green ha. misread Locke in attributing
to hi " c. view of the given? in and from which knowledge
of these other existents is obtained, which makes it
c nsist of ideas having a sort of ''simplicitywhich
Locks never suggests end which it is demonstrably im¬
possible to n---i--risnce. If, therefore, toeke' s
phenoraenological an-lysis is wrong -- the analysis,
that is? of the phenomena of experience into ideas -'of"
tMy?ye, 'of" minds, and. "of other ideas — then it is
cert, inly not wrong on the ground ■ Green ha.: to shew.
88. Having identified the coirs'1 of this important
misreading of Locke, we should now restate hie doctrine
of existence in form which avoid j the consequences of it.
'
'e may note that, a3 n matter of history, it was not
left for Locke 's later critics alone to misthterpret him
through inattention to his use of the word, "idea". A
fair part of the first letter to Stillingfleet is taken
up by &• patient attempt to make the point that 'idea"
refers to a great many thing:: which :'<ust form the greater
part of any van's experience, including Stillingfleet's,
and among that greater o rt is experience of the existence
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of objacts and "ninds. Locke writes (VorVs If.th ed.
vol. IV p -7); "Fay, as long an t.h^re is any simple idea
or sensible quality left, according to nry; way of arguing,
substance cannol "be discarded- because all simpl0 ideas,
all sensible dualities, carry with then:- a supposition of
a su' strutu- to exist in, and of a substance wherein they
inhere? and of this that chapter (ll.rxiii.) is so full,
that I cb,?llency any one who reads it to think I hare
almost, or one jot discarded substance out of the reason¬
able port of the world. And to emphasise the point
further t' ' 'simple: ideas" are rot. what both Stilling-
fleet no Green -ould. have them, Locke quotes himself from
.xxiii.?9 as saying that: "sensat ion convinces us that
there are solid extended substances: and reflection, that
there are- thinking onps."
Fow, in terms of the present account of Locke's
position, these things amount to this: the data of
orurn - .ry expert ^noa, of which a plain historical account
is oeinw given, are to be called "ideas And, for the
purpose of giving a plain, historical account, these
'
L7 be re'-srhe", and talked of, as relative unities -
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to avoi~-- a mora dangerous term*1 But within these
relatively unitary idea there is diversi ty of content
constituted "by el emento which are diacriminaol e only in
u>otraotio- and n *ro-- in experience. Pot' only do these
elements, iridisso'.'ubly united as experienced, include,
when catalogued in abstraction, "duration ', 'self-
identity11, and sometimes "extension , as well us in some
oae33 • 3 *nsua! content no m •••? exoerienceeQcfi e in its
simplicity then t ey, hut also sometimes, Locke is here
saving, a giveri reference to, or representation of, an
order of entities of the same degree of unity with them,
vit which t-' -yy •/.re intimately and indissolubly and
disceraibly c nn-cted — i.e. "physical" and "mental or
spiritual" things. That is to say, the diversified
content of the unitary idea e.g. 'of a green object"
contains an awareness (by no means precise and clear —
which is gooc" observation on Locke's part) of the object,
but. the awareness of the object can no more be experienced
and 30 contemulated, as itself apart from 'its" greei>-ness
"j ——™ —— ' — — '
To guard ourselves against misunderstandings to which
otkrr-s have ho en prone, 3 may note t hat, Historically, this
way of speaking for that purpose is justified, whether in
Locke's case it '-/as "inevitable" or no, on the grounds that
it employs what, -v a for Locke's readers a.- well as himself
tbo current eoucaf ®d vocabulary founded on tli« terminology
and usa.ies of the 'atomic , 'compositional" metaphysics of
the 17th Century — for which elucidation we are indebted
to Professor Gibson.
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than can the green-ness itself (i.e. the sensual content)
be experienced and do contemplated apart from (as we have
shewn) "its" extension and duration. Not all such ideas
necessarily have this element in their diversified content --
it is not necessary as duration is necessary; because
among the phenomena of experience there can be such
relatively unitary ideas (their unity subject, as ever, to
the minimal conditions noted) which are revived by the
mind from previous presentations of only similar ideas
which then did contain this element, but which now, as
revived ideas, do not, — liVewise with "imagined" and
constructed ideas which the mind may compound out of
such revived ideas. Nevertheless, all such derivative
phenomena in consciousness ultimately, as Locke clearly
says, terminate and, are grounded in ideas which originally
contain this element in them. But although it is not
necessary that this "element" (as it is in abstraction)
should be pres nt in all relatively unitary ideas of the
order of "idea of a green object", it is important to note
that in certain other relatively unitary ideas which may
be distinguished farom these, there is, and must be, always
present a similar element viz. an awareness of a "mental"
or "spiritual ' thing (again by no means precisely and
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clearly). In other words, although a simple idea of
sensation may in some cases -- e.g. when it is, or is part
of, a memorial image -- lack this element, a simple idea
of reflection can never have a diversified content that
lacks it. A "simple" idea of reflection is a relatively
unitary idea containing, necessarily, "duration" and "self-
identity' as w^ll as e.g. a "believing" or "discerning"
(or in general a volition or perception) as an ob,ject,
and the awareness that it is mine i.e. that it is in, or
of, "my mind". Locke is abundantly clear that all con¬
sciousness includes self-consciousnes3 i.e. that t'ni3
element is always present in simple ideas of reflection
as experienced. (See, e.g., para.123 below).
In brief, among the data of ordinary experience are
included awareness of physical things" and awareness of
"spiritual beings" which are part and parcel of "ideas"
and whic are not isolabls from them in experience, and
which as abstractions are awkward to talk about.
90. But this is obviously not all that there is to
Locke's account, which is much less simple and more
accurate; and perhaps this has only been too obvious to
his hostile critics who, like Green, have found the
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eladoration of his account we are now going to consider,
merely an irreconcilable contradiction with the foregoing.
It is maintained above that, according to Locke,
knowledge of existence i.e. of orders of existents other
than of "ideas as axistents", is given, however obscurely,
among the data of experience i.e. in and through the
"ideas" which are the data -- and, as we have seen, it is
not much more mysterious or elusive than is "green-ness
as such alone, or "duration" as such alone, about which
there appears to be greater confidence. But our knowledge
of other existents consists in more than this. An
examination of the constitutive phenomena of our experience
reveals, according to Locke, general ideas of substance
and of substances which are other thap, and over and above,
that awareness of objects (and spirits) which is dis-
criminable but not isolable (Like ■qualitioc) in the given.
Q*Jr C<%
91. Before we examine this further, let us take the
preliminary precaution of noting that when Locke talks of
this phenomenon, or of these phenomena, it is unsafe to
presuppose that he is talking about the same thing as we
have been considering above. He is in fact examining
another sort of phenomenon which, together with what we
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hav^ already examined, is found to occur in our experience
\srhen we sxa ine it carefully for the purpose of giving a
plain, historical account thereof.
A little further on in the first letter to Stilling-
fleet from the point we last quoted (i.e. Works Vol.IV
p.19) Locke writes: " for I have never said that
the general idea of substance comes in by sensation and
reflection; or, that it is a simple idea of sensation or
reflection, though it is ultimately founded in them: for
it is a complex idea, made up of the general idea of some¬
thing, or being, with the relation of a support to accidents.
For general ideas come not into the mind by sensation or
reflection, but are the creatures or inventions of the
understanding, as* I think, I have shown; and also, how
the mind makes them from ideas, which it ha3 got by
sensation and reflection: and as to the ideas of reflection,
ho'vir the mind forms them, and how they are derived from, and
ultimately terminate in, ideas of sensation and reflection,
I have likewise shown." What Locke is talking about here
is one order of the phenomena of our experience which is
not "given" as those we considered formerly are given.
Prom this and from what is said in para.90 above, it is
obvious that I must disagree with the emphasis at least of
Professor Gibson'3 interpretation (op.cit. p.92).
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They are the results of the operation of consciousness
itself on the given-in-consciouaness. They are the
ideas" resulting from discursive activity exercised about
other ideas e.g. "of objects" and "of mental operations",
and are, certainly in a sense, derivatives of these. These
"ideas of" having been given in the way we have seen, this
latter sort of idea is constructed from them, and they
(the latter sort) are "founded" and "terminate" in. them,
but are not given with them. In particular, the complex
idea /hioh is the abstract general idea of substance is thu3
derived from what is given (and this, most importantly,
includes an awareness of objects - things and minds) and it
i3 a VQlative idea i.e. it is the idea "of" a non-ideal
i
correlate to these originally given ideas, and this is
something quite distinct from the given element of "thing-
hood" or "mind" in the original ideas, the correlate of
which we are now considering. Again in the first letter
we read (Vol.IV p.2l); "The ideas of these qualities and
actions, or powers, are perceived by the mind to be of
themselves inconsistent with existence...... Hence the mind
pei-ceives their necessary connection with inherence or
being supported; which being a relative idea superadded to
the red colour in a cherry, or to thinking in a man, the
mind frames the correlative idea of a support." The
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content of this complex idea, then, consists of the terms
of a relation, and one terminal of the perceived relation
is the series of "first order" id'as in the given, and the
other is that which makes the "first order ' ideas to be
th3 ideas "of things", though their being such is, at_ an¬
other level, as we have seen, "given". Locke observes
that he has never "denied that the mind could frame to
itself ideas of relation" but that he has "showed the quite
contrary in my chapters about relations." (Loc.cit). Now,
the second terminal of the relation cannot, Locke train-
tains, be nothing, for a relation cannot "be founded in
nothing, or be the relation of nothing." {loc.cit.). But,
on the oth-=r hand, as Locke points out, there is no clear
and distinct idea of it; it is an obscure idea, a some-
thing-I-know-not-what. This need not, however, be any-
insuperable difficulty; the difficulty and inadequacy of
our knowledge of the non-ideal terminal of the relationship
only becomes apparent when an attempt is made to analyse
out the terms as "atoms" from their complex presentation.
The content of our idea of the terminal is no more elusive
or irysterious than the content of any idea of sensation:
,-just a3 it is impossible for us, as we have seen above, to
isolate the content, of our idea of "green" and take it
apart from its necessary minimal concomitant3, so is it
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impossible to isolate for contemplation by; itself the
correlate of the original presented ideas. It is known
only and sufficiently in its relation to them (they being
its minimal necessary concomitants)? it is unknowable
without their compresence, and the attempt to know it
otherwise is to draw 'water in a sieve.
92. What has been said above applies, of course, .just
as much to-the complex idea of substance as referred to
minds as it does to the same somplex idea as referred to
things.
The important thing from the point of view of our
interpretation, is that this complex idea, part of the
content of which (and a "non-isolable ' part) is the
correlative idea of a non-ideal correlate to the ideas "of
things" and "of mental activity" in which it is grounded
and from which it is derived, is an idea of a different
order from those ideas on which it is grounded and from
which it is derived. It is not a part of_ theip, given
with them. It is not the "same" idea, both 'given" and
"derived", as Green would have us believe. It is not
presupposed in our having the first sort of idea; it is
completely distinct from and subsequent to them. It is
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another part of our experience, and when, for example,
Green says that the process "by which wa arrive at the
complex idea of substance is the same in the end as it
was in the "beginning (1.39), he is, in a sense, correctly
describing the situation, but without insight. The
"knowledge we have "at the end" is the same as that which
we had when we set about constructing the complex idea,
in that it is knowledge "of the same thing"; but the
phenomena whioh acre the vehicle of the knowledge in the
two cases are diverse, even although trie latter knowledge
is "grounded in" the given and, in the end, returns to
terminate in it i.e. even although the general idea is
derived from a number of particular ideas (part of the
content of which constitutes our first sort of knowledge)
and, when derived, i3 found to give us another form of
knowledge of what we already know. If you like, our know¬
ledge is reduplicated in the phenomena presented to us
both "in the given" and abstraction", and I maintain
that it is precisely the virtue of Locke's analysis that he
takes note of this. Our experience is not so tidy as Green
makes it out to be — and as Locke, very properly, does not.
In other words, what Locke is saying is this: among
the multitudinous phenomena of our experience, there are the
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(relatively) "simple" ideas (Which are absolutely simple only
in an inexperienceable abstraction) which contain as part
of their content the awareness of the arxistenca of that "of
which" they are. There are also among the phenomena of
experience, complex ideas, and in particular, the complex
idea of substance which has as part of its content the
awareness of a non-ideal correlate, in general, to the
ideas presented, simultaneously with and over and above the
awareness "of things giv n with the ideas, in particular.
In other words, we have knowledge of orders of existents
other than ideas in two distinct and often simultaneous ways.
And this is the answer to the sort of criticisms we analysed
in, for example, para.75 above. (That, according to Locke's
account, we do in fact have in experience knowledge simul¬
taneously by two different channels and at two different
levels -- and not only in regard to this particular matter
of substance -- we saw much earlier in considering the idea
of identity in para.56 above.) Our knowledge of "reality",
as contrasted with "ideas", is then indeed both "given" and
'derived". But the knowledge we have "given" is not the
same as the knowledge we "derive". They are contained in
quite different sets of phenomena, both of which may be
present at once in our experience. The latter is not
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presupposed in the former. And this, which is in fact a
striking and persuasive piece of phenomenological analysis
on Locke':; part, is misapprehended "by Green (& other
hostile critics) as merely a "bad argument. Certainly, if
Locke's views about the nature of the given were as Green
would like us to believe they were, and as, no doubt,
Hume's were later, then it would be a bad argument, but
Locke's views were, as we have seen, quite otherwise, and
there is little excuse for fathering our own or his
successors' epistemological myths upon him. It is,
indeed, the copiousness and accuracy of Locke's phenomeno-
logical analysis in the "plain historical account" that has
confused his critics, and not his own inconsistency and
mal-observation.
The main point is: we know existing things in two
ways and sometimes simultaneously in two ways. The "new
way of ideas"is not by any means so narrow as Locke's
critics_would make it; and in particular it is broad enough
to permit the passage into our experience of more than
"atoms", even if it was to be abridged later, and perhaps
mistakenly, by Hume.
-87-
93. We started out on this part of the enquiry from
the point where we had found that for Locke the principle
of Identity i3 existence. We have subsequently been
enquiring into which things do exist, and how we know that
they do. We have found, to sum up, that:
ideas exist as natural fact3, and as such each
has its own identity,
things exist apart from the ideas through which
they are revealed and so each has its own
identity
runds exist apart from the ideas contained in
them, and so each has its own identity
and, for the rest, we have been concerned with expounding
Locke's account of how we know this is so. We should note
too that this three-fold order of existence included the
two sorts of identities which, we saw above (paras 33-39),
Locke distinguishes viz. the identity of ideas (as
individaa), and the identity of "continuants" (e.g. "things"
and "minds").
94. But before we can leave this part of the enquiry
entirely and proceed to the next examination, which is of
Locke's views concerning "continuants ' as "organic identities",
we must pause to make clear that there is nothing in the
foregoing which by itself, as might seem at first sight,
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resolves the main problem we are concerned with viz. that
personal identity. The fact that Locke establishes
that minds exist apart from the ideai they contain and 30
have identity, tell3 us little about personal identity, and
for this reason: that although it is true that every simple
idea of reflection we experience, must have, as one of
its minimal necessary concomitants, an awareness which is
a reference to the mind "whose idea it is" (see para.89
above), this tells us nothing but that there is a
"spiritual substance" revealed in the idea as underlying
it. It does not tell us, for instance, whether or not it
is the same substance as is revealed in immediately pre¬
ceding and subsequent ideas, or trh®ther it perishes with
the passing of the id^a. It does not establish the
existence of that ''subject element which is successively
and literally present in the conscious states that make
up the biography of one person", &o which we referred in
the Introduction to the present enquiry. And, as we shall
sea, it is a consideration of this that leads Locke to
enunciate one of his most striking doctrines.
CONTINUANTS AS "ORGANIC IDENTITIES"<
95. We have found, then, that "identity" may he
attributed to three distinct orders of existents, one of
them "ideal" (i.e. the ideas themselves) and two of them
un-ideal (i.e. minds and objects), and we have seen that
according to Locke's account there are, in our experience,
certain indissoluble connections among these three, and
that indeed our experience is totally constituted by
these three orders of existents and their connections, or
in their various connections. And at this point we must
stop to note something arising out of this which, although
it may be a digression from the immediate topic, is too
important, for the present interpretation, to be relegated
to a footnote. And it is this; it does not seem to be
safe, or fair to Locke, to assert any more than that
these three orders "are connected"; in particular it is
unsafe and unfair, to Locke to try to narrow down this
"connection" to the "representation" of the two latter
by the former. (it is perhaps unnecessary to labour
over again the disasters consequent upon doing 30.)
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Admittedly Locke often speaks in "representational"
terms (although, as Professor Aaron points out, "with no
great enthusiasm"), hut at other times, as I have shewn,
he does not. To give a further and plain example of
this -- the "simple idea" of Existence does not repr ;sent
Existence. Ideas, whether simple or compound, and
whether sensory "images" or otherwise, in ""being had",
exist, and we in merely having them, "know existence",
which "knowing" is the simple idea of Existence -- similarly
for the other Modes. An idea is not only, or need not "be,
on Locke's view, an "image of" or "picture of" something
else. An idea is whatever phenomenon is discriminatee in
consciousness, whether it is, or is part of, for example,
a smell of onions, a moral aspiration, a twinge of
rheumatism, or our entertainment of the notions of
contingency and necessity. Likewise, he sometimes speaks
in terms of a dustlistic analysis, an analysis that accepts
the "two parts of nature" (Cp. Mendel: "Studies in the
Philosophy of David Hume" Cap.8, and Laird: "Hume's
Philosophy of Human Mature", pp.'58-41), hut at other
times he shews that he is capable of thinking and is
prepared to speak 4n different terms, particularly in the
celebrated passage at IV.iii.6 which occasioned so much
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ecclesiastical alarm -- perhaps, indeed, as Professor Kemp
Smith has brilliantly suggested,-5 he was too good and
experienced a physician ever to accept a radical dualism
of mind and matter: likewise, he often speaks, as we
have seen, in terms of an "atomic" and "compositional"
metaphysics, hut again (as we shall see precisely in the
present examination of organic identity) he shews himself
capable of eluding the fetters of an inherited and closed
conceptual system. I suggest that all these are different
"manners of speaking" adopted by Locke at his convenience
to describe always the same thing viz. what he experienced.
It has been remarked for us by Professor Kemp Smith (op.
cit.) that his reading was mostly among the work of his
contemporaries, and was sparing at that, and that his
philosophical activity appears to have been stimulated
by conversation in an enlightened and strenuously
intellectual circle of friends; it might then be natural
to suppose that his technique of exposition should have
something of the variable expression, including and
adapting technical and sard.-technical terms appropriate
now to one sort of general outlook and now to another,
which is almost necessary in intelligent conversation with
"John Locke. The Adamson Lecture for 1932." Manchester
University Press 1933.
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men of diverse interests and, each in his own sphere,
considerably informed.-* I suggest that in carrying out
that most difficult of tasks viz. giving a plain, historical
account of our ex .erienee, he first of all kept what he
was describing steadily before him -- wherein lies the
great strength of the Essay -- and used whatever terms
were available and most appropriate to the immediate
object, to communicate what he observed in a way that the
readers he had in mind could follow, and that in doing
so he used more than one accepted figure, or system of
figures, of speech, to describe one thing; that, in fact,
what he wa3 doing unavowedly was what a recent -writer has
suggested is a necessary precaution in the attempt to give
any such account, when he says: "Where the use of metaphor
is unavoidable, it seems that the be.st way to escape being
misled by them, especially by one's own favourites, is to
use as groat a variety as practicable. This at least
reduces the risk of coming to unwarranted conclusions by
assuming that a characteristic which is peculiar to some
one metaphor is a characteristic of the situation which
1
Cp. "The Epistle to the Reader" -- "'"y appearing therefore
in print being on purpose to be a3 useful as I may, I think
it necessary to make what I have say as easy and
intelligible to a 1 sorts of readers as I can."
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the metaphor is being used to describe." (W.A. Sinclair
"The Conditions of Knowing",) It does not appear to me
that there is anything very improbable involved in
attributing to Locke enough sagacity to anticipate this
recommendation in his practice. What Locke was doing was
to change the vocabulary and system of concepts he used
in his description -- while keeping what ha described
steadily in view -- whenever the passage of his attention
from one part of what he described (i.e. the content of
his experience) to another, brought him upon something
which could not be described in a manner intelligible to
himself or his readers in the same terms as he had de¬
scribed another and different part. But to say this is
not to say (as has been said to weariness) that he gave a
contradictory account of that experience. It raight have
been (or be) possible to give a plain, historical account
that did hot involve these switches from one mythology to
another, but it -/as not, he found, possible to do it within
the bounds of ordinary English, and it would have involved
him in the construction of a private language or jai'gon;
ana for these, Locke, to his credit, had no liking. It i3
on grounds of this sort that I tend to think that the
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interpretations of Locke's modern critics, e.g. Professors
Aaron-, Gibson'', Kerap Smith®, and Samuel Alexander^, al¬
though acute and sympathetic, do less than justice to
Locke in emphasising the diversity, or even irreconcil¬
ability, of the different ways in which he describes things?
ways which fall into two general kinds viz. those
appropriate to the two "levels" of experience suggested
earlier. For, although even in this they avoid the extra¬
vagance of Hegelian or Hamiltonian sorts of criticism, they
seem to suggest that the two theoies of knowledge which are
3aid to be revealed (corresponding, very roughly, to what is
said in Book II. and. Look IV.) are, even if complementary,
impossible to reconcile and therefore represent a failure
on Locke's part®, whereas, I suspect, the two different
sorts of account are not due to inaccurate observation or
Op.cit. w Op.cit. Op.cit. - ''Locke in the series
^'Philosophies Ancient and Modern". Constable, London 1908.
Even Whitehead writes, in "Process and Reality" II.vi.:
"The m-rit of Locke's "Essay Concerning the Human Under¬
standing" :s its adequacy, and not its consistency. He
gives the most dispassionate descriptions of those various
elements in experience which common sense never lets slip.
Unfortunately he is hampered by inappropriate,metaphysical
categories which he never criticised." ~and this last
sentence, which I have 'italicised, seems to me to misplace
the emphasis, as does his late statement ("Process and
Reality" II.vi.ii): "Hothinv can make the various parts of
his "Essay" mutually consistent", although otherwise White¬
head goes furthest of any writer I know in elucidating the
nature and scope of what Locke was doing.
ineptitude on Locbe's part, "but are due, for example, to
the 3ort of phenomenon in our experience which I have
called "double-presentation". For example, there are tw
ways, as we saw in para3 56-58 above, in which we simul¬
taneously appi'ehend the 3 ^lf~identity of any individuum -
firstly we apprehend it as a relation between the idea
(the individuum) s a psychic event and the idea as that
event*s ideal content, and this is the relation of the
idea's successive appearances within the duration of the
moment; secondly we intuit the event as such, and the
ideal content as such, together at once. So that, it
appears, our apprehension is at once durational and
non-durational; it is durational because the relating
of the idea's diverse appearances to each other requires
I
duration, and non-durational because the terms of the
relation must be apprehended each as itself (and not as
the apprehension of identity between yet further appear¬
ances) for there to be relation at al1; but yet, again,
it is durational because "every part of duration is
duration too", while for there to be duration there must
be succession of ideas, and for individual ideas to be
related "as successive", they must be intuited non-
durational] y as the terms of s ch a relation. And this
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sort of account* as we saw, is to be dismissed, according
to 3uch criticisms as Green's, as a mere reductio ad ab-
surdum, with no consideration of its possible justification
by experience. "But that there is something odd, in our
experience, about what we "know, e.g. the identity of a
thing with itself, from the perception of relations (which
are "fictions of the mind"), and what we tenow "as given"
to intuition, e.g. individual ideas, Locke is well aware,
as we can see from IV.iii.29 where he writes: "In some of
our idea3 there are certain relations, habitudes, and
connexions, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas,
that we cannot conceive them separate from them by any
power whatsoever." Again, writing in II.xxi.3 of what he
wishes to call the simple idea of power, he writes even
more pertinently to the present paradox in experience;
"I confess power includes in it some kind of relation
as indeed which of our ideas, of what kind soever, when
attentively considered, does not? For, our ideas of
extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain
in them a secret relation of the parts?" From which we
can 3ee that Locke was quite aware that in our experience
of relationships (even those of identity) and of their 'given
terms, there is something too complex for it to be described
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adequately "by either account alone. Consequently, unless
we keep in mind that his intention was to describe our
whole experience by the best means possible, we shall fall
into the error of making criticisms which consist only in
pointing out the inconsistencies between those of his
descriptions which are descriptions of part of our experi¬
ence, and the futility of this sort of criticism was trans¬
fixed for all time by Kant when he wrote in the first
Critique (K.r.V. 3 xliv); "In every writing, above all
when it proceed as a free discussion, it is possible to
ferret out apparent contradictions by comparing together
r
isolated passages torn from their context. Such apparent
contradictions cast a prejudicial light upon it in the eyes
of those who depend upon criticism at second hand, but they
can easily be resolved by anyone who has mastered the Ideas
as a who1e." . This does not mean that any account of experi¬
ence, however inchoate and contradictory, will serve as well
as any other. Bo such account may be gratuitously contra¬
dictory, and I do not think that Locke's is. In other
words, the two sorts of account, unreconciled, constitute
an accurate account of experience. The accounts are in¬
compatible because what Locke experienced (and we experience)
that'; and to dismiss this out of hand on the grounds
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that any account of our experience Timet "be wholly coherent
"because our experience itself is not so "contradictory ,
or is not such t at it cannot be described (in English)
without contradiction, is merely to demonstrate the holding
of eertain rationalistic or linguistic presuppositions which,
whence-ever derived, have nothing at all to do with what we
actually do experience.^ That this dualism or "ambiguity"
in Locke*a account is the consequence of the nature of our
experience as it is, will, I hope, become clearer as our
progress to and examination of his doctrine of the Self
develops; indeed it must, if there is anything at all in
my interpretation, for the problem of the Self is as crucial
in Locke's essay as it is in any other philosophical essay
which pretends to completeness.
That what we thus "experience", is illusion, as against
the "reality" of what is assumed in these presuppositions,
might be the case, but ass_ illusion we do have it, and with
what we do experience Locke is avowedly concerned. The
reasons why, historically,the fact that experience, in
Locke's sense, cannot be described in terms of a certain
group of languages having a certain syntactical structure,
without verbal contradiction, should have compelled somethinkers to assert that experience is therefore in some
sense "unreal", do not concern us here.
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96. To revert, however, to our immediate subject,
"organic" identity, we may note that two of the orders of
existents to which we attx-ibute identity vis. objects and
minds, come under the wider designation of "continuants",
i.e. things which are identical with themselves in diversity
of times. A physical object i3 a continuant identical
with itself in that the collection of ideas by and through
which we know it are seen not to vary in different times
of observation. And fox' it to have an identity, the ideas
must not vary. Thi3 is, as Locke remarks, more easily
seen in the case of a "simple substance". "Let us
suppose" he says in II.xxvii.4, "an atom, i.e. a continued
body under one immutable superficies, existing in a
determined time and place; it is evident that, considered
in any instant of its existence, it is in that instant the
same with itself and so it must continue as long as
its existence is continued; for so long it will be the
same and no other." (in the light of the observations
already made on Locke's general method, it might be as well
to italicise the "let us suppose".) That is to say, if
we suppose a continued body under one immutable superficies,
then the ideas that constitute our experience of that body
(even if our experience is confined to supposition or
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imajjjining) must not vary in repetition of the experience,
and these idea3 must include, as we have seen at length
before, such idea3 as existence, extension, whatever
quality "fills out" the extension, and minimal duration
"within the moment", which are the rainiTnum constituents of
even an atom or a suppositious atom.. Therefore it is
clear that even the "simplest" thing we can experience as
an object must have diversity in it3 constituents, and
those constituents must remain stable for the body, however
simple, to be identical with itself. Most things we ex¬
perience a3 objects, however, are very far from simple;
and, as above, even the gr atest simplicity we can imagine
involves diversity. In actual experience there is nothing
that is simple, but that does not mean that what we do
experience lacks identity; as Locke goes on to point out
(ll.xxvii.4), not only does the supposed, atom have identity,
but 30 also does any mass or group of "atoms". "In like
manner, if two or more atoms be found joined together into
the same mass, every one of these atoms will be the same,
by the foregoin;- rule; and while they exist united together,
the mass, consisting of the same atoms, must be the same
moss, or the same body, let the parts be ever so differently
'Umbled.'' (ibid). That is to say, there are things in our
4
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experience which we regard and name as one, although they
may he composed of a multitude of relative ''simples" each
having its own identity, e.g. a heap of marbles is regarded
and named as "a heap", "one heap" of marbles, the marbles
representing the ''atoms" of Locke's hypothetical illustration
above.~ And that heap has it3 own identity as long as the
constituent (relatively simple) parts are the same on
repeated ins'pecti n of the hea , and. the identity is not
affected even if the constituent "simples" are, on different
occasions, disposed in totally diffei'ent spatial or other
relations, one to another. But if some marbles are taken
away, then the heap has lost it3 identity and is become
another thing with another identity. The ground, then,
of the identity of sone kinds of continuant which we meet
with in ordinary experience, is mere non-variation; and
whether the continuant is as simple in structure as may be,
within the limits noticed, or however complex it may be,
this ground is sufficient. Just as in the case of the
si plest conceivable object, its parts, i.e. existence,
This is quite a good example of one of Locke's "manners
of speaking". That what he meant by an "atom", Locke very
well knew and was at pains to point out, is insensible
{inexperienceable), but he here uses "atom" and masses made
up of atoms" -- quite beyond perception ^van with the aid
of microscopes and so on -- a3 a figurative way of illus¬
trating his argument about the identity of things which
are perceptible.
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of. course, we roust read in the light of what we have already
found about the relation of ideas to things. In a sense
Locke i_s talking, here, about the identity of ideas, but
eo facto he refers, as we have seen, to things. If the
qualification about the connectedness of ideas and things
were to be inserted every time, then his account (and this
one) /ould be intolerably prolix. There are, then, in our
ordinary experience, elements such that it is intelligible^
to describe them, a3 Locke here does, as units containing
within themselves diversity of parts, such parts having
1
If anyone is disposed to contend that we do not, in fact,
have experience of such unities as identical and distinct
one from another and from all other things, but that our
experience is, in some sense other than of mere summation, a
whole, or that every part of it is received as related to
every other part, the answer is that this is not a "matter
of fact" at all. Our experience .is what it is: so much is
"matter of fact"? but thereafter in assessing any aocount
of experience, the assessment, I maintain, can only be in
term3 of intelligibility? either the account is intelligible
or it is not, and it is 30 or is not so strictly in the sense
that it either directs my attention to a recognisable part of
my total consciousness, or it does not. In a sense, no one
can tell me anything "about" ny experience; I can only have
my attention directed to something ijg ij,. If what Locke
writes here directs me to something I can identify as being
in ny experience (the term being in no way confined, to pre¬
sentation in sensation alone) as it is, then his description
is intelligible and good. Likewise, if someone talks of some¬
thing as a settlement of Monads or as a Qualification of the
Real, and by so doing directs me to some part of cy experience
which I can identify there "as being as it is", and which I
may have failed to notice befdre, then his description Is
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each its own unity and "being susceptible perhaps, in turn,
tn further analysis into yet simpler parts and so on down
to that limit which we have noted, more than once before,
beyond which "simplicity" becomes meaningless. And to such
things, recognised and named each as "one"thing, ws can
attribute continuing identity, provided that the constituent
elements do mot vary.
98. Hot all continuants, however, are like this; nor
is the identity of all continuants grounded in mere non-
variation of parts. Hot only do we meet in experience such
continuants as a heap of marbles, or a fleet of ships, or
those that are, as Locke says, the "mo3t part of artificial
things, at l@a3t such of them as are made up of distinct
substances", but al3o we come upon continaants such as those
we designate "oak tree", "horse", or "man".
Intelligible and good; if Try attention is not so directed,then the description is unintelligible and bad, and all it
has done is to add to my experience by the amount of the
images or concepts it gives rise to (in which case, if Iretain any memory of them, there will be something in my
experience, i.e. a memory of these, to which ny attentioncould be directed by some other subsequent description;and this is called doing History of Philosophy).
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99. On what grounds, then, do we attribute identity to
such a continuant a3 an "oak tree"*? Obviously enough not
on the grounds that its parts do not vary, for, observably,
they vary very frequently, almost from day to day if we
observe that often. The sapling I may observe as a child
is the "same'1 as the mature tree I may observe when I look
again (with luck) seventy years later into the same corner
of the garden; yet, as Locke suggests, every particle of
matter in its constitution may have changed many times i.e.
the simpler parts contained within the experienced unity in
each case -- at the time of my childhood and in iry old age --
may not have maintained that invariability of constituent
which makes them self-identical. In the case of the heap
of marbles, we saw that if some marbles were removed, the
identity of the continuant was destroyed; but in this
case, if a sizable branch is lopped off the tree and
allowed to decay and ultimately disintegrate — its con¬
stituents being, at the least, totally dispersed — the
identity of the tree is not thereby destroyed. The
identity of such a continuant cannot, therefore, be as in
the former case, the mere aggregation of non-variable parts.
f,rphe reason wherof is"' as Locke succinctly says, "that, in
these two cases -- a. mas3 of matter and a living body --
identity i3 not applied to the same thing."
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100. We find, then, that there is another sort of
unity, containing parts, which must be accounted for in
our experience. In the first sort of continuant we
examined, it was sufficient, for it to have identity in
duration, that there should be a one-to-one correspondence
(so to speak) between the parts on successive observations
and that, as in the case of the heap of mai-bles, the
relations, spatial or otherwise, which the parts bore to
each other in successive observations, were a matter of
indifference; it was encu gh that they were the "same"
parts. In this latter case, however, almost the opposite
is the case; there need bjs no one-to-one correspondence
between the parts on successive observations, provided the .
relations between such parts as are, remain stable i.e. at
time Ti the "parts" of the continuant may be "a,b,c,d,....nw
and at time Tii they may be "x,y,z,...•&" and, Locke
suggests, provided that the parts, however diverse their
identities at the different times, conform to the same
"disposition" or "organisation", then Ahe continuant is the
"same thing" at time Tii as it was at tiros Ti. How, in the
case of the oak tree, this arrangement or disposition is,
aocording to Locke, such arrangement of the parts "as is fit
to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and
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frame the wood, bark, and leaves etc. of an oak, in which
consists the vegetable life." In other words, the ground
of continued identity in this case is participation in a
continuing life "by changing, perhaps constantly changing,
parts; and although Locke says that such an organisation
(in such terras as above, in the case of the oak tree) is
this continuing life, it might be safer to say that it is
that by which we reoognise the presence and exact location
of such a continuing life. Recoiling from the poeitivistic
implications of Locke's literal statement that the organis¬
ation "ijs that individual life", Campbell Eraser inserts a
note on p.443 of his edition that "it is only in a loose
sense that the 'organisation', which is visible, can be
identified with the 'life' which is invisible", and although
Iraser's alarm is understandable (being of the same sort as
Stillingf1eet*s alarm o^er "thinking matter'), there is, I
think„ no reason to magnify this into a difficulty. Plainly
enough, what Locke means is that where in experience we come
upon the parts of a thing, revealed iu us in the ideas of
time, behaving in a certain way viz. maintaining a certain
disposition, then we know we have some upon a continuant
which is a living organism, vegetable or animal, and the
disposition of the apprehended parts hears the same relation
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to the living thing as each idea presented hears to the
thing "of which" it is. This view is home out, I think,
by the immediately succeeding paragraph (II .xxvii .6.).
here Locke says that the organism can he described by analogy
with a watch. Such a machine as a watch is, like these
organisms, a disposition of parts "to a certain end" which,
provided with a sufficient force, achieves that end. But
* •
although they are similar -- and we may he instructed hy their
similarity — in possessing such a disposition of parts (and
if we can imagine the constituent atoms of the machine in
change as constant as tho3@ of the organism appear to he,
the analogy becomes closer), they are radically different in
that "the fitness of the organisation and the teotion wherein
life consists, begin together" in the case of the organism,
while in the case of the machine the force "comes sensibly
from without." So, as Mar as the disposition of the parts
alone is concerned (i.e. the "visible" of Eraser's note)
there need be, in Locke's account, no distinction as between
mechanism and organism. But a distinction i_s pointed;
therefore Locke is not identifying the 'life" and the
"organisation". And the distinction, as I have suggested,
is that the disposition of the parts of certain continuants
indicates, or may do so, the locus of a live being in the
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same way as ideas, simple or complex, indicate that of
which they are. And this is "borne out "by experience to
which, if questioned, Locke would doubtless appeal, even if
in doing so he used the unfortunate and deceptive formula
of "sending us to our senses". We do not normally confuse
animals with mhchines^ or machines with vegetables. We
may attempt to persuade ourselves wilfully, by adopting as
a priori some principle which is supposed to legislate for
our experience, and may then say like, for example, some
Cartesians, that we know that animals are merely complicated
automata! but this has to be a late and sophisticated sort
of "experience" superinduced upon an ordinary experience part
of which is of "animals", which neither children nor honest
men mistake for machines, or ever have done.^
The fact that clever artificers like the Dr. Coppelius of
Delibes • ballet, or Ding Pygmalion, or Madame Tussaud may
temporarily deceive us, is no great objection.
ry
The substance of the note to para.07 shove applies in full
here as it does at almost every point where a new topic in
the Essay is examined; but to insert the qualifications
contained in it into the text, as in the case of the
qualifications about the connectedness of ideas and things,
would make exposition impossible. They must, nevertheless
be borne in mind.
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201. This paragraph 6 of Il.xxvii has, however, a
further interest for us although in a different respect.
It seems to me to contain an excellent example of what I
mean by Locke's ability to ado jt a "manner of speaking"
for the purposes of a public exposition. The example of
a watch or clock is, par excellence, the figure used to
expound the nature of anything in terms of a mechanistic
analysis (see Collingwood "The Idea of Nature") and that
was an analysis familiar enough to Locke and the group of
friends he kept in mind while writing the Bssay.1 It is
an analysis, the ultimate metaphysical context of which is
the "atomic", "compositional" metaphysics of post-Galilean
science -- which describes it well enough, whatever its
antique derivations may hove been. Yet here, with what
seems to me remarkable virtuosity, Locke uses it — a
mechanistic mythology -- to describe i.e. draw our attention
to, a part of our experience which is not amenable to that
an lysis, and uses it successfully. Gere he wishes to draw
*
Cp. "The Tpistle to the Reader"? "If I have not the good
luck to please, yet nobody ought to be offended with me.
I plainly tell all my readers, except half a dozen, this
Treatise was not at first intended for them; and therefore
they need not be at the trouble to be of that number."
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our attention to a part of our experience viz. our coming
upon organisms as continuing identities; he does not find
to hand an ''organic" vocabulary devised, for the purpose;
consequently he ta'es a vocabulary with which he is familiar
and with which he can assume his readers ai-e familiar, and
directs their attention by means of a mechanistic figure
to a non-mechanistic fact. I suggest that this happens
throughout the Essay (see para.95 above); that, in de¬
scribing his experience, Locke "uses" whatever terms will,
he has reason to believe, serve as intelligible i.e. will
make us regard those parts of experience he is attending to,
and usually he is satisfied if he thinks he has succeeded in
that, without being put out if the description he has used
to direct our attention to one part is not completely com¬
patible with the description he has used to direct our
attention to another. If he had found it possible to
describe each part of exx^erience in the same terms so that
all the descriptions were compatible, then no doubt he would
have done it. Apparently he found it was not so possible;
and in this he is not alone. One consequence of this, of
course, is that the attempt to reconcile the various accounts
in the Essay so that they make a verbally coherent system is
not only vexation of spirit but also vanity. And it is not
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at all evident that this is so because Locke raisdescribed
what he experienced; it may very well be that what we
experience is such and so diverse that its parts cannot be
described in a set of verbalisations that are non-
contradictory. So that the accounts in the Lssay may,
after all, be reconcilable at least in the sense that they
are, precisely in their incompatibility, a good and con¬
tinuous account of what we do experience -- the criterion
£ y9)<S t / <7uof their mutual coherence being o3Bpori'niieutad and not
linguistic. To urge, in criticism of Locke, that any
continuous account of our experience must be internally
coherent, is merely to say that we hold a curious and rigid
set of superstitions about the nature and origin of
language -- a sort of superstition that is as diffused in
our day as it was in Locke's. Obviously enough what we
experience is not, and cannot be, either "contradictory" or
"non-contradictory"; what we experience i_s what it is.
The fact that, being what it is, it cannot be described in
compatible propositions within the syntactical structure of
known languages, may be regrettable and very inconvenient,
but it does not alter what we experience nor even tell us
much "about" it -- beyond adding certain perhaps rather
unnecessary feelings of irritation and frustration to its
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content and telling us that it is awkward to verbalise;
the latter "being something we can learn as well from the
dithyrambs of the poets as from the disputation of the
logicians. The fact too that, from an admittedly different
point of view, there seems reason to believe that vocalis¬
ation, not to speak of language, is a late and fortuitous
biological development in certain species, might give us
pause to think before joining in an immoderate veneration
of the merely linguistic mysteries which, it appears, can
so ecstasise their adepts that these aver that the order
of our experience is subject to the order of language and,
as one contemporary slogan goes, that "language hews out
the facts". For, whatever facts these are that are hewn,
they are assuredly not the "facts of experience" -- which
it is one of the merits of Locke's Essay to point out.
102. I do not wish to suggest that Locke is explicit
about this "use of" iracorapatible manners of speaking as a
merely expository device -- although he hints at it in his
remarks that he is not nice about words, and that he has
often observed how many enquiries are spoiled by too much
niceness about them -- nor, even, that he was fully conscious
of all the incompatibilities which his critics have
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industriously sorted. I do suggest that, "by his practice,
he shews that he realised that our experience is in no wise
limited, hound, or altered by the sort of description we
give of it or can give of it, and that accordingly, in de¬
scribing it i.e. in leading our attention consecutively
among its parts, he adopts whatever "sort of" description
is most consonant with his limited objective at the moment —
the part or sort of part of experience -- in the hope that,
a tention having been directed, the understanding will
apprehend what is what e.g. that an "organism" is not a
"machine", even when it is described in terras of one; and
provided that attention is so directed, the mutual com¬
patibility of descriptions is a matter of indifference,
since both (or all) of the descriptions are then justified
by experience* and the assertion that experience is such
that it never iustifies two or more incompatible descriptions,
is not the statement of a fact, but a presupposition commonly
held by people who happen to have highly sophisticated
linguistic habits. This interpretation provides us, too,
with an explanation of Locke's genuine difficulty (for we
have no reason to suppose him disingenuous) in seeing what
his critics would be after, and his frequent complaints that
he cannot see "wherein they differ" from him by using merely
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different words. We might try to put it "by saying that
his expositorial method is ostensive, and that sometimes
he points with his thumb, sometimes with his head, and
sometimes with his toes; and provided that in each case we
identify the object of the ostentation, we should not com¬
plain that he does not point -with his whole body (were that
possible) every time, e.g. that part of our experience
which is constituted by our entertaining the notion of
substance is such (see para.9? above) that it is to be de¬
scribed as, both and simultaneously, given "in" simple ideas
(thumb-pointing), and as a complex idea derived from series
of simple ideas (toe-pointing), and this part of our experi¬
ence is presented simultaneously in two different ways for
each of which he has found an appropriate description, even
if we are tempted, from a lingering prejudice in favour of
verba] compatibility, to say that they are at "different
levels". One of the general implications of the Essay
seems to me to be that if the world we experience is not, or
is not readily, to be described consistently, then at least
we have learnt a little about it viz. that it ia like that
in despite of whatever desires we may have for a more elegant
one. Consequently, in returning to a minftter exposition of
Locke's views, we should be prepared, on finding incom¬
patibility, not so much to do violence to the text in
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trying to make the parts fit neatly together, as to re¬
examine and appeal to the experience to which Locke is
directing our attention, to see whether the elements that
are incompatibly described are, in fact, there --as, I
think, we shall find is the case with experience of the
Self.
10'^. To revert, now, to organisms as identities % Locke
has shewa us that certain continuants are identical con¬
tinuants in that these things which constitute their parts,
although not themselves identical in duration, being in
constant change and. development, ao-operate in an unchanging
function which is the maintenance of the sort of life we
recognise in plants and animals. Now, among these con¬
tinuants we meet of the animal sort, there is a species
which -••■-e call Man, a species whose parts are organised so
that they indicate at least the same sort of continued life
as is indicated by the disposition of the/parts of cows,
mice, and monkeys. We should, then, be in a position to
establish what is the ground of the identity of a man -- in
so far as he is a member of the animal kingdom i.e. is that
sort of continuant. And with the consideration of the
identity of the "same man", we se^rn to be getting within
measurable distance of the main topic, Personal Identity.
But the identity of the "same man" is not necessarily a
"personal identity. For what, Lock® asks, do we indicate
by the term "man5'? Surely, he maintains, "man" is the
term annexed to those ideas which exhibit in their con¬
catenation an animal disposition. Man is essentially a
physical thing, a body. If we see a body, like our own,
we say "here is a man" although that body may be to all
observation devoid of the habits and behaviour which we
generally take to be the symptoms of rationality and the
sort of sensibility w« ourselves poisess. It is, indeed,
only in a developed and self-conscious state that we are
tempted to deny the name, for example, to a moron or some¬
thing otherwise so monstrous that we are cut off from
imaginative sympathy with what we infer are its p&periences.
Contrarily, if we come upon a body in all "physical" reppects
different from that of our own and of those other contiuants
in our experience which w unhesitatingly call men — which
has, for example, wings for legs, a beak where men have
mouths, and a tail or talons -- which, nevertheless, exhibits
the symptoms of a rationality and feeling such as that we
experience in ourselves, we do not, for that reason, say
"this is a man". And this point Locke illustrates at leag1|l
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hy the celebrated anecdote of Prince Maurice and the Parrot --
the only part of the Bssay, according to Dugald Stewart,
of which many readers retained any distinct recollection J
"Man" is, therefore, a biological or even zoological term
referring to a 3pecie3 of organism having sufficient
differentia other than rationality to separate it off from
other bipeds* If this is not so, Locke suggests, and if
"ran" is to refer other than loosely and by synecdoche to
what we more properly call "a person", then it will be hard
"to make an embryo, one of year3, mad and sober, the same
man, hy any supposition, that will not make it possible for
Seth, Israael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Caesar
Borgia, to be the same man." (II.xxvii.7}. In other words,
if the ground of a man's identity is to be located beyond his
body, in, for example, continuance of spiritual substance or
of the Soul, then the uncertainty remarked above enters into
the attribution of identity; for, says Locke, the soul of
Heliogabalus embodied in a hog, is not the man Heliogabalus.
A "man's body" may always be, and may necessarily be, the
locus of a "person" -- in so far as'that refers to "human
persons for Locke never excludes the possibility of
rational beings other than human rational being3 --, but
that does not in itself locate the Identity of the person
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in the continuance of the parts of that body, nor the
identity of the body itself in the continued identity of
the person. "Man", the body, has its own identity and that
identity must always be of "body and shape" whatever other
concomitants are normally present with it e.g. sensitivity
and rationality. The identity of a man, in brief, is the
identity of an animal without regard to \tfhat else in the way
of soul or personality may inhabit or use the "man". A man
is that sort of continuant which is an organic identity.
104. This account of the identity of a man as distinct
from a person, leads Locke to the first enunciation of one
of the most striking general doctrines of the 3ssay — that
one which is succinctly expressed in his own words in
II.xxvii.8: "It is not therefore unity of substance that
comprehends all sorts of identity, or will determine it in
every case," As we have already seen, the identity of a
man is not concerned with the identity of a single spiritual
substance; it may be connected with the identity of material
or physical substance — namely that which the ideas that go
to make up the man indicate to us. But even so, in the
case of all organic identities, including "man", this
material substance cannot be the same "identical" substance
-1S1-
conscious mind -- and how little he was in fact hohhled
and "blinkered by inherited and uncriticised metaphysical
categories, as even his otherwise most intelligent critics
would sometimes have use believe; for, particularly
with reference to the conscious subject itself, this
separation of identity from single (simple) substances
goes contrary to the categories of previous thinking




THT ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY IN BOOK II LXAI1IN 3) IN
RELATION TO LOCKE'S THEORY OF MEMORY.
105. We may properly start the consideration of Locke's
most sustained and elaborate account of personal identity
by repeating his assertion that it is "one thing to be the
same substance, another the same man, and a third the same
person", and then going on to notice that, he starts his
main account in II.xxvii.ll characteristically with a round
assertion in ordinarily intelligible terms of what a
"person" is viz. "a thinking intelligent being, that has
reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself,
the same thinking thing, in different times and places
and thereafter goes on to elaborate the triple distinction
noted above by adopting in turn a series of suppositious
alternatives, each clothed in its appropriate terminology,
waieh by their pointing in a common direction, both in a
positive and a negative sense, narrow our attention to what
it is in experience we name by such names a3 "self" or
"person", rather in the way an artillerist "brackets" onto
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his target -- in this case, that in experience which is
to he described as "experience of our selves" -- by a
succession of fairly deliberate near misses in its
vicinity.
106. Of the ground of the third sort of identity, that
of the "same person", Locke gives in his preliminary account
here, a summary statement. And it is that this ground is
"consciousness" which is, he says, "inseparable from think¬
ing and, as it seems to me, essential to it...." (ibid).
Consciousness is, in fact, the invariable concomitant of
every perception and volition (the two mo3t general designa¬
tions in Locke's phenomenology) and it is in consciousness
that "everyone is to himself that which he calls self."
Therefore, Locke goes on, "since consciousness always
accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one
to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself
from all other thinking things, in this alone consists
personal identity and as far as this consciousness
can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so
far reaches the identity of that person."
107. That these views are unorthodox and, in some of
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their implication, some\*hat alarming, Locke is well aware
e.g. II.xxYii.27: "I am apt enough to think I hare, in
treating of this subject, made some suppositions that will
look strange to some readers, and possibly they are so in
themselYes", and they led, as a matter of history, to an
outburst of eminently unphilosophical abuse (unphilosophical
both in its tone and in the mere technical ineptitude of
the authors) which is the matter of the comment by T.S. Webb
with which I prefaced the main text of this thesis. It
was probably an awareness of the startling and uncongenial
nature of his description which led Locke to the extreme
elaboration of the remainder of his exposition which is,
in effect, an examination of the question: "If this is not
so, what are the alternatives, and do the alternatives
properly describe what we experience?"
108. If the ground of a person's identity is not
continuing consciousness, what, indeed, are the alter¬
natives?
The first alternative, and the one most congenial
to the prevalent metaphysics of his age from which Locke
is commonly supposed to have been unable to disentangle
himself, is that the ground of personal identity, and of
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every other sort of identity, is one continuing individual
substance -- in this case qualified as "spiritual". But
we have already seen that Locke rejects outright the
doctrine that all identity is grounded in invariability of
substance in, for example, is description of organic
identity. Identity grounded in invariability of subsxance,
indeed, can on his explicit view be attributed only to a
rather hypothetical sort of "atom" or to objects that are
numerically absolutely stable colligations of euch atoms;
and as far as our ordinary experience of identities goes,
Locke is clear that we have no experience of such "atoms"
at all (they are "insensible") and the number of their
colligations which are absolutely stable -- or which we
could be sure are so -- is not large. And here, in the
examination of personal identity, Locke proceeds to under¬
line his rejection of this doctrine already so strikingly
made in the description of organic continuants; which
sufficiently, I think, demonstrates that his break with the
metaphysics of the Schools was real and. that a large part
of the apparent stultification due to the influence of it,
which certain scholars purport to find, is in fact only his
practice of making do with the terms appropriate to it for
lack of a convenient set of existing alternatives, and for
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the sake of Ms le33 originally minded (or less observant)
readers
109. Now if, as many people would have it -- both among
Locke's contemporaries and arnon : those later adherents of
the theory we called the "pure Ego" theory in the intro¬
duction -- the Self is some individual continuing existent
thing or substance, then, as Locke points out in II .xxvii. lOa,^
a difficulty is immediately presented by any break in the
continuity of consciousness: !1 if these perceptions,
with their consciousness, always remained present to the
mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always con¬
sciously present, and, as would be thought evidently the
s-.me to itself .then, says Locke, it would doubtless
be possible and proper to describe the Self as such a
single, continuing substance. And this rather difficult
For evidence that Locke is prepared rather to adapt an
existing vocabulary than to invent new words, see his replyto Edward Stil lingfleet's remai-k that he (Stillingf leet) is"utterly against any private mint of words", in "Mr. Locke's
I eply to the Rt. Lev. the Lord Bishop of Worcester's Answer
to hi3 Second Letter". (Works. l?th Ed. Vol.IV.)<p
In Campbell Eraser's edition of the "Essay" the paragraphsin this chapter are wrongly numbered, ''30" and "11" being
repeated. Since this edition is the moot convenient to use,I have simply numbered the second "10" and "11" as 10a and
11a in my copy.
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statement means that if, in fact, our consciousness were a
continuous and ever concrescent stream of ideas occurring
in groups one after another in an open 3eries of specious
presents, and heing retained memorially as additions to each
successive such specious present -- so that all our past
experience is present to us in each succeeding moment of
consciousness -- then, we might be able to describe our
Selves as that spiritual substance which is revealed, through
the having present of such a complex and ever swelling
stream of ide/as; for, that spiritual substance is revealed
in such ideas, is already admitted; because consciousness
is that which accompanies every perception and volition i.e.
if we perceive or will, we know that we do so, and our
knowing that we do so involves us in having those ideas of
reflection whose obiects are precisely these perceptions and
willings as such, and, as we saw in para.89 above, one of
the minimum concomitants of all ideas of reflection is an
awareness of the contained or underlying spiritual sub¬
stance revealed in and through them. And since, if our
experience were indeed like this, all our 'past" i.e. all
former ideas we have ever had would, in all their excessive
number and complexity, be re-presented in each present, that
spiritual substance revealed as a minimal concomitant of the
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idea of reflection t^hose object would be our preception
of them all at once in their complexity, would presumably
be the same "identical" dubstance. But, as Locke points
out, our experience ijs not like that, nor in fact anything
at all like it. Sometimes we sleep deeply, thereby inter¬
rupting the stream of consciousness for a greater or less
period, and have no ideas ''or at least none with that con¬
sciousness which remarks our waking thought." (ibid). Some¬
times we are absorbed in some limited part of what is pre¬
sented to us so that we are for the time quite oblivious of
our recent and remoter past, and so on. So that our experi¬
ence is, in fact, of a series of longer or shorter intervals
of consciousness, the contents of which are diverse and of
very varying complexity? and this means that although
spiritual substance may be revealed in each interval of
consciousness or in each successive state therein, there
is no certainty that in each case the spiritual substance is
the same identical substance. Let us suppose, for example,
that the contents of two intervals of consciousness is
represented by the series firstly "1,2,3,4,5, 0" and
secondly "a,b,c,d,e,.......n", and further that, as not only
•well may be, but certainly frequently is, .the case, neither
series has any one unit in common with the other, then
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although the constitutive ideas of each series may
severally and together reveal spiritual substance, unless
the consciousness ia expanded so that "both series are
included, it is obviously impossible to assert that the
substances revealed by the constituent ideas of the two
aeries are the identical substance. They might» per
accidens, be so; but that i3 something we could never
'miow unless the consciousness were so expanded -- as of
course it might be, in the sense that a later interval of
consciousness might include, in its constitutive ideas,
memorial representations of the order "1,a,2,b,3»c,4 id,...
..On" together with other presented ideas indigenous to
such a third interval of consciousness itself. But until
we can with honesty assert that our experience at any time
consists of a super-series of ideas which exhaustively
includes every constitutive idea of every other previous
interval of consciousness marked off from its fellows by a
drowsy nod or diminution or concentration of attention, we
must yield Locke tie point that description of what we
experience as our Selves is not properly achieved by
asserting the continued existence of a single substance
underlying that experience, and the further point that
whether the successive stares of conscious experience are
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underlain by the same substance or different substances
"concerns not personal identity at all". The point is
perhaps to be made again that Locke never denies that i_t
is possible that the conscious experience of any one
"person" is underlain by one single substancet his point
is that as far as what ordinarily we experience of our
Selves goes, the matter is 30 uncertain that to assert
that we do_ actually experience the continuation of such a
single substance is plainly wrong, and that the hypothesis
itself, whether "reasonable" or "unreasonable", is so
little justified by what we do have in the way of con¬
tinuity of consciousness (which is a.so a relative dis¬
continuity) that its entertainment is quite irrelevant to
an account of the grounds of personal identity as we do,
and can only, know it.
110. This, then, is one argument why we must locate
identity of person in continuity of consciousness and not
in invariability of cubstance. Further to it, we should
note that Locke says, Il.xxvii.10a: "For it is by the
consciousness it.(any intelligent being) has of its present
thoughts and actions, that it is self to Itself now, and
so will be the same self, as fax" as the same consciousness
can extend to actions past or to come-*-", and again at
II.xxTii.17: "That with which the consciousness of this
present thinking thing can join itself (Locke's italic)5
makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with
nothing else? and so attributes to itself, and own3 all
the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that con¬
sciousness reaches, and no further.", for these passages
contain a qualification which, however obvious to common
sense, could have damaging "philosophical" consequences if
it were ignored or denied. The consciousness of personal
identity in any "Here and How" is coeval with the con¬
sciousness of whatever objects are the content of that "Here
and How", and these may well include the retaitied or revived
cabsciousness of objects which were the content of some
other "Here and How" which is now a "Then", but this does
not mean that the consciousness which is the ground and
medium of our knowing our Selves is confin d to the content —
which may or may not include retained or revived contents of
few or many previous moments of consciousness -- of any
particular "Here and How", nor that there is an unique
S — — —
A The rare and only partially investigated phenomena of pre¬
cognition are in point here, but I wish to remark in this
connection only that the discussion of their relation to the
problem of Personal Identity would probably be a sort of
"mirror image" of the discussions to be unfolded here.
-138-
"Here and Nov/" whose content includes the revived and
retained content of every previous moment of consciousness,
as in the hypothetical example we worked out above, but
on the contrary, as Locke here tells us, it means that so
far from being the consciousness of one particular moment
in which we actually do experience something, it is whatever
consciousness we can achieve of things of which we have, in
fact, previously been conscious and which sometimes we
"remember" and sometimes we do not. If this is not so, then
we are saying that Locke denies us memory, and this he does
not do in any of his accounts. Our experience, Locke i3
saying, is such that our successive intervals of conscious¬
ness contain, among other presentations, diverse contents
''as memorially qualified" which, in the case of different
©I
units of the successive series, exclude each other to a
greater or less degree, and no unit of any series contains
all the possible content which we may have a3 "memorially
qualified". In brief, theij^ that consciousness in terms
of which we know Selves as relations ojf identity between
terms which are, in each case, a then-Self arid a ITow-Self
is not, or not only, the actual consciousness of any moment
\
as "now" (i.e. that in which any intelligent being "is self
to itself now"), but is also the potential consciousness
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which is very variously actuali&ed "by the supervention
of the phenomenon which we call "remembering".
ill. This view, as I have remarked, is not repugnant
at east to common sense; bjections nevertheless can be
made to it. And the most relevant of these are:-
i. (ilote: the answer to this first objection is only
partially anticipated in the previous para.)
Personal identity cannot be grounded in the actual
eonscious ess persisting in any one moment, because if that
fere so, then "I" am not the same person ag I was on this
day of the month ten years ago, unless I am remembering that
of which I was conscious at that previous time.
ii. Personal identity cannot be grounded in the
potential consciousness which, when actualised, might have
as part of it, anything of the extended series of things
of which "I have been" conscious, because if that were so,
then there is, in fact, no ground of identity, because
until the potentiality is actualised there is no certainty
that thra relation between the "now" element in the actualis-
ation and the "then" element, is one of "identity1, nor,
even when it is actualised, that the ideas which are
actmalAsed as the "then"-terminal of the relationship) may
not be thos^ annexed to some different person" i.e. may not
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have "been related to a different "now"-terminal in a
relation which formerly occurred? nor that the ideas
which are actualised as the "then"-terminal of a relation
in a present moment of consciousness may not have been,
when they first occurred in the past, those that constituted
a "now"-terminal which, in that past moment of consciousness,
4
was related to a further "then"-terminal consisting of ideas
which are no part of the potential consoiousness of the
Self whose ideas constitute the "now"-terminal of the
present moment of consciousness? nor that the ideas which
might "be actualised as the "then" element might not simul¬
taneously have as their related "now'--terminal other ideas
(i.e. those annexed to "another person") not included in
the series of the first mentioned "now'-terrrdnal. In
other words, one person might be indistinguishable from
another.
iii. Personal identity cannot have, as its joint
grounds, such actual and potential consciousness; because
if it is consciousness"which makes every one to be what he
calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other
thinking things", then the Self "creates itself" -- and does
so ever anew in each moment o£ consciousness, so that the
content of that Self never has elements of such a kind that
between them the required relation can be asserted. And
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this is so because, -/hen any potential o ject of conscious¬
ness (of the required so~t) becomes actuali3ed, the mere
fact of its actual!sation in consciousness makes it to ae
one with the reraaining contents of the consciousness which
form the context of its actualisation, and whether or not
it is properly, in the sense required,a "then"-terminal in
a relationship with the remaining elements of its context
(the "now"-terminal), the mere inclusion of it in conscious¬
ness makes it a part of the particular actual moment of
consciousness in which it occurs, which involves an 'I"
whose consciousness it is, and the resulting relation between
it and the "now"-terminal does no^T constitute a revelation
or discovery of Self through memory, but a creation of Self
in the present. In other words, wonsciousness creates the
Self or ''I" by "thinking itself I". And the objection to
this is that Locke does not seem, on the face of it, to want
to suggest t' at the "I creates itself by "thinking about IM.
This objection — which is by no means a negligible
one -- can usefully be expressed in another way vis. if it
is asserted that any two ideas in consciousness are in the
relation of identity as between a "then"-terminal and a
"now"-terminal in one personal consciou msss, then there is
no possible way in which I, if it is my consciousness, or
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anyone else, can test this proposition, because my "being
I" (my being myself) consists, for that moment, precisely
in my making or entertaining it. So that any occurrence of
such a relation between two or more ideas bjr its mere
occurrence creates a new self which is quite independent of
the nature or origin of the terms of the relation or of
whether or not they are, in fact, related as units in the
series of the successive perceptions of any one person,
which, on + he other hand, would necessarily have to be the
fe»cas 1 if personal, identity were to be grounded in consciousness.
112. The first two of these objections are those which
Berkeley actually makes, or at least indicates, in an entry
in his Commonplace Book (Works. Cpbl. Fras. Vol.IV -- also
quoted by Campbell Fraser in his edition p.449), and the
third represents a line of thought which was later developed
positively in some post-Kantian German philosophies and
their derivatives (e.g. James Perrier's, as in his "Institutes
of etaphysic" ■— sic -- particularly in Props.i - iii - ix.).
But that they are not legitimate extensions from Locke's
description of what we experience of ersonal Identity, but
are distortions of it, we can see as follows:
ia. The first objection can be dealt with in a short
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way by pointing out that it ignores what has already been
demonstrated fiz. that Lock® does not confine the ground
of personal identity to the actual consciousness persisting
in any one moment, but includes in it potential conscious¬
ness in the form of memory; so that even if 1 am not now
at this moment conscious of what and how I was conscious on
this day of the month ten years ago, I am still the same
person as I was then in that it is possible for me to re¬
collect something of my consciousness at that time. The
only relevance the objection can then have is when it takes
the form of admitting that "it is by the consciousness it
(an intelligent being) has of its present thoughts and
actions, that it is self to itself how", but denying that
we have such potential consciousness in the form of memory
of ideas which can be revived although they may not be so.
And this might, I suppose, take the form of a view, somewhat
like that of the third objection, that the occurrence of
apparently "me orial" id-ass is in fact the occurrence of
novel ideas with a quite Illusory apparent reference to the
past, or of a view that there are some ideas which cannot
be revived, or things that cannot be remembered# And to
deal with the objection of locks's account of memory which#
being of the first importance to the whole of the present
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exposition, would have had to ha undertaken sooner or later.
113. We find that what is perhaps Locke's most interest¬
ing statement of his views on memory is not, as might have
been expected, in chapter x. of II "Of Retention", hut is
embedded in the polemic against innate ideas in Book I.,
and I propose to quote extensively from this passage I.iii.21.
In the course of his contention that any ideas which the
mind does not actually think about (e.g. "innate" ideas)
must he lodged in the memory, if they exist at all, Locke
gives the following account of the memory in which they may
he lodged; ideas "must be known, when tfhey are re emhered,
to have been perceptions in the mind before; unless re¬
membrance can be without remembrance. Ror to remember is
to perceive with a consciousness that it wa3 perceived
or known before. Without this, whatever idea comes into
the -and is new, and not Bgmembered; this consciousness of
its having been in the mind before, being that which dis-
tinguisues remembering from all other ways of thinking."
He goes on to remark that awy idea "having been an actual
perception, is so in the mind that, by the memory, it can be
made an actual rerception again. ' And, again, iterating the
A
special distinction of this mode of consciousness, he saysj
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"Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is
with a consciousness that it had been there before, and was
not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so,
1 appeal to every on e ' s observation . " Again: "... ui tnout
which consciousness of a former perception there is no
remembrancei and whatever idea comes into the mind without
that consciousness is not remembered " Somewhat
further on in the same passage he asserts: if it (an
idea) be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought
into actual view without a perception that it comes out of
the memory: which is this, that it had been known before,
and is now remembered." Again: if they be in the
memory t ey can be revived without any impression from
without | and whenever they are brought into the mind. .....
they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly
new to it. This being a constant and di3tinguishiny dif¬
ference between what is, and what is not in the memory .....
and what is in the memory ... appears not to be new, but the
mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before."
114. jne of the advantages of this particular exposition
of Locke's, besides it; relative compactness and precision,
is that it avoids some vicious metaphors that occur in his
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lat«r version metaphors that are vicious in that they
of his readers (not perhaps the most discerning among them)
to what is the content of their experiences but have instead
misdirected it and misled them. When in II.x. he comes to
treat of memory in a chapter on the faculty of retention,
Locke remarks that the way of retention that the mind has
other than contemplation of an idea continued through some
perceptible duration from its reception, "is the power to
revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting
have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of
sight." (it is a pity that the "as it were" is not italic¬
ised in the text.) And this power, he goes on to say, "is
memory, which is as it were the storehouse of our ideas.
(Again we are to note the explicit qualification "as it
were".) But by the time he came to prepare the second
edition he found it necessary to correct his metaphors, for
the sake of those who would not attend to the "as it weres",
hp inserting this; "But, our ideas being nothing but actual •
perceptions in the mind ....... this laying up of our ideas
..... signifies no more hut this ..... that the mind has a
power ..... to revive perceptions which it has once had,
w■th thls additional perception annexed to them, that it has
had them before." How, from these quotations, and
their purpose of directing the attention of some
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particularly from those parts of them I have italicised, it
appears that, in terms of our present interpretation of
Loche's phenomenology, the situation is this: there are in
our experience elements such thay they can be intelligibly
described as things (or ideas) "remembered"; and these
phenomena, like all others, are ideas, either simple or com¬
plex ; but whether simple or complex they always have, as
we have found, certain minimal concomitants, or perhaps it
would be better to say that these simple ideas which are
perceived, or in this case, "remembered", either as single
or as parts of m re complex ideas, are always "groups of"
concomitants which.are not extricable one from another
"beyond a certain minimum limit which, as far as ordinary
immediate presentation goes, consists in the corapresence of
Existence, Extension and/or Duration, a' Content specific
in being the content of that particular idea but of variable
nature, and, in certain cases. Substantiality of one kind or
the other: Locke is now saying that, apart from the limit
set by the minimal concomitants of anything Immediately
presented, there is another limit applicable only to certain
phenomena -- i.e. "ideas remembered" -- and it is a limit
different from the former by the addition of a further
minimal concomitant, variously described in the quotations
~K2'
above, for which we might use the phrase "me o ial quali¬
fication". For an idea to be remembered (i.e. for "re¬
membrance to be remembrance") it must have this qualific¬
ation; if it doa3 not have it, then it is not a remembered
idea, but a novel one. And once again his description seems
admirably Just to me. Such phenomena, in other words, do
occur. And, since this is so, we can perceive a relation
within the content of an actual moment of consciousness as
between ideas subject to this perceived qualification which
are (by the memorial qualification) "then"-terminals and
other "present" ideas, thich is a relation of identity (in
certain respects), so that, in fact, we do have experience
of a continuing consciousness of the sort t e objection we
are now considering purports to deny. (if questions are
raised, at this point as to whether such a relation is indeed,
ar must be, one of "identity", I must ask the; to be reserved
until the matter is more fully explicated in its place in
parau 123-125 below.) Per sonal identity, then, i3 to be
grounded in a conscio sness extended to whatever it can
apprehend, and among the things it patently can apprehend
are "remembered ideas" -- in the sense described.^ Of
We must try to keep constantly in mini how Locke uses
"idea" -- as distinct from any way in which his successors
may have used it -- viz. as referring to whatever, at ail
discrininabla, we are conscious of.
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subsidiary objections to Locke's theory of memory itself,
those of his contemporary Morris which provoked him to add
to the text, are not important. T ey consist in seizing
on the metaphors in II.x. with a complete indifference to
the repeated "as it weres". If there is a "storehouse"
for ideas which can be brought out from memory, way, it is
• asked, is there not a storehouse for "innate" ideas. Hut
Locke is not asserting that there is an actual repository
where the ideas while uhremembered 'go on existing". In
none of his manners of speaking does he try to describe the
wind as an actual extended thing which could be coiapartraented.
(•ven if mind rere "thinking matter", it does not follow that
the "thinking" would be extended like the "matter" -- it
might be, as indeed Locke suggests in another place, an
.-•organic "function".} His use of such terms as "storehouse",
laid aside", "out of sight , "bring in sight", "repository",
and of all thai is suggested by such words in his account as
"ret ntion, revive, repetition, reproduction, return, renew,
recognise, refresh", where the prefix "re" transfers the
referent invariably into % mode, the essentia.' mark of Which
if an immediately apprehended "once-1hen-and-again-now",
wnich is the controlling concept underlying all these metaphors'
/
of Locke's is lainiy enough an attempt to draw our attention
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to a specific qualification which "immate" ideas (if there
are any) would not possess, sincp they are supposed to be
essentially what is not remembered.J ('.ha1 could be re¬
membered in relation"to "innate" Ideas» would presumably be
the occurrence of an innate idea -- or an instance of the
operation of an innate principle, but that would be, in
any case, a perfectly reputable "memory'' in its own right#)
The 'neatness" which Professor Aaron purports to sff.ind in
this criticism, which is a naive and literal misinterpret¬
ation of what Locke goes out of his way to emphasise are
metaphors, is something which T confess eludes me.
115. Professor Aaron's own criticism, however, may be a
different matter (op.clt. pp.129-130). Locke, says
Professor Aaron, lays aside the "'repository' theory" as he
calls it (which means no more than that Locke tries in the
second edition to make it even clearer, if possible, that
his metaphors are indeed, metaphors) and regards each in¬
stance of memory as a new fresh perception. It may not be
unduly pedantic to point out that Locke does nothing of the
kind, and that he has already made it quite clear in the
Cp. the whole argument of Look I.
first edition text of Boole I. that each instance of memory
is a "new fresh perception"."'' However, this, Professor
Aaron agrees, dos away with Horris's "difficulty" as to the
" whereabouts of" ideas when they are not actually remembered
but leaves, he thinks, an equal difficulty of distinguishing
between perceiving and remembering. There is, of course,
no such difficulty. An appeal to observation -- which
Locke bids us make -- reveals that certain pehnomena in our
experience have, as one of their minimal concomitants, a
qualification which distinguishes them from others, so that
we can intelligibly call the first kind "memories" and the
second kind "perceptions". "This being" as Locke says,
"a constant and distinguishing difference between what is,
and what is not in the memory", and again is "that which
distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking" --
including "perceiving". And we do make a distinction in
these terms in every moment almost, of our waking lives.
If any of the ideas we have do not have this distinction
then they are not memories, nor do we call them such, but
are perceptions; but, be it noted, if none of our ideas
Professor Aaron himself refers to these important passages
in Book I at another point in his exposition, but gives the
reference wronrly as I.iv.SO — theng.be ing no such paragraph
in the "Essay".
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have this qualification i.e., if it is, as Professor Aaron
maintains, impossible to distinguish "between perceiving and
remembering in terms of Locke's account, then, appealing
to our findings of some time ago in paras 55-5? above, we
must point out that we would not be conscious at all (and
we are}» because even in the perception of the identity of
an dea with itself, i.e. of an idea as a new psychic occur¬
rence of which we. ara coisscious , with its apprehended con¬
tent within the minimum of duration which has to be the
specious present if consciousness is to continue, there is
involved the recollection, admittedly over a brief gpp, of
one of the presented terms of that relation of identity.
And as we raraain recalcitrantly conscious over relatively
long intervals, it is purposeless to deny that the dis¬
tinguishing qualification is experienced. Professor Aaron
is determined, however, that the grounds of the distinction
are insufficient; because "we frequently perceive something
we have perceived before, and remember to have perceived
before, and yet this particular perception is not itself an
instance of memory. Row, T confess that I find this state¬
ment of Professor Aaron's baffling in respect of any relation
it con bear to Locke's theory of memory. How much does he
include in "this particular perception ..... itself"? And
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if the now-perceiving of a thing occurs in a situation
which is also a remembering of Ir ving seen the thing oefore,
what is it, if it is not the "now"-terminal of the relation
which constitutes the instance of remembering» on Locke's
account? After all the essence of a memorial situation is
that it is bi-polar. Memory involves the present just as
much as the past "if remembrance is to be remembrance."
It may be that what Professor Aaron is trying to get at is
this; sometimes we perceive something i.e. have as one of
the presented phenomena of a given moment of consciousness,
an idea which is without the distinguishing me orial quali¬
fication which Locke draws our attention to, and then very
soon after in a subsequent moment of consciousness which
continues to include that "perception", we "remember" that
"this" we have seen before i.e. there is now added to the
phenomena presented, the distinguishing memorial quali¬
fication (which, as discriminate within consciousness, is
itself an "idea''). but surely I can and do distinguish
between the phenomenon which is the object (idea) under its
"presentational qualification" and the phenomenon which is
the object under its "memorial qualification", both quali¬
fications being, I maintain, in Locke's usage of the word
'idea". Suppose that the perception I have in the first
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instance i3 a visual image which is presented to me, in
that moment, as "novel", and then very soon thereafter I
"remember" that I have "seen it. "before", ;nd have the
additional idea involved in that presented to me together
with the continuing idea-of-sensation "of seeing it";
these "ideas" (or "ideal iualifications" if that is any
clearer -- they are still phenomena, i.e. "Lockean" ideas)
are-distinguishable in the latter case, but that does not
involve me in "seeing two vi3ual images ! one "as perceived"
and a fainter copy sitting alongside "as remembered". The
sensual content of the idea certainly remains unchanged
during the original perception and subsequent (or for that
matter simultaneous) remembering, but that does not mean
that the perception of the sensual content and the remember¬
ing of the same sensual content are indistinguishable, or
th.,t the sensual content is not simultaneously qualified
"presentatianally" and "memorially", so that because the
sensue1 content does remain stable, I cannot see and re¬
member it at the same time, or that it, as a present per¬
cept Ion to me now, is not the nearer end of an instance of
memory. To say that it does .;l2- that, Is o be involved in
giving an almost incredibly crude reading of what Locke means
ideas , and one which we can only hope Professor Aaron
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does not assent to -- viz, a reading that they "are all
little pictures'.
116. how if, from this, we take it that Locke's theory
of memory itself is freed of these objections, we can
properly conclude that, in terms of his account, the first
formulation of the objection we are considering is invalid --
and the argument towards this has had to be rehearsed at
length beoause of the necessary examination of the theory of
memory so far. It is clearly invalid because Locke's
account consists in his drawing'our attention to the fact
that, in our experience, consciousness does (a fortiori
"can") extend to ideas which wa have had before, and also
that we know that they are ideas we have had before because
of something given with certain ideas viz. one of their
minimal concomitants (memorial qualification) Which, as we
can see on a moment's reflection, must be present if con¬
sciousness of any kind is to continue -- and it does. And
if the objector takes refuge in saying that this which is
so given may still be ''illusion", then the answer is that,
in that case, so is everything else in our experience, and
if all experience is Uniformly illusory (whatever that could
mean) the final answer deserved would be no more than the
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eristic quip that if ail is a dream, then that is of no
consequence at all, provided we never wake up.
117. There remains, however, the other formulation of
the objection that even if our consciousness can so include
so- e of "our own" past ideas, and we can thereby know some
parts of what constitutes our own identity through such an
extended consciousness, it may still perhaps be the case
that there are past ideas which cannot be so revived; so
that, for example, if the ideas which constitute what was
my consciousness exactly a decade ago cannot be revived,
then I am not the same person (and can never be) as that
which was conscious exactly a decade ago.
118. In starting to deal with this form of the objection
to Locke's doctrine th&t continuity of consciousness is the
ground of personal identity, it may be as well to have a
look at what h« has to say about the circumstances in which
those ideas which can be revived are in fact normally re¬
vived, to see if there is perhaps any reason to be found
why, counter to the oblection, it is the case that all past
ideas can be so revived. In II.xxvii.23. Locke makes, on
this point, the general observation that "the mind man#
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times recovers the memory of past consciousness, which it
had lost for twenty years together." And, reverting to
x. of II. we find that in drawing our attention to the
sort of situation in which this may occur, he says that
"the appearance of these dormant pictures" depends "some¬
times on the will." And goes ons "The mind very often
sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns
as it_ were the eye of the soul upon it,...." And that is
one sort of situation in which ideas can "be revived. But,
otfi the other hand, "sometimes too they start up in our minds
of their own accord ..... and very often are roused and
tumbled out ..... by turbulent and tempestuous passions."
The situations, then, in which ideas are liable to recur
may or may not be influenced by the volition of the subject,
and in connection with his last point that strong emotion
is a frequent contributory to their reappearance, we may
also note that he says at II.xxvii.10 that ideas may be
fixed in the memory i.e. may be readily capable of revival,
when they are those "which naturally at first make the
deepest and most lasting impressions those which are
accompanied with pleasure or pain." Readiness to be re¬
vived is also, he observes subsequently, ensured by fre¬
quent repetition in the ordinary way of experience. So
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that, it seems, the sort of ideas that can be revived in¬
clude, among others, those that we wilfully try to re¬
produce -- in the example we took this might, mean that,
having some belief that I was ten years ago the same
person as I am now, I may make an effort to recall what I
was conscious of then, and may or may not succeed -- or,
again, I may in the present have an experience of unusual
and intensely emotional nature which, without effort on
my part, may revive a memory of that day ten years ago by
reason of some similarity or other connectedness in the
consciousness on the two occasions. And this, of course,
does happen. Again, on that past day I may have had an
intensely painful experience which, although its memory may
be suppressed according to some principle of psychic self-
preservation, remains ready to obtrude itself upon ray con-
sciousness from time to time? and this, again, is observ¬
ably quite common.
119. It might be said that none of this information
Locke gives us is very remarkable, but that that is so
arises only from the fact that it is both accurate and
commonplace, which, in Locke's opinion and in mine, makes
it good evidence. Certainly there is nothing in it which
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would persuade us that it is necessarily true that all
;
ideas can "be revived, but such accurate and easily verifiable
observations as Locke does make do, I think, shift the
balance of the probability to the side that all ideas can
be revived, and leaves the onus probandi that they cannot,
very much with the objector.
180. On the other hand, Locke is very clear that some
ideas can and do become utterly lost. In II.x.4. he writes
that ideas can "quickly fade, and. often vanish quite out of
the understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining
characters of themselves than shadows flo flying over fields
of corn." And among the situations in which this can
occur, he catalogues lack of attention in the moment when
the ideas occur, states of the bodily organs, and disease,
such as fevers which can "in a few days calcine all those
images to du3t and confusion, which seemed to be as lasting
as if graved in marble", and mere non-repetition whose fatal
effect he describes in a passage ef startling eloquences
"Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth often die
before us? and our minds represent to us those tombs to
which we are approaching; where, though the brass and marble
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remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the
imagery moulder3 away. The pictures drawn in our minds
are laid in fading colours; and if not sometimes refreshed,
vanish and disappear." Finally, that ideas can be lost,
i3 plainly stated in para.8 of the same chapter, when he
writes that the memory sometimes "loses the idea quite, and
so far it produces perfect ignorance. For, since we know
nothing further than we have the idea of it, when that is
gone, we are in perfect ignorance." Now, given that it is
highly probable at least that any of the ideas which we have
once had can be revived, and that nevertheless it is highly
probable that some ideas are in fact lost and never revived,
it must be admitted, on Locke's view, that if the latter
situation does in fact occur e.g. that what I was conscious
of ten years ago never is in fact revived, whether it can be
or no, then (and here we must be very cautious with out
language) the Self I "was then", in the hypothesis, ia> not,
and is not any part of, the Self which I know and, in know¬
ing, am now. And that blunt and perhaps rather ambiguous
statement must be left for the moment, because to deal with
the problem it raises further, as it must be dealt with,
would involve too great an anticipation of the argument by a
consideration of Locke's very important distinction between
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"self" and "person", which we shall presently come upon.
Meanwhile the (provisional) answer to the objection i3 that
the situation is not that the ground of personal identity
cannot be in continued consciousness because that can be
broken as in the case we have exainined, but that if it is
so broken, then what is destroyed by the bi*eak has no part
in the identity revealed in the otherwise continued con¬
sciousness — which conclusion is, in the sequel, a good
deal less paradoxical than it might appear.
121. It is, however,1 hard to leave the consideration of
this objection without making the remark that it is odd
that, in so far as he entertained it, this should have
been an objection of George Berkeley's, since he was by his
professions very much more committed than Locke to a belief
in the latter Day when everyone shall receive according to
his doings and the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open
i.e. when all former contents of consciousness will be re¬
furnished to the consciousness under judgement. More than
once, we may note, Locke is prepared to rest his argument
on such eschatological grounds -- and, be it noted, he is
perfectly entitled to do so, for religious experience, in¬
cluding tnat of apocalypse, if vouchsafed, is just as much
156-
experience as the seeing of colours, the hearing of noises,
or the smelling of smells; and the only empirieist who
would attempt to deny it is one of the sort who, in A
Whitehead'3 words, refuses to look at experience as it is,
naked and unashamed, and without its a priori fig-leaf —
which garment, however exiguous, is usually cut distinctively
more after the style of Hume than of Locke. This leads to
an observation that is of more general relevance to the
present discussion than might perhaps appear, in that by
reminding us of what sort of man Locke was, it may prepare
us to anticipate the methods he is apt to use; and it is
that among the very frequent expressions of piety and
ultimate reliance on the revelation of scripture, which
occur in 17th and 18th Century philosophising, Locke's, as
far as my reading goes, seem the least affected, and their
genuineness is vouched for by the mere bulk, which we some¬
times overlook, of his exegesis of the apostle Paul (which
must have been a labour of love) carried out late in life.
There is in his religious attitude (which contrasts with
Stillingfleet's insufferable assurance) the same impressive
humility whieh, in the matter of philosophy, confined his
exceptional powers to a candid examination of what he
experienced (but of all that he experienced) and restrained
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him from embarking on "the va3t ocean of Being", upon the
waters of which three among his contemporaries and close
successors who in their time ornamented episcopal chairs,
were under the misapprehension they could walk with so much
more skill and confidence than he. The relevance of thi3
digression, however, is "becoming tenuous, and it must be
concluded, even if such reflections on Locke's character
are a pleasant relief from the dialectical rigours of the
discussion.
122, Ve must now, in continuing the exposition of Locke's
doctrine, turn to the second objection:
iia. We are to meet an objection that these ideas
which can tre and are revived in "present memory" may be ideas
which, in their original or a previous occurrence, were ideas
another consciousness, "somebody else's", so that the
apparent relation of identity between the aualifications of
the revived ideas "as self-consciously held by a person",
and the same qualification of the present ideas, is false,
and -- as is the logical consequence -- some or all persons
would be the same person.
123. In dealing with this and the next objection, we must
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revert once again to an earlier part of our exposition of
what is Locke's description of experience -- and if these
constant reversions a-e tedious, it must "be pointed out that
it is the copiousness of Locke's description that imposes
such prolixity upon us, for neglect of the effort to keep
in mind his various accounts leads, as we have had occasion
to see, to extravagance of criticism -- and we can start
hy noticing that according hoth to the account and the ob¬
jection to it, what totally constitutes the consciousness
in which the ground of personal identity is or is not to be
located, are id^as, either presented or re-presented. We
have already marked that in Locke's account, an idea is
whatever is the object of the understanding whan a man
thinks, and that includes phantasms, notions, percepts,
concepts, images, and whatever in fact is the object of any
perception or volition. And we have found that of ways of
perception (the term being used as one of the two moat
general in Locke's phenomenology) there is one we call
memory, by which we can make ideas "appear again» and be
the objects of our thoughts." (ll.x.2.) We know, further,
that consciousness is inseparable from thinking and essential
to it, "it being impossible for anyone to perceive without
perceiving that he does perceive", and that "when we see,
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hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we
"know that w<= do so." In II.i.19. Locke makes it quite
clear that this is his view "by saying: "If they say the
man thinks always, "but i3 not always conscious of it, they
may as well say his "body i3 extended without having parts.
Per it is altogether as intelligible to say a body is ex¬
tended without parts, as that anything thinks without being
conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so." It
follows, then, that every constitutive idea of the conscious¬
ness we are considering, whether of the presented sort or
of the re-presented sort, to which memory can extend — and
it is no part of the present objection to deny this much --
carries with it a qualification of being "consciously
possessed as some person's", and for brevity's sake we may
refer to this as the "I"-qualification.^ Further, since
remembering is a form of perceiving, every act of remembering
is, regarded as itself, a simple idea of reflection -- like
every other act of perceiving so regarded. .'very idea,
then, in the situation we are considering, which is a
1 I very much regret being reduced to using jargon like this
and like "then"-terminal and so on -- which is of a kind
that Locke himself would carefully have avoided -- but it
does do something to make a discussion as minute as this
less unwieldy.
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remembering, is a simple idea of reflection (which, we
must remember, is like all other "simple' ideas, a
"relatively unitary" idea with contents), part of whose
content is other remembered ideas, whether simple or more
complex. (An effort must be made to keep this in mind,
for the analysis i3 about to become unavoidably rather
complicated.) Now, if we revert to our previous exposition
in para.89 above, we see that in considering what, in ex¬
perience, are the minimal concomitants of any relatively
unitary idea which is a "simple idea of reflection", that
these included "dutation", "self-identity", a volitioneil or
perceptual "content", and "the awareness that it belongs to
some thinking thing" (in other words, the "I"-qualification
as we have decided to call it). And this last concomitant
-- only isolable in abstraction -- was, we saw, the revelation
of spiritual substance in every idea of reflection as pre¬
sented. How, since every time a m nd has an idea, it knows
it has it, so that when we see we perceive we do so, or when
we smell we perceive we do so, it is evident that every idea
a§. remembered involves the remembering of a simple idea of
reflection, because, if, for example, a visual idea is re¬
membered, it must be remembered as "a mind's visual idea
perceived by that mind", so that not only is the sensual
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content of the visual idea remembered, but so also is the
"perceiving of" the visual idea remembered. That is to
say, part of the content of every simple idea of reflection
which is a present act of memory, is a simple idea of re¬
flection which was a perceiving by a mind which took place
in the past i.e. if last week I saw a green cube and today
I remember that I saw it, then I have in my consciousness
not only the Idea which is the "memory of" the green ob,1 eot,
but also the idea which is the 'memory of" seeing it.
Every act of memory, then, involves the recollection of a
simple idea of reflection; and. one of the minimal con¬
comitants of any simple idea of reflection is an "I"~
qualification, 30 that the recollected simple idea of re¬
flection which is necessarily part of the content of a
present idea of reflection which is an act of memory,
carries with it an "I"-qualification, and this '^"-quali¬
fication is recollected with it. Now, the "I"-qualification,
as we saw, is what reveals a thinking substance whose idea
it is at the time at which the idea occurs as a presented
idea. Therefore in any act of memory there is involved
the idea which is a re-presented idea (itself a minimal con¬
comitant of an idea of reflection) revealing a thinking
Substance whose idea it was. Tha' is to say, frhen a man
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remembers, say, gome part of Ms visual experience, he has
in his consciousness not only the revived idea of the sensual
content of that experience, hut also the revived idea of a
perceiving, part of which is, in turn, an "idea of" thinking
sybstance {the '[["-qualification). Consequently -- and we
must be very careful indeed here since the act of memory
by which the ideas which are the memory of the past visual
experience and of the perceiving of that experience, is,
itself, an idea of reflection with an "I "-qualif icaf^ ion, if
there i_s a relation of identity between the "I"-qualification
of the present idea of reflection (act of memory) and the
»«I"-qualification of the remembered act of perceiving, then
we know that the man is remembering an idea which he had
before. I said that we had to be extremely careful here,
for if we do not keep some nice distinctions in mind at this
point, we shall find ourselves making a quite fatal confusion•
Because, as the argument stands, it might too hastily be
said that since the "I"-qualification in any presented idea
of reflection reveals a spiritual substance whose idea it is,
and if there is a relation of identity between the "I"-
aua,lification of a present act of memory and that of a
recollected act of perceiving, then it follows that there is
a perceived relation of identity between the substance
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revealed in the other. And this, of course, would mean
that the ground of personal identity was in a perceived
continuity of spiritual substance, whic would be, as I
say, a fatal confusion. But this is not so. Ideas are
idea3 and substances are substances. Ideas are not sub¬
stances: nor are "ideas of substances", the substances
themselves -- however much it may be true that substances
ar revealed "in and through" them. Some precaution has
already been taken against this possible confusion in para.
94 above, where i+ is pointed out that although it is true
that every simple idea of reflection which we have presented,
has as one of its minimal necessary concomitants, an aware¬
ness which is a reference to the mind "whose idea it is",
this does not tell us whether or not it is the same thinking
substance that is revealed in successive ioeas, or whether
each substance perishes with the passing of the idea; nor
does anything in our subsequent examination of the theory of
me ory invalidate th|§|p. To nuke it clearer that this is so,
we may, having recently emphasised that ideas even "of sub¬
stances" are not the substances themselves, refer back to
the argument in para.89 above, once again, where there is an
instructive analogy. It is pointed out there that the
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x-sl&tively unitary idea, for example, "of a green object"
contains an awareness (by no means precise) of the object
of which, it is an idea, together with other indissolubly
connected elements such as, once again, duration, existence,
and extension, but it is further pointed out that not all
such ideas have at all times this particular concomitant,
which is not necessary as, for instance, "duration" is.
For when such ideas are "revived" in the mind, they do not,
as revived idea?, have this element which they did, have
when they were "presented" and not "re-presented" ideas; or,
in more concrete terms, when I"see" a green object, the ideas
by which I know .it include a "qualification of thinghoci
but when I have a memory-inage of it, although the ideas
which constitute that image include the idea "of a green
object" i.e. a qualification as of thinghood, the actual
thinghood is not revealed, because the thing is not present
on the latter occasion. Likewise, in the case we are now
examining, when a man has a relatively unitary idea which
is a present idea of reflection, that idea contains an
awareness (by no means precise) of the self whose idea, it is,
together with other indi)S30lubly connected elements such as
duration and existence; but when such ideas are "revived",
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they do not, a3 revived, have precisely this element that
they did have, or at least they do not have it iti the same
way as they did have it when they were "presented" and not
"re-presented" ideas: or, again more concretely, when a
man is immediately aware of thinking substance, the ideas
through which he is aware of it include a "qualification of
being thought by a present thinking substance", but when he
has a memory of his awareness, although the ideas that con¬
stitute that memory include the idea "of self or thinking
substance" i.e. a qualification as of being thought by a
particular thinking substance, the actual Self is not re¬
vealed, just as in the previous example the actual Thing was
not revealed, because on the latter occasion the thinking
substance is_ not, present as it was present in the original
occurrence of the idea. We might try to put it by using
a metaphor and saying that when Thinghood or Self is re¬
vealed ae present in the ideas of them, then these ideas*- *
are, as it were, transparent; whereas when, as in memories
of thera, neither Thinghood nor Self is actually present,
then the idea of them are opaque, so that -- if we can
develop the figure without too much hazard -- the ideas in
the fir3t case are like a lense through which we "see" the
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3ubstantial thing or self, while in the second they are
like a medallion or ivory on the surface of which "is en¬
graved" some sort of memorial "of a spiritual or material
substance.
124. So, therefore, it i_s possible for a relation of
%
identity to be discerned between the "I"-qualification of a
past idea of reflection which was of an act of perceiving,
and the "I"-qualification of a present idea of reflection
which is of an act of remembering, without it being in any
way possible (let alone necessary) for a similar relation
to be discerned between thinking substances, because the
"I"-qualification of the present act is that through which
actual thinking substance i_3 now revealed, and the "I
qualification of the past a.nd recollected act is that
through which actual thinking substance was then revealed
(and no longer is). It might be said that these dis¬
tinctions are indeed very subtle — but then so are some
of the nuances of our experience, which is the criterion --
but whether they are subtle or not, they must be noted,
For the sake of perplexed shades such as that of John
Norris, it is impossible to emphasise too strongly thatthese are optical metaphors»
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or we shall fall into errors which Locke tries hard to
avoid. It might he said, too, that the arguments to
their establishment are very wearisome, hut the answer is
that these points h ve to he made clear if we are to do
;justive to Locke's account, and if there is a way to make
their exposition chop less small and yet remain unambiguous,
I have not found it.
125. In accordance, then, with what we have found ahove,
the present objection fails. It is an objection whose
point is not that there is no ground or knowledge of personal
identity in the consciousness extended by memory, which we
actually do have, but that in the potential consciousness
which we may have, a memorial idea may be included which is
not "one of our own". Berkeley's own phrasing of the ob¬
jection isj "Wherein consists identity of person? Not in
potential (consciousness)5 for then all persons may be the
sam-*, for aught we know. " (loo. clt.). The suggestion,
as we saw, is that the ideas which might be actualised. as
the "then"-terminal, might have been, 'when they were, at
some time in the past, a "now"~terminal, the ideas of some
other mind, or that the ideas which might be actualised as
the "then'-terminal might be simultaneously related in
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identity to two mutually exclusive seri©3 of ideas forming
two different "now"~terminals. But, from our last argu¬
ment, this could not be so. Because, as far as memory is
concerned, every "then"-terminal and every "now"-terminal
must include ideas that are their respective "I"-qualifica¬
tions, and between such "I"-qualifications identity can be
discerned; 30 that if, as probably never happens, a man
were to find that he was presented with a set of ideas as a
"then"-terminal, the "I"-qualification of which did not
agree with the "I"-qualification of his present act of
memory, then he would know (see Berkeley's remark) that he
was "remembering" some "other" person's ideas -- if it is
at all possible even to conceive what such an experience
would be like. Accordingly, the ground of personal identity
may properly, as far as this objection is concerned, be
located not only in actual consciousness but al30 in
potential consciousness, since any potential consciousness
which could be actualised is such that any of its ideas
could be known either as "our own' former ideas, or, per
impossibile, as not so. This shews too, I think, that
when its implications arj£ drawn out in terras of the rest of
his description of experience, Locke's theory of memory is a
good deal less "inadequate" than dome critics'would have us
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suppos©. If it is remarked that I hare perhaps made the
way too easy for Locke "by frequent references to, what is
perhaps suspect, "acts of memory", then it must he pointed
out that the substitution of "instance of me ory ' wherever
the former phrase occurs, makes no difference at all to the
argument. If anyone wishes to believe that these is no
such thing as the "power in the mind" which Locke speaks of,
and that no memorial idea we have is ever the result of a
volition -- and to say this is to fly in the face of all the
evid nee from ordinary experience — then he is at liberty
so to describe his experience, provided that he realises
that this mere contingency in the succession of these
peculiarly qualified ideas (phenomena) is accompanied in
experience by such feelings and modal alteration of con¬
sciousness that it is perfectly intelligible and legitimate
to describe their occurrence as subject, in despite of Thos.
F.eid^ and others, to such a power. If the succession of
such ideas is merely contingent, even although our common
experience does not persuade us that it is, and Locke's
"power in the mind" is a metaphor -- then it is a vsry good
metaphor.
"Intellectual Powers" '^ssay III Cap.7 passim.
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126. Turning to the third objection we have to
consider:~
iiia. We should note that Professor Gibson has an
admirable short answer to the second formulation of it 1
gave (op.cit. p.115). This version says that a proposition
about myself must differ from all others since my self is
constituted by my thinking it, and that therefore any pro¬
positions about myself such as "I recognise this or that
past experience as mine" can never be verified the mere
thinking of the proposition, whether true or false, con¬
stituting the Self for and in that moment. Professor
Gibson disposes of this toy pointing out that "like all.
thought which is true, the judgement of self-consciousness
is determined for me and not by me. It is no arbitrary act
of mine, by which I am a self %o myself, or by which I re¬
cognise certain past actions as mine, whenever I think of
them.. In fact like all other forms of these relations,
identity and diversity of self are 'relations and ways of
comparing well-founded * (ll.jacvii .12.)".
My own answer in terms of th« present interpretation to
the more general formulation 1 gave of it, will be, in effect,
an explication of what is involved in "relations and ways of
compearing well-founded" which is, as it stands, too
elliptical.
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1?7. The Tersion of the o"blection we are to consider
here is in the form that "because personal identity is con¬
stituted "by a mind or Self annexing other ideas to the ideas
constituting its present consciousness, the content of any
idea so annexed becomes part of that self's personal
identity, so that if the content of such an idea is or
includes the doing of an action, then this present Self did
the action and is the same self now as did the action or
had the experience which is the content of the idea annexed.
Fow, if this means no more than that all the ideas which
make up my consciousness are "my" ideas, then the objection
s not an objection at all and can be neglected. Because,
for one thing, it has already been shewn in the argument
a-ainst the second objection that not only all the ideas
that- are presented as memorial in my or any other conscious¬
ness, but also any ideas that can "be presented in that con¬
sciousness, carry with them an "I"-qualification which can
he compared, as to identity, with the "I"-qualification of
my present consciousness, and although as far as experience
goes the "I"-qualification of all such ideas is found to
eren if, per irapossibile, one -/ere presented whose
'I"-qualification did not agree, then that fact would be
apparent and my mind or Snlf could not annex it to the
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present consciousness, since the necessary relation of
identity wonld not be discernible. The suggestion in this
obi action is that a mind or Self, being furnished in con¬
sciousness with an unordered manifold of ideas, selects out
from it some that it will annex to its temporally "present" .
ideas and thereby arbitrariljr makes a personal identity --
an "identity" which could, in these•circumstances, be
utterly diverse in successive moments of consciousness, and
which could, if the argument is pressed, bring about a
situation such that an identity which is "one person" in a
present moment of consciousness, could include within itself
the memory of being two or more utterly distinct persons
in its "own" past. But the point is that the fluent mani¬
fold of ideas presented to any present consciousness is not
unordered; it is ordered in that every idea in it which is
a memorial idea has an "I"-qualification which makes it one
of a class of ideas whose members agree in respect of their
"I"-qualifications with the members of the class of "present"
ideas, and in that if there were other ideas present which
did not agree in this respect with the members of the
"present" class, then they would form another class within
he same order. And this means, in terms of such an order,
that when a mind or Self has id-'as in a present moment of
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conseicu sness, it not only does, "but cannot do other than,
annex all and only those memorial id>as whose '^"-quali¬
fication agrees with that of its present ideas, and, further,
it not only does not, "but could not, annex any others; so
that, it clearly follows, the annexation which results from
a comparison of "past" and "present" ideas is the result not
of a creative and arbitrary act on the part of the mind or
Self, "but is the result of the comparison itself "being "based
on an order in the ideas which is, as an order, distinct
from the Self i.e. the order of agreeing "I''-qualifications,
and consequently the "relations and ways of comparing" the
ideas are, indeed, "well-founded". Therefore if this
supposed objection is merely the statement that all ideas I
have are "my" ideas, but that consequently I "make myself",
then it can only appear to be an objection if what is in¬
volved in those ideas being "rrry'' ideas -- as explicated
above -- has been misunderstood; and the objection fails,
128. Sut it is possible that this objection might mean
something rather different. It might mean this;- granted
that all the ideas a present 3elf annexes to itself are
certainly its own ideas, so that those of them that are
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memorial ideas are ideas which the present self has at some
time previously experienced, the ground of that self's
identity still cannot he located in the consciousness formed
hy these ideas, because it is impossible to distinguish
sufficiently between their contents. And the result of
this, it might be alleged, would be that even although
er&vy memorial idea is one which constituted part of the
self's former experience by the principle of the agreement
of "I"-qualificationa, it still might not be possible to
distinguish between an idea, properly qualified, which was
"of what it is for someone elae to hafre such and such an
experience", and one which was "of what it is to have such
and such an experience", when one or other of them is a
"revived" idea -- and the best example of this, of course,
is that of King George IV who, we are told, said and be¬
lieved in later lif?e, that he remembered being at the battle
of Waterloo when, in point of historical fact, he was on that
day of 1815 at Carlton House or some other place. And., the
objector might urge, provided that his assertion was not a
deliberate lie, and he did have in his consciousness when he
made the remark, ideas, with an appropriate (though mis¬
placed) "I"-qua]ification, which constituted "what it was lite
to be at Waterloo", then, in strict accordance with Locke's
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account of personal identity, he was, when he made the
remark, a person who had "been at Waterloo.
We might illustrate the point "by further concrete
examples. If, in my consciousness, there are memorial
ideas of what it was like to "be at the final, or some other,
Speech Day of my school career i.e. revived ideas which,
as presented ideas, constituted my experience on that
occasion, and also other memorial ideas which are revived
ideas which constituted my consciousness when, on an
occasion in the past, I imagined "what it was like to "be"
Alcihiades at the Symposium which Plato commemorates i.e.
revived id«as which, as presented ideas, constituted my
consciousness while I was reading Plato's book, then, the
present objection urges, the "I"-qualification i3 an in¬
sufficient criterion for distinguishing these sets of ideas
one from another? "because, if it happens that, having both
sets available to consciousness, the Self selects out from
the relatively unitary ideas which constitute the remembered
sets, certain parts so that it annexes to its present idea3
('"I"-qualified) the ideas which would constitue the experir
ence of "being at the Symposium as Alcibiades" as if "I"-
qualified, and not the ideas constituting the experience of
"imagining what it was like for Alcibiades to be at the
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Symposium" as properly "I"-qualified, then, as far as
-ocl-e's account of personal identity is concerned, I am
Alcibiades and nothing can prevent me from being him, even
if, from a point of view external to my "present Self", it
is said that the annexation is mistaken. Provided that
this relation of "then"- and "now -terminals does, in fact,
occur in consciousness then, according to Locke, I am
Alcibiades and I am made so by thinking myself so in this,
manner. And, the ob/jector might point out, this does
happen -- just look at George IV.
19. The shortest answer to this form of the objection
is that it is like saying that no men can be mathematicians
because some men make mistakes in adding up sums, or that
no man can be a mathematician because sooner or later he
will make an arithmetical error. But thi3 3ort of answer
does not get to the root of the objection which really urges,
as we can now see, that Lockef3 theory of memory which is
so radically involved in his account of personal identity,
does not allow us to distinguish between remembering and
"imagining" -- just a3, we saw in the examination of a pre¬
vious objection, some critics, notably Professor Aaron,
maintain that Locke's theory of memory doe3 not distinguish
bet'/sen remembering and "perceiving".
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130. To clear this matter $ip and to demonstrate that
I am myself and not Alciniades, in despite of whatever
"creative" is-selections "iy mind may appear to "be capable
of, we must shew that, in fact, the comparison between ideas
as "now" and ideas as "then" is to all intents and purposes
always "'-'ell-founded'' in the order of experience and is not
a fiction-producing activity carried out by a capricious mind
recreating itself in every moment of consciousness. To do
this satisfactorily we must go bach to a much earlier part
of the exposition where, in an examination of some of T.H.
Green's mis-re'dings of Locke, it was pointed out, at para.
64 above, that between the two most general "kinds into which
ideas can, in Locke's view, be sorted in respect of their
content (i.e. ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection)
there are certain differences which at that point we
designated as differences in stability. And the ground of
this difference was seen to be located in the order of the
occurrence of these two sorts of idea. In the case of
ideas of sensation it was found, as Locke pointed out, that
the order in which they 'were successively or simultaneously
present to any mind was controlled by the order in which
occurred the objects or facts of tiature "of which" they were
ideas and which were revealed in them. And this, as far as
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tliat argument was concerned, was found not to apply in the
case of ideas of reflection such as "reasonings about" or
"choosings to do" etc., which ware controlled as to their
succession "by the activity of mind, and not by the established
order of external things in nature. But in a mora recent
part of our enquiries we have found that some ideas of re¬
flection are. controlled by the order of things in nature
outside us. For, since if we perceive anything through
sensation, we know that we do so, and in perceiving that we
perceive, re have an idea of reflection which is part of,
and tied to, the having of the idea of sensation. Mow,
this control exercised by "things" over the order in which
we receive all ideas of sensation and some ideas of re¬
flection, was the reason why the raind can exercise no
voluntary control over that order, and the reason why the
m'.nd cannot ever invent a new idea of sensation -- an idea
of sensation being always one that comes from a thing. But
it was also pointed out that the mind once paving received
divers ideas of sensation subject to the imposed order, it
could thereafter recompound them at will into an infinite
variety of other and more complex; 'revived" ideas of sensa¬
tion which is not subject to that order? and this is
called "imagining'1 (and it is what some people suggest we are
i
really doing when we think we are "remembering"}. Sow,
this "imagining" consists in the compounding of "revived"
ideas which were formerly "ideas of sensation", and it is
an activity of mind. All activities of mind ara, as such,
objects of ideas of reflection. Therefore, whan we imagine
something we must know that we do so, and in knowing or per¬
ceiving that we do so we have, as an idea of reflection, an
idea whose content is "a compounding of revived ideas of
•
sensation"; so that when I imagine Chiron the Centaur, I
have an idea of reflection whose content include# revived
ideas of sensation of the sort that normally shew me men and
kor3es as compounded, or as being now compounded by my
mind «— since it is only in an abstract way that I could,
talk of the "compounding" quite apart from what it compounds
I could never (iT.B.) experience them apart.
(
131. -How, to leave this business of imagining aside for
the moment, it is clear from all this that when I remember
having been in a certain plac^ e.g. in the Hall of my school
on the last Speech Day of my school cdreer, I have presented
to me the revived ideas which were the ideas of sensation
which constituted the appearance, sounds and smells of the
lace when I was there, and which, being ideas of sensation,
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were controlled aa to the order of their occurrence "by the
order of the things in nature which they revealed. Con¬
sequently, when I remember having be«n in some particular
place, the revived ideas, sub 1 set to all the other quali¬
fications we have noted in recent pages, conform to the
save order of occurrence; and if they did not, but were
re-presented in some other order, then they would not he
qualified as "my" ideas, that is to say they would not have
the "1"-qualification which attaches them to the other ideas
present at the time when "I am remembering my having been in
a particular place" — for, "being controlled as to their
order "by the order of "things", if they are present in a
different order, they must "be the ideas of things different
to those which actually were at the place remefobered and so,
being in that case different ideas, they are not adequately
qualified; but since all ideas I do have are so qualified,
and any I could have -would have to be so qualified or re¬
jected (which probably never has to happen), and since many
ideas trhat I do have are presented in the mode "as remembered"
and with the proper "I"-qualification, then clearly it
follows that I can add do actually "remember", and that the
re-presented ideas in terms of which I do so are ordered in
the same way as they were when, in the past, they were
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presented ideas of sensation, and that is an order which
is controlled by an archetypal order of the occurrence of
things in nature which are not themselves the ideas, al¬
though they are presented through the ideas, and although
\ 4
the ideas are "of them". The thing3 "of which" the ideas
are, form an order of things external to the mind or Self,
consequently, as far as memory is concerned, the order in
which our ideas occur is "well-founded". No*/, of this
order, one important aspect at least is that it is in the
form of a "before" and "after", or "earlier" and "later"
series. Things are presented after each other, and in
retrospect are presented as "earlier" or "later" than each
other in the same series. Consequently, x/nen I remember
something, the revived ideas of it are not re-presented in,
as it were, isolation, but as related by being "before" or
"after" each other in the series of their original presenta¬
tion. And if it is asked how this is so in the case when
we remember a "single thing", we must be careful to know
what a "single" thing indicates. It i3, as we have very
clearly seen before, quite impossible that I should have
presented to me an utterly "simple" idea, and it is equally
patent that I could not have one re-presented to me.
Simplicity is a relative term and there are certain very
definite limits to it. A "single" thing could not be less
than a relatively unitary idea at or above the lowest level
of "simplicity". But that I could remember a "single"
thing even in this sense seems very doubtful, and it cer¬
tainly is not what I remember when,, for example, I remember
having been in a particular place. What I remember in that
case and in the most normal eases of remembering, is a sub-
series of the total before-aft&r series of things that have
been presented to me since I became conscious. Consequently
the revived ideas I ha^e in remembering it, are in sub-series
(before-after) which repeat the order of the sub-series of
original presentation. Now, we must be very careful to
note what this does not imply. In the first place it does
not imply that when I remember something I mentally "run
through" the whole before-after master-series until I come
upon and stop at some one particular point which is, then,
the thing T am remembering. Nor does it imply that if what
I am remembering, e.g. myself having been at a particular
place, consists of a number of sub-series which can \re
called A. B. C. D. IS........ etc., which are all parts of
some more inclusive series and, for that matter, of the
master series, I cannot then have re-presanted 3ub-series C.
(as a 3ub-series) before sub-series A., or sub-series B. (a3
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a sub-series) after sub-series E., although as presented
these sub-series were successive. That thi3 is obviously
rot so can be \*"erified by the observation that if I re¬
member my journey from Edinburgh to Perth, I may remember
the sub-series which constitutes my recollection of the
Forth "'ridge before I remember the sub-series which con¬
stitutes my recollection of getting into the train at the
Waverley Station, even although the ideas -- mostly of
s occasion -- from which the sub-series of revived ideas are
derived, were not presented in that order. All this is
clear enough, but what is perplexing is the question as to
what is the shortest sub-series of revived ideas I can and
do have presented in experience - and that it is perplexing
is not, I third'', dtie to faults in Locke's account or in this
extension of it, but id due to the complexity, fluency, and
instability of our experience as we do have it, a state of
affairs that makes it necessary to exercise caution in apply¬
ing arbitrary "cuts" to the series and patterns which it
forms. It is, I think, pretty certain that the briefest
sub-series of revive! ideas which we can have, although
short indeed in comparison with the master-series of our
total continuing experience, is much longer than people who
try to apply the thoroughgoing "atomistic" analyses of Locke's
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suocessors to experience, would make it -- and this serves
to remind us that descriptions "based on such analyses are,
in respect of memory as well as in others, gross distortion.
The point at present at issue, however, i3 that thi3 is a
specific way in which the ideas I have when 1 remember any¬
thing are grounded -- viz. in the way in which the things
of which they are revived ideas originally occurred in
series of greater or less length; and it is a quite
specific way which is apart from the Self or any "creative"
or "selective" capacity the Self may have. It is also
one which will be of some importance in considering "imagin¬
ing" as against "remembering ".
132. To leave aside for the moment this matter of
"remembering", it is likewise clear fsrom what has been
rehearsed of the arguments begun in para.64, that when I
imagine something, e.g. myself as having be^n in a par¬
ticular place where I never nave been, I have presented to
me series of ideas of reflection whose content is the "com¬
pounding together of revived ideas originally presented as
ideas of sensation." And thes •> revived ideas which in
their being now compounded" are the content of those ideas
of reflection, are ideas derived usually from ideas of
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sensation presented i_n -very diverse "before-after sub-series
of the total series of my ideas of sensation. Consequently,
the order in which I have the revived ideas which are part
of the content of my present imagining, is not controlled as
to succession by the order of the original ideas of sensa¬
tion from which they are derived, as, in the case of re-
membering, all revived ideas are. Their order is controlled
only by the order in which the id«as of reflection which
constitute my imagining follow each other in the present,
subject to the activity of mind, and not to the order of
things. Ana this is what Locke means by the note Professor
Aaron extracts from his Journal; "Memory is always the
picture of something, the idea whereof has existed before in
our thoughts, as near the life as we can draw itj but
imagination is a picture drawn in our minds without refer¬
ence to a pattern." - although, we should note, the plastic
medium (so to speak) in which the latter picture is drawn
has to be derived from ideas of sensation which have "existed
before in our thoughts", in other patterns. And, again, in
the text of the "33s say " itself he writes in this connection;
('II.xxx.5.): "Whether such substances as these can possibly
exist or not," ~~ he refers to such things as a Centaur or a
yellow metal lighter than water -r- "it is probable that we
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do not know; b t, be that as it will, these ideas of sub¬
stances, being made conformable to no pattern existing that
-.re know; and consisting of such collections of ideas as no
substances ever showed us united together, they ought to
pass with us for barely imaginary.
1T t . out if we ©hange the perspective of the situation
slightly -- as will be useful if we are to answer the present
objection fully -- and regard it not as myself now imagining
myself as having been in a particula olace where I never
have been, but as myself now at time T-° remembering that at
time 7-1 I wo.3 imagining myself as having been in a particular
place where I never have been, e.g. in Agathon's house on
the night of the celebrated Symposium, then in considering
thi3 situation we have to note that although ideas of re¬
fection ere in general not controlled as to their order,
in the way ideas of sensation are, by the order ot "things" —
except for those of them inseparably attached to every per¬
ception in that we perceive that we perceive -- nevertheless
ideas of reflection themselves, as psychic occurrences, are
natural facts. That all ideas occurring in ninds are
natural1 facts, we have observed before. Consequently,
a1though it is true that when they occur in the present,
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ideas of reflection are controlled In respect of their
order only by the activity of the mind, when they are
past, and have become revived ideas of reflection, t&ey
are controlled by the pattern which they constituted when
they occurred as natural facts, just as much as remembered
ideas of sensation are, likewise, when such ideas con-
stitiiting a past imagining are revived, they can only be
revived as related specifically in a before-after series
controlled by the original before-after series of their
occurrence as natural facts? so that, as far as imagining
is concerned, the i'deas which constitute anything I hhve
imagined, as distinct from anything I "have actually ex¬
perienced", are grounded in an order quite extrinsical to
the mind or any "creative" or "selective" ability it may
possess, which means that both in respect of "remembered
ideas" and of "imagined ideas", the judgement of self-
consciousness is, as Professor Gibson reminds us, determined
for me and not bjr me. This is to say that the mind is
never at liberty to select random ideas of imagined things
and random ideas of remembered things, annexing them to each
other and to present ideas in consciousness, because no ideas
whether of imagined things or of remembered things are, in
^ac*» P&ndom• for all a^e presented as conditioned by the
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two orders of which all of "both kinds are simultaneously
members viz. the order of ideas related by identity of
"I"-qualification» and the order of ideas controlled by
the succession of things-in-n-ture, which includes ideas as
natural facts occurring in minds. And. in the case of the
example we used previously, this means that if, having
available to consciousness both the series of memorial ideas
which constitute my memory of my final Speech Day at school,
and the series of imaginative ideas constituting ry imagining
what it was to be Alcibiades at the Symposium, "I", or the
mind thinking in me now, is unable to distinguish between
them, then there is every reason why it should be able so to
distinguish, and experience gives evidence that in- the great
majority of cases, minds do so distinguish.
134. An objector might still urge, however, that, be
all this as it may, the demonstration given still does not
account for the case of George IV. And the answer, already
hinted, is that Locke nowhere denies that mistakes can be
made, nor in particular that memory is fallible -- as indeed
we have already seen in para.1GO above. To reinforce the
point, we may note further that he speaks in II.x.9. of
"defects we may observe in the memory of one man compared
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with another''s and in the same paragraph of the case of
th t "prodigy of parts. Monsieur Pascal" the decay of
who • e health had "impaired his memory". And as to
imagination, we are to note that Locke regards us as so
apt to er or hy reason of its mal-functioning that he
locates in it the principal cause of madness -- which is
what we would generally call George IV's described state
if persisted in, or my condition if I continued to he
conscious of being Aloibiades and of what I did at Agathon's
party, Professor Aaron has a quotation in this connection
from Locke's .Journal (op.cit. p.130): "Madness seems to be
nothing but a disorder in the imagination, and not in the
discursive faculty," And there is a passage in the Essay
it-self at II.xi.13. whin1-1 is so very pertinent to the
present part of the discussion that "I shall quote it.
Speaking of madmen, he says: "For they do not appear to me
to have lost the faculty of reasoning, but. having joined
together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for
truths'; and they err as men. do that argue aright from
principles. For, by the violence of their imaginations,
having t "ken their fancies for realities, they make right
deductions from therru Thus you shall find a distracted
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man fancying binsel f a king, with a right inference require
suitable attendance, respect, and obedience; others who
have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution
necessary to preserve such brittle bodies."
That there may be confusion in and between what we
emember and what we imagine, Locke is, then, well aware;
but it happens over prolonged periods in few cases.
Nevertheless, there remains this point to the objection
-- nnd it will be observed that it is the contrary of the
residual point left to the first objection -- that if anyone
uch as George IV continues to be eon3ciou3 of having been
at Waterloo or of being Alcibiades, in the manner suggested,
then, as far as Locke's account goes, there is quite an
important sense, as we shall find, in which as "Self" or
"Person" two hi isel f, he w s at Waterloo or ijj Alcibiades
and is a person identical with the person who fired a musket
before Q,uatre Bras or drank at the Symposium, although a3
"Person" to other Selves, he most certainly is not -- that
he could not in any circumstances be present as "Self" to
other Selves, is something that remains to be clarified.
But on the grounds that t is failure in memory or
imagination is relatively very rare and that generally
speaking, memory and imagination are clearly distinguishable
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In the way and for the reasons shewn, and that consequently
continuity of consciousness may, as far as the possibility
of their confusion is concerned, remain the ground of
personal identity, the third and last objection fails.
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VI.
---TAtTFA^TO^ QjT LOCK'S ACCOUNT 07' p-?PSONAL IULNTITY IN
BOOK II COUTTUXriD, WITH Pgy-iTPUUC"- TO TU" DISTINCTIONS F5TWB3N
WAN-, "PUmSON'S AND "3TLF".
136. In the orevious section I tried to shew which are
Locke's main reasons for grounding Personal Identity in
continuity of consciousness and not in identity of substance,
and to eliminate as far as possible what seemed to be some of
the most pertinent oblections to them. We must now, as was
undertaken to be done at the beginning of that section,
return to consider how in his exposition in Book II he
returns more than once, each time characteristically changing
his approach by a little, to the rsinforcement of his great
principle that: "It is not unity of substance that comprehends
all sorts of identity, or will determine it in every case."
1^6. We saw that in starting his main exposition, Locke
asks, in effect, "if continuing consciousness is not the
ground of Personal Identity -- and there seems to me to be a
prima facie case that it is -- what are the alternatives?"
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And the first alternative is "a continuing, identical,
single spiritual substance." Taving shewn some of the
consequences of this in the ways noticed and extended in
the last section, he then goes on to turn the question round
and ash, in effect, "Supposing the persistence of a single
spiritual substance is, after all, the ground of Personal
Identity, what are the consequences of this?" And. again,
•is the exposition proceeds, he asks, in effect, (ii)
"Supposing that the ground of Personal Identity is neither
in continuity of conaciaisness nor in persistence of a single
spiritual substances but in the organic identity of human
bodies constituted by the changing -material substances of
their parts in conformity to the organic pattern, what are
the consequences of this view?" And a consideration of
these hypotheses reveals for examination some interesting
cross-connections fhich are included in the question (iii),
''hlrw' is the relation between the 'Identity of a Man' and the
'Identity of a Person'?" And, finally, the consideration of
■ 1! these brings us to ;iv), the revelation of a distinction
which is crucial to the whole complex problems which from
Locke' • day to ours have perplexed the matter ; of "Personal
identity , "Self", "Self-consciousness ', and """oral Responsi¬
bility" viz. the distinction between "self" and "person".
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This, indeed, is the very h-art, of the matter, and the
reason why our approach to it has heen so long and some¬
times apparently devious, is that in exploring the province
which this distinction reveals, and which is the last
traversible territory extending on all sides of the last --
and probably impregnable -- citadel of the "Self", we shall
have to employ findings w" ich have "been made in almost all
of the previous paragraphs or to which the ar ument of
these paragraphs has heen ancillary, -~ for example, the
phenomenon we noted in connection with the general notions
"both of "Identity" and of "Substance", hich consists in a
"double presentation" in nd of experience, an', again,
various aspects of what it is to perceive and what it is to
■-eraember, which we have more recently examined.
147. First of all, as to the question, "If continued
v-'iyitual substance does constitute identity, vreat are the
consequences?", Locke raises the very pertinent query
{'I.xxvii.13): " /hethsr, if the same thinking substance ....
be changed, it can "be the same person?" That is to say,
the con ciousness which is 'personal" (however the person
is fundamentally constituted) remains unaltered, but the
substance underlying i" a consciousness -- i.e. the spiritual
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substance that thinks in and through the consciousness -~
changes, is there one person or two persons? In examining
this, Locke grants that, if, as W1 hare seen above he shews
is not the case, our consciousness were all-inclusive of
itself at every instant, then this question could not even
be asked. But since, a he remarks here, "con ciousness"
is not "the same individual notion ... but ... a present
representation of a past action", or in other words, since
all consciousness is in fact interrupted by periods in
which f v hypothetically single constituting substance neithe
thinks nor acts — for it would have the necessary reflex
awareness of perceiving that it perceived, if it did and
+ "~.es? periods ore bridged only by "memory"; then, "that
which we call the 3-me consciousness, not being the sane
individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have
represented to it, as done by itself, what it never did, and
was perhaps done by some other agent.... will be difficult
tc determine from the nature of things." And this is to
say that because, cults discounting the extension and con¬
nectedness of eonsciousness achieved by memory in the ways
pointed out by Locke which w have already note', identity
is to be grounded in continuing substance of' which we are
not in fact conscious, then, on thi •; hypothesis, as Locke
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points out, "two thinking substances" (and therefore, ex
f ' vV' •?
hypothesi, two persons) "may make btit one person" and --
if we turn Berkeley' • words bac1- on himself -- "for aught
we know" (all evidence of mere extended consciousness being
discounted) "all person3 may be the same. 1 Whereas, on
the other hand, according to Locke's counter hypothesis —
that the ground of identity is in continued consciousness --
v can know, for the reasons set out at some length in
nara.l°5 above which involve the principle of the agreement
of "I"-qualifications, that all )ersons are not the same
and that one person is not another. Since veridical re¬
membering "unitipr these distant actions into the same
person, whatever substances contributed to their production
(TI.xxvii.10a)forms a real experienced identity, the
were hypothesis of a continued, substance must yield to it
on the ground^ certainly, of its consequences in this respect.
But before we can leave the consideration of this, we must
remember that the objection to which the analysis of veridical
remembering was en answer, did have, we found, some point
left to it; and that was (see para.134 above) that if memory
wa3, in fact, in error -- as in the case, presumably, of
George TV ~~ then a strange and. unnatural sort of "identity"
undoubtedly resulted -- the sort of identity which would
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perhaps allow things "dome by some other agent" to be
annexed to the "wrong person". And we must note that in
+ he passage we are examining here, Loche is not. unmindful
of this. "Why" he says, "such a representation (i.e. such
a one as the Waterloo delusion) may not possibly be without
matter of fact, as well as sevrral representations in
dreams ere, which yet whilst dreaming we take for true
will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of
thinking substances, be best resolved into the goodness of
God? who as fa~ as the happiness or misery of any of Ms
sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not by any fatal
error of theirs, transfer from one to another that conscious-
9
ness which draws reward or punishment 1th it." And this,
applied to the example we have been using, means that if
anyone like George IV who is conscious of having done some¬
thing or much that he has never "in fact" done, then when,
in any important sense, he is under judgement for his
actions, responsibility will not be imputed to him, under
a benevolent providence, for any of his actions at some
aterloo -- however scandalous and. however clearly remembered
they may be i.e. however wrongly the "I"-qualifications are
related.
-193-
13d. This qualification of Locke's leads us into another
brief excursus in nor-1 general terns, which can start ~by
our noting that once again Look* is prepared to introduce
into his general account of experience (as an extension of
what he experienced) concepts soon as that of a benevolent
providence for which his own experience did give warrant,
even if they are concerto whose possession is peculiar to
some sorts of men only, and in so far as this thesis is
expositorial of Locke's views, we roust only tave not of
this historically, but one of the points I am concerned to
make from a mor • critical point of view, is that when he
does this, ik m a ; far as the use of technical terms goes,
he is no les ■ an "empiricist" than other philosophers whose
accounts Lav- been different. When. we are tempted — as no
doubt w all are from time to time -- to put such beliefs .
and the men like Locke who hold them into their "proper
historical or psychological perspective" — or into some
equally ambiguous metaphor --.from Some point of view of our
own •-/hie.i. is somehow superior, but generally unspecified,
.t is well to keep in mind that there is nothing any more
inherently irrational, or divorced from the ordinary run of
experience (which is the important thing here) in a belief
in a benevolent providence, than there is in the dogmatic,
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a priori assumptions of "empiricists" of schools later than
Locke -- some of them so much later that, however anachron¬
istic it may appear to some of us, they are quite contemporary.
The point of this is, that if anyone id disposed to say that
Locke's resolution, here, of the problem raised by the re¬
sults of default in remembering and imagining, into the
goodness of God, is merely facile, then, to my mind, that
is itself merely a facile criticism. The'point which Locke
is making is a perfectly serious (and quite familiar) one
viz. that responsibility is not ultimately to be imputed --
and whether the imputation i3 in terms of a process of
judgement as in the words of the Apostle or the 20th chapter
of Revelation or not, is very little to the point -- to any
•arson because something is erroneously, but perhaps in-
eradicably, contained in his consciousness. And an account
which expresses this in terms of the intervention -- in some
s -nse perceived or known or revealed ''ideally" -- of a bene¬
volent God, is, given Locke's starting point, perfectly
legitimate, and it is to be taken seriously, and not regarded
s a psychologically or historically explicable (and there¬
fore excusable) lapse into superstition. In other words,
one cannot get rid of Locke's religious experience, merely by
pointing out that one does not oneself have any -- if such is
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the case. This is not to say that one must accept Locke's
account here -- for it might well "be that what he is saying
does notj in its literal sense, draw our attention to any-
t ling recognisable in our own experience -- out it i_s to
say that his account h-^re and elsewhere is to he seriously
considered and not 3nilsd off tolerantly as one of the great
man's typical "confusions", a not Ancommon way of regarding
Locke which I find distasteful, and, i confess, irritating.
A view of human action and of human consciousness of action
in the modes which include "ideas of" responsibility, such
that it is described afc u"Jtiraately subject to assessment
and requital -- analogous at least to "judgement" -- i3
neither inconceivable nor av all obviously absurd i.e.
"moral" experience is a part of most ordinary men's experi¬
ence and indeed, I suspect, of the experience of all men
other than certain quite easily recognisable types of lunatic,
and such moral experience, however anti-theological in tone,
cannot be free from the notion of "desert". If it is urged
that this part of iuocke's account, which is necessary to
make it a complete account, is not to be taken seriously
because the suggestion that such vita errors as we are here
considering will be put right by some "God the Judge", is a
suggestion unacceptably crude and naive, then it must be
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pointed out for the benefit of anyone whose intellectual
sophistication makes him so squeamish, that one can hold a
"belief in what at a convenient level can be expressed in
traditional terms as "benevolent providence", "judgement",
or, plainly, "the good God", without in any way being bound
to express oneself, or think, subject to the conventionalised
(if not purely conventianal) limits to conceptualisation or
vocabulary of, for example, a Norman peasant or a Calvinist
divine -- of which fact several series of Gifford Lectures
delivered in the past two or three decades is sufficient
proof.
139. Having now taken precautions to defend this part
of Locke's account -- which, I maintain, must be taken
seriously — from criticisms, -lien and ironically coming
from "empiricist sources, of a sort which has sometimes
been designated "sixth-form rationalist", we can go on to
knote how Locke continues his consideration of the consequences
of this hypothesis in a later paragraph, 23, of Il.xxvii.
Let us suppose, he says, that two quite,distinct conscious¬
nesses are located alternately in the same man i.e. con¬
sciousnesses which consist of series none of whose units are
common or ever contained in a third inclusive series* then,
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having supposed this, are we not presented with two persons
as distinct as Socrates and Plato? And is not the distinction
"based solely on the mutual exelusiveness of the contents of
the consciousnesses? It does not, he points oat, make any
difference if wo suppose the distinct consciousnesses as
underlain "by different spiritual substances and the body
they ara located in as a mere accident, for, again, it is
the nature and content of the consciousnesses that is the
ground of the distinction. So that, even granting the
possible alternation of substance, this hypothesis has as a
minor consequence "two persons with the same body" and
although as later researches into "multiple personality"
suggest to us, t" is situation is not impossible, the rarity
and, %o to speak, exotic nature of just those cases that are'
cited in this connection are enough to raise further doubts
as to whether any such general hypothesis as this can account
for "normal ' personality — w ich means no more than "most
other personalities". The real objection to the "substance"
theory is however, not that two persons may at different
times be manifested in the sam3 body, but that if and when
they are, the ground of the distinction between them is not
"substance"»
Let us now, on the other hand, suppose that this same
"body we are considering is the locus of the same spiritual
substance which is possessed, a before, of, alternately,
sa • for twelve hours «?.ch, two mutually exclusive series of
conscious states. tie are entitled to make t is supposition
as of a possibility, because all consciousness is, by in¬
spection, known to be subject to interruption -- which is a
point mode, "iVewise, by the defenders of the hypothesis
against Locke, Let us further suppose that in each state
of the "A" seri »s, >. ■ we may call it, the spiritual substance
is una-.' -.re of any state of the "B" series, a.- we may call it,
only "b?c. .'?,o of failure of memory — and we are entitled, to
suupose thin as a possibility because, a • we have seen, it is
a r ".in point of the defenders of this hypothesis against
Locke's that memory is faVible. Then, having made these
suppositions which are all,in terms of the substance theory,
within the bounds of possibility, are we not presented with
the c■ -sequence, oven less palatable from the point of view
of the hypothesis, that there c ,n be two persons sharing one
spiritual substance i.e. that one person can be two persons?
If it is said that this depends on an ambiguous use of the
word "person", and that person ">edns "one substance", then it'
must be pointed out tkat if th« two consciousnesses we started
with ar" distinct, and as distinct as those of Socrates and
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plato "because of the utter diversity of their contents --
and this is cert .inly one sense, in the ordinary use, of
being a arson" — then this hypothesis w-st wean — if
t . •; sense is to be disallowed — thn there are no such
distinctions as th one commonly made between a Socrates and
a Plato or a Peter and a Paul* whic" is, again, unacceptable.
P.ut none :f these awkward consequences follow on Locke'a
hypothesis hie1. locates not only the distinction between the
er ns hut the ground of their several identities, in the
co tinuity of each consciousness "so t at self is not deter¬
mined by identity or diversity of subs4 ance, which it cannot
be sure 1, but only by identity of consoiousneas (II.xxvii .23)"
140. Reverting now to 14 of Il.xxvii., we find, that
Locke shifts his ground a little to aproroach the matter by
studying in a slightly different way the same question:
" hether the same immaterial substance remaining, there may
be two distinct persons?" He points out that certainly all
those who have held the various doctrines of reincarnation
and pre-existence must answer "yes" to this question. But
going on to exa 1 n • what is involved in such an answer, he
points out that if, in any one incarnation, a mind is com¬
pletely shorn of all recollection of all previous ones, then
»?05~
there is no difference whatever between this situation and
that of the mind's (or minds') being created afresh on each
occasion.' If the spiritual Substance which thinks in me now
is, per accidens, thvt which once thought in Hecuba, that does
not .-sake Hecuba and me one person, un 1 es I have some re¬
coil ection of being Priam's wife. If I have not i.e. do
not share consciousness wit Hecuba, then that spiritual
substance which was .ers and is mine, no more makes me the
same person as her, than would the presence in ray body of
•tome of the material substance which once made hers -- as.
might after her disintegration and all sorts of cyclic pro¬
cess, be the das. - and Locke' point might well be put
• - '-re by ou:_ as": in ; ./it., ..ra-"-l et: "/.it's Hecuba to him, or he
to .iecubai'' Andalthough this does not mean that the same
spiritual substance may not be siccessively present in dif¬
ferent consciousnesses, it does demonstrate the point that
If
its presence has nothing whatever to do with -orsonal
identity.
These, then, are further cons® u races and implications
of the view that continued spiritual substance is the ground
of identity, and they are such that Locke quite properly,
regard them as making the description of our experience of
our selves in terms of i- , a distortion. If anyone says
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that continued spiritual su"b3tance makes him a person
and he >nows it, then he must "be making some sort of "act
of faith", for, a; far a experience goes, this is not the
case. If, having somehow made sue-: :-n ac' of faith, a man
chooses to describe his experience in terms of such a self,
then he is entitled to do so, provided, that, as I think
Locke would a; \ we ore ch r that although the various
complexes of ideas thai constitute such rn act of faith may
undoubtedly be experienced, what the faith is in, is not.
It is perhaps to be noted here that this objection does not
apply in the same .ray to the sort of act of faith, as it
:night be regarded, which Loo1 e indulges in by appealing to a
noral order in the universe -then dealing with the difficulty
v/e noticed before; bee ruse, although it is possible for a
nan to deny convincingly, as Locke does, that he has any ex-
oerience of himself as a continuing spiritual substance, it
is not possible for a nan to deny convincingly — or so it
.eems to me -- that he has moral experience involving the
notions of judgement and desert obtaining in an absolute
sense -- extra-hunanly and extra-sociologically -- i.e. to
deny that he has the sort of experience to which Locke some¬
times draws our -attention quite legitimately by using
Christian apocalyptic terms; and even if a man is not
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convinced by ?',ch experience, as Locke was, of the actual
operation of something at lea t like divine justice, then
h? io cert -inly involved in the -v.7 lission that if it doesn't
r pervt r-, then it on ■fit to, or, if he is a very doctrinaire
rotagorean, ir. the admission that "'it wou'• d "be very nice
(me -.ning desirable) if it did op-wte"' and sue': admissions
wake it clear that Locke's account is in t" is respect
intelligible to any man whose experience is not markedly
.e-orr.nlour. Tn othe - word's, the appeal to the existence of
a moro.*J order is not divorced from ordinary experience in
the war that m aortal to th existence of a monadic spiritual
substance as 'f, is.
141. V/e mn t nor/ turn to the second alternative hypo-
t esis v ic "ocke examio- es, though at less length and Is 33
•ex.rlicitly vis. thol. held by peo le 'ho would "place thought
in a purely animal constitution, void of an imarterial sub¬
stance (Il.xxvii.l2)'nd this, h- point3 out, is really
concerned with tk~ same general quest ion: '" hather if the
some substance which think be changed, it can be the same
person' ", for, obviously an0ugh, cr>1 e '-/ho adopt this hypo-
t%esvs c-.annot locate the ground of per son?. 1 identity in
identity of even material 3tibstance; because, ,3 he has
/
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pointed out in a previous paragraph, 11a, although a con¬
sciousness, when located in so 13 particular body, is conscious
of and ''concerned for" the various parts of that body in
such a way that they are known and felc, as parts of itself,
if any of the is amputated, this conscious concern ceases,
• he part decays and disintegrate.;., its various material sub¬
stances being at least totally dispersed, and it is no longer
known, felt, or regarded as part of the Self. And, further,
an animal constitution in a normal state*-- i.e. not subject
to sue1; violent lesions as these suggested just now -- is
not a stable colligation of material substances, as we al¬
ready know from the previous section on "Organic Identities".
Its parts are constantly changing and its identity is grounded
in organic function and not in 3ubstantial identity. This,
Locke noted by 11 le way, means toat ti.03 wao insist on
locating the grounds of personal identity in one spiritual
substance must take account of the .fact that the vitality
and identity which animals, to a dggree, share with men, is
located, in change of material substance. hor if they are
disposed to /c^hy tnai it can bo so locat-d because, precisely,
of the change, then t . ray be com itted to locating it --
coun er to the Cartesian hypothesis about ani .Vila -- in the
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sane sort of continued immaterial substance as that in which
they locate human identity. And if they are disposed to
ad'-it that it is 30 located, then they must shew good reason
why personal identity cannot be located in an exactly similar
c •n:-; of spiritual substance — which i :• good debating
point against the Cartesians, if it is not much more --;
and this links m interestingly with another argument which
he uses in considering the same general sort of hypothesis,
at another .lace viz. tr- tha Second Fe iy to ft ill ingf leet,
where he -emarks (Vorks vol.! v. p.466): "Though to me sensa-
ti n be comprehended under thought in general, yet in the
foregoing discourse I have spoken of sense in brute^. But
here I t ke liberty to observe, that if your lordship allows
brutes to have sensation, it /ill follow, either that God
can and doth give to so^-e parcels of matter a power of per¬
ception and thinking; or that all animals have immaterial,
and consequently, according to your lordship, immortal souls,
as well as men; and to day that fleas and mites etc. have
immaterial souls as well as men, wil1 probably be looked on
ao going a great way to serving an hypothesis, and it would
not very well agree with what your ledship says." And this
shews, T think, that Locke is inclined to find more to be said
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for this "materialist" hypothesis than for the "spiritualist"
one, although his admission of sensation in animals (and
therefore of cert-.in sort of t"! in" ing) does not automatic-
ally involve hi01 in regarding men or persona a parcels of
"tainkinm matter"# over; if anim-ls are to he so regarded (as
a opears here}, "bee .use there is the crucial distinction "be¬
t-reen sensation (thinhing) in animals and in men, that in
the latter case and not in the former, the s mnsation is always
accompanied "by self-consciousness i. . when we perceive we
always, and ■-lust, "pe ceive that /" perceive", "but animals do
not.
The objections, tt i s hypov'.xesis -- ..v. out which Locke
is reol'y very cautious# a . we can nee from the the quotations
f nora toe letter to Stillingfleet, and of which there is a
significant echo in hook 17. -- cc ? incidentally, and some¬
times "by implication, in other parts of the chapter, some of
which we have air ady looted at, and all of them, ju3t as
much ao fhe c"t .7 actions against the spiritualist hypothesis,
point persBi&tently to consciousness as the sole possible
-noun! of personal identity. For example, in the course of
hi3 consideration of the problem: about fallacious memory and
the ^transferability of moral responsibility -/rich we ex-
in d in para,IdV above, he as 3 in view of hie confinement
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(under providence) of responsibility to that of which we can
«
conscious, "how far this may be an argument against those
who would place thinking in a system of fleeting animal
spirits (II.xxvii.13)". And what he means by this is that
if thinking is confined to a fleeting system of animal
spifits, then the identity of a conscious intelligent being
is thereby located in a mere animal constitution* and the
consequence of this would be that if the "animal constitution"
were the instrument by which something was done* then the
"self" or "person" would be responsible for that thing whether
or not it was conscious, or ever could be, of having dome
it i.e. whether that "self" or "person" were in the proper
sense the "agent although its physical members were, in
fact, the "instrument"; and. by this is opened up a con¬
siderable part of the universe of discourse traversed by the
Aristotelian Ethics. But we do not have to enter upon that
here; for, as is the implication of Locke's argument, we
do not mean by "person" a thing which does not, or may not,
have the sort of consciousness to which responsibility can
be annexed. That is to say, we do not in the ordinary course
of experience find ourselves or other people as "persons" of
this sort, and it is not the identity of this sort of thing we
are enquiring into --as will perhaps become clearer when we
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enquire into the relation of the identity of "a man" to
the identity of a "person".
142. There is another difficulty in such a hypothesis,
the exietence of rhich is implied in Locke's discussion,
viz. if it is the case that, as we saw in 11a, when a
'person is located in a certain "body, then all members of
that "body are considered a3 parts of the person '.s Self with
which it is in a uniquely intimate relation while they remain
parts of the "animal constitution" and contribute to the
maintenance of its organic function, but when they no longer
are, or do so, it rxas no more relation with them than with
any other extraneous parcel of matter e.g. when a member is
amputated, then the question arises as to how far, in prin¬
ciple* this excision of parts can go on without destroying
the person's identity. To the limit at which the animal
constitution ceases to be one i.e. until the animal is
"clinically" dead? Or to the limit, on this side of
clinical death, at which consciousness ceases? If it is
the latter, then this is no more than the location of the
- round of identity ija consciousness. If it is the former,
then it would have to be observed that a vestigial animal
constitution, not yet clinically dead, "but rendered forever
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unconscious i.e. a piece of matter not dead only in that it
•«*-
is "not ^organic"» is not» and. could not he, a "conscious
intelligent "being", so that between the supersession cf
consciousness and the supersession of organ!c life, there
would "be an interval in which the sufficient ground of a
person's identity, as it is on the hypothesis, would not,
in fact, constitute a person. mhe contention that it is
not in the animal constitution that the identity is to "be
grounded, but in the consciousness that can be coeval with
it, .1 s reinforced by hoche'a further observation in para.17
of rxvii. that while "every one finds that., whilst com¬
prehended under .... consciousness, the little finger is as
much a. pert" of himself as what is most so", if the little
f'inge • were to be removed, and if the consciousness were to
accompany it on itr removal, then the lesson end the Person's
identity, and the "self", would be located in the little
f'n^er, and would have no more connection with the remaining
carcase thus deprived of consciousness than with any other
part of the physical universe.
And these are the unacceptable consequences of this
second hypothesis, which must be regarded as invalidating it




143. The consideration of these "spiritualist" and
"materialist" hypotheses and their consequences lead3 us,
naturally enough, to an examination of the relation between
the identity of "a man" and that of "a person", which we
have already touched on by the way. At II.xxvii.10., Locke
makes his characteristic, first compendious statement of
the matters "For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking
or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in most
people's senses but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to
it; and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive
body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same
immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man" and, as
will be remembered f©om a previous section, the soul of
Heliogabalus inhabiting the body of one of his hogs, is not
the man Heliogabalus. Likewise, as Locke ha3 it in an
example in 15 of xxvii., if the soul of a Prince migrates
to the body of a Cobbler on the departure of the Cobbler's
consciousness, then the resulting synthetic Cobbler-Prince
is the same person as the Prince, but the same man as the
Cobbler. Prom which it follows that, on Locke's account,
continued identity of body has nothing to do with identity
of person, but has a great deal to do with the identity of
what we call a man. It is interesting to note that in
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amplification of this, at Ti.xxvii.20, Locke links this
conclusion up with a vital question we have already been
considering viz. how identity is affected "by a total 103s
of consciousness of some parts of a biography "beyond a
possibility of retrieving them." (Cp. para.120 above).
And here it is pointed out that if this question is raised
in the forms "Am I the same person that did these actions,
had these thoughts that I once was conscious of, though I
have now forgot them?" then the "I" applies to the "man"
and not th the "personfor the person is constituted by
the consciousness it has, and what that does not include is
no part of the person, although it may be part of the man
whom other people remember as having acted thus and thus,
or as having been conscious in this mode or that. (This
is an important point which anticipates a distinction yet
to be made.) And the confusion which arises when the
question is asked, comes, as Locke points out, from the
failure to distinguish between "same man" and "same person"
in common usage, although the distinction and what it
implies -- i.e. that one man can in an important sense be
two persons -- is borne out by another common usage viz. a
man is sometimes said to be, in special circumstances, "not
himself" or "beside himself".
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144. Being perhaps aware that this part of his account
was quite as liable to be unpalatable as the general doctrine
*
that substance is not the sole, or even main, ground of
identity, Locke goes on to elaborate the point by raising
yet again all the questions we have been considering, but
specifically in relation to these interesting cross-
distinctions between Man, Person, Body, and Consciousness «-
and this, me we have noticed before, is quite typical of
his general method. The general form of the question we
have to consider iss "How can the same individual man be
two persons? In answering this question there are, as
Locke points out, three possible hypotheses as to the nature
of the "same individual man"s
(i) that it is the same individual, immaterial,
thinking substance;
(ii) that it is the same animal constitution without
regard to immaterial spirit;
(iii) that it is the same, individual, immaterial,
thinking substance underlying the same animal constitution.
STow, whichever of these is adopted as a description of
the "same individual man", the identity of the person or
persons who he is, is not at all affected but remains
grounded only in consciousness, because in the case of (i)s
the same spiritual substance may be present in different
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organisms at different times (see para.139 above) and
possess diverse consciousness and in the case of (ii):
the animal constitution, as such, constantly changes and
only the consciousness remains in any sense "the same"
(see para.140 above); and in the case of (iii); the same
applies as does in the case of (ii), and further, there
apply the considerations in para.137 above, concerning the
interruptedness of consciousness. Consequently, the reason
why one man can be two persons i.e. why the grounds of the
identity of "a man" and of a "person" are not the same, is
that in the case of "man", something further than continuity
of consciousness is required, though precisely what, is a
matter on which, a3 Locke says, there is little agreement;
but it is generally something that presupposes the existence
of an animal organism -- even if only as a vehicle for spirits
whereas "person" requires no more and no less than continuity
of consciousness "which is that alone which makes what we
call self", unless, as we have seen, we are to be involved
"in great absurdities."
145. Locke approaches this matter of the indifference of
persona] identity to the c ntinuity or even existence of
bodily organisms, and the distinctions grounded in it, from
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another angle, which, as well as illuminating the point he
is making, is of some intrinsic interest. This consists
in his noting what are the consequences of his view in
relation to the doctrine of the Resurrection, and such an
approach is justifiable from an expositorial point of view
alone, "because speculation (and controversy) on such points
of doctrine was an accepted exercise among the educated
public he had in mind when writing -- quite apart from the
more general legitimation of an appeal to religious experi¬
ence, as such, rhich I tried to establish previously. In
the conclusion of the paragraph of the "Essay" we were last
considering (II.xxvii .21) Locke observes: ,rBut then they
who place human identity in consciousness only, and not in
something else, must consider how they will make the infant
Socrates the same man with Socrates after the resurrection."
Now there is a possibility of confusion here which is due
more than usually to Locke's phrasing. It must be clearly
noted that, here, "human identity" means "identity of a man"
as distinct from "person". In a previous sentence he has
spoken of "making human identity to consist in the same
thing wherein we place personal identity", feherehy dis¬
tinguishing them, although introducing the unnecessary extra
term "human" identity. Tha point is, then, that if grounded
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ln consciousness, then, although after the resurrection
Socrates may he the same person a3 he was before it (and
this ig what matters) he may he two different men before
and after. And whether or not it is necessary that
Socrates should he the same man after the resurrection as
before, is a theological point which is left open for the
moment. But that Socrates, being the 3ame person after
death, may, according to this account, be a different nan
in the same circumstances, Locke has already made clear in
earlier paragraphs, 14-15, by pointing out that "the 3arae
*
immaterial substance, without, the same consciousness, no
more making the same person, by being united to any body,
than the same particle of matter, without consciousness,
united to any body, makes the 3ame person", we are then
able "without any difficulty to conceive the same person
at the resurrection, thai gh in a body not exactly in make
or parts the same which he had here". And since, in
Locke's view, body is essential to "man", and since indeed
man is, as we can recollect from the section on "Organic
Identities", 3J rictly a zoological term, this means that
the same person can be a different man (which is no more
than to have a different body) at and after the resurrection.
This whole question of the relation of Locke's account to
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the doctrine of the Resurrection receives vei-y considerable
amplification in the controversy with Stillingfleet, who
made it one of his charges that this account of Locke's is
incompatible with Christian doctrine. Locke's reply to
this covers thirty very diverting pages of his "Second Reply
to the Bishop of Worcester" which I have, with some regret,
decided not to 3vnopsise here since, although it contains
some of Locke's most devastating and elegant dialectic,
is not, in large parts, of sufficient immediate relevance to
justify its inclusion. It will be enough to note that the
point which we saw Locke denies viz. that a person after the
resurrection must have the same body as that with which he
perished and in which he sinned i.e. must "be the same man",
is one which Stillingfleet chooses to elevate, on uncertain
authority, into an article of faith. If there is to be
resurrection of the dead, says Stillingfleet, (and Locke
agrees that belief in so much is an article of Christian
faith) then this can only mean resurrection of the actual
identical body a person had when in like he sinned. The
marrow of Locke's reply to this somewhat hazardous inter¬
pretation which, in the sequel, commits the Bishop, as Locke
points out, to some odd (not to say hilarious) conclusions, is
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contained in the following passages from the "Second
Reply
i. (Works Vol.iv. p.332) "It is not necessary to
the same person, that his body should always consist of
the same numerical particles: this is demonstration,
because the particles of the bodies of the same persons
iS. "khis e change every moment, and your lordship cannot
deny it...." And. again ii. (op.cit. p.308) "The body he
(i.e. any person) had, and did things in at five or fifteen,
was no doubt his body, as much as that which he did things
in at fifty was his body, though his body were not the very
same body at these different ages; and. so will the body,
which he shall have after the resurrection, be his body,
though it is not the very same with that which he had at
five, or fifteen, or fifty. He that at three score is
broken on the wheel, for a murder he committed, at twenty,
is punished, for what he did in his body; thca gh the body
he has i.e. his body at three score, be not the same i.e.
made up of the same individual particles of matter, that
that body was, which he had. forty years before. When ycur
lordship has resolved what that same immutable he is, which
It may be as well to note that what in Campbell Eraser's
footnotes to the "Rssay" is made to look uncommonly like
quotation from this work, is, in parts, drastically
condensed paraphrase.
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at the last judgement shall receive tha things done in
his "body; your lordship will easily see, that the body
he had, when an embryo in the womb, whan a child playing
in coats, when a man marrying a wife, and when bed-rid
dying of a consumption, and at last, which he shall have
a ter his resurrection; are each of them his body, though
neither of them be the same body, the one with the other."
And, finally and succinctly iii. (op.cit. p.331) "I say,
that a body made up of the same numerical parts of matter,
is not necessary to the making of the same person; from
whence it will indeed, follow, that to the resurrection of
the same person, the same numerical particles of matter are
not required." And at the end of his discussion of this
point in the Second Reply ', Locke thanks Stillingfleet,
with perhaps less irony than he generally uses with that
stultiloquent prelate, for redirecting his attention to the.
scriptural utterances on this matter, none of which contains
"such express words ... as that 'the body shall rise or be
raised' or the resurrection of 'the body'", and concludes
that although he does not doubt that the dead, shall be raised
with some sort of bodies, his point that neither reason nor
faith make this necessary is sufficiently made. And,indeed,
from the point of view of reason at least, it could hardly
be more trenchantly put.
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146. This leads us, perhaps strangely, to consider
another 3ort of criticism of Locke's contention that personal
identity is in no way dependant on identity of "body (and
therefore of "man") but is dependant only on consciousness,
which, although liable to come from contemporary sources,
is more than a little akin to Stillingfleet's. It is, in
general that since con3cicusnes3 is inconceivable (or
"unmeaning") apart from a body that is conscious, personal
identity grounded in consciousness and quite apart from
physical considerations is likewise inconceivable or un¬
meaning or nonsense. And since Locke does not in the "Essay"
consider the case of a person never located in a body in
this life (see II.xxvii.27), we may consider thi3 criticism
in relation to his discussion of personal identity ini the
next. (And this is legitimate, 3ince such critics them¬
selves agree that of the problems cognate to that of personal
identity, that of personal "survival" is intrinsically the
most interesting.) The contention we have to consider is,
then, that if survival or resurrection of a person means any¬
thing, it means that the surviving or resurrected person is
or becomes "conscious", and so far Locke and I, and the
critics, may agree. But since consciousness consists to a
very large degree in such things as having present to one,
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visual, auditory, tactual, and other sensation^ or, in
etich things as seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling etc., then
it foilows, according to this sort of view, that we cannot
he conscious unless we have eyes "to see with", ears "to
hear with", surfaces "to feel with" and so on. Therefore
if there is survival after death or resurrection there roust
1:39 a fc°dy -- surviving or resurrected -- completely equipped
with this physiological apparatus, or we cannot he conscious
i.e. we cannot survive or he resurrected as persons, there¬
fore personal identity cannot he founded in consciousness
alone. And so there is discovered to us an instructive
situation in which we can observe the apologists of the
Roman Catholic and Logico-Analytical Churches sharing their
dogmas. ITow, as for myself, I must confess that I have
never seen any force whatsoever in the argument that a
sensation" or an "idea of sensation" is "inconceivable"
apart from a physical organ that conditions or mediates or
originates that sensation. A sensation, or an idea of
sensation, is, in the first instance and as far as our
presented experience goes, what it is, a phenomenon in
consciousness, and it is so in Locke's account — he re¬
peatedly disavows having any "theory" about sense-perception
-- and, to my mind, ftn any reasonable and unbiased account.
I
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That sensations have as necessary correlates to their
occurrence in consciousness, certain physical organs
actually present and causally inextricable from their
occurrence, is an account which has, most assuredly, the
pragmatic sanction of its usefulness to physicians, oculists,
and others in the practical way of things. But it has, as
necessary, neither this authority nor any other in an open-
minded epistem.ological or phenomenological analysis of
experience. If we allow ourselves to expect — as we do —
that the tyros of philosophy can compass this point in
dealing, for example, with the doctrine of Representative
Perception (e.g. "Are the findings of physiologists con¬
clusive in explaining visual sensation?"), then we should
reasonably be able to expect its contemporary hierophants
to be able to compass it as well. It seems to me that the
assertion that conscicu sne3s, in terms of sensation, is
"inconceivable" without actual physical organs, is plainly
an untruth; and I am inclined to regard the assertion that
eyes in good mechanical order and as described in Gray's
"Anatomy" (or whichever is now the standard text-book) are
necessary "for there to be" what we call visual sensation in
any consciousness, as no more than a piece of high priori,
mythopoeic legislation of a sort typical, in our time, of
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raore Curias than the Roman. This matter, however, can
rest, since I can no more he instructed "by someone else
as to what it is possible for me to conceive than I can
instruct anyone in the same matter, and consexiuently the
criticism and its answer become no more than contrary
assertions of what purports to be fact. I can only imitate
Locke and direct people who hold such views to an inspection
of their own experience, lest they may have overlooked some
of their own powers of conceiving and analysing or have let
them disappear under an a priori fig-leaf. So, a3 far as
this sort of criticism is concerned, the ground of personal
identity may continue to be located in consciousness per se,
since those that hold these views apparently have, like
George IV. and the men without "moral" experience,
anomalous experience.
147. At this point we may conveniently pause to make
something of a summary of the conclusions we have drawn
from Locke's account of identity so far;
(
I. The identity of an "idea" i.e. of any existing
individuum of which we are conscious, is grounded
in our intuition of the idea's identity with itself
at a moment i.e. within a specious present (paras
39-58).
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II. The identity of a continuant is grounded in the
relation we apprahend "between successive appear-
ances of an idea or complex of ideas in duration
(paras 39-58).
III. The identity of any continuant which is an organ¬
ism is grounded in the cooperation of its parts
toward the maintenance of its proper function i.e.
the maintenance of animal or vegetable life
(paras 96-103).
Lemma 1. (from II. i.3 & IV.ix.2): Conscious¬
ness can be located in an organism,
because consciousness may include
bodily sensation;
(& from II.xxvii.11)
Lemma 2. A thinking being may be embodied in
an organism, because it is con¬
stituted by having consciousness.
IV. (a) The identity of a human body is the identitj'-
of an organism, (paras 96-103).
(b) The identity of a man is the identity of a
human body, (ibid)
And note"Human11 identity is the equivalent
of "identity of a man", but the term is used
when this "man" is regarded from the side of
the consciousness (see Lemma 2) at any time
annexed to the "man as organism".
V. The identity of a spirit, or intellectual sub¬
stance, is grounded in and confined to the con¬
sciousness which is "now"to any thinking being
(para.89.)
VI. The identity of a Self or Person is grounded in
and confined to the continuing oonsciousness
which the Self or Person has(paras 106-134)
with these consequences:
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(a) that what is never presented in that
consciousness is not part of the Self or Person (120)
(b) that whatever is contained in that con¬
sciousness as "experienced by" the Self or Person
is indefeasibly a part of the Self or Person
Tpara 1^4 }T
These seem to be our main conclusions about identity,
together with the two necessary auxiliary propositions also
obtained from the text of the "ISsasy". They have some
important corollaries which we may summarise as well:-
A. The same spirit, or intellectual substance,
may, or may not, be embodied in the same
organism~Tfrora~V., IVb & Lemma 2).
B. The same spirit, or intellectual substance,
may, or may not, underlie the continuing
consciousness of the same Self or Person
(from V. & VI.).
C. The same Self or Person may, or may not, occupy
the same human body (from VI., IVa. & Lemma 1).
D. The same Self or Person may, or may not, appear
as the same man (from VI., IVb., & Lemma 1).
E» The same Self or Person may have annexed to it
diverse intellectual substances together with
the same physical organism (i.e. human body or
"man"l"~Tfrom VI., V., IVa & b. & Lemma 1).
P. The same Self or Person may have annexed to it
diverse intellectual substances and diverse
physical organisms (human bodies or "men"""}""
(from VI., V., Lemma 1, IVa & b. & III — the
grounds of identity being all diverse.).
G. The converse of D holds good.
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K. The contrary in respect of substance and
organism in E.» holds good.
I. The contrary in respect of substance and
organism in F*» holds good.
J. If spirit or intellectual substance is known,
it is known (H.B.) only by intuition at a
moment i.e. within a specious present
(from I. & V.).
K. If identical Self or Person is known, it is
(ll.B.) apprehended as a relation between
successive appearances (from II. & VI.).
The above constitutes, then, a table of the relations
between, and mutual inclusions and exclusions among, these
identities which in experience we discriminate as: Self
and/or Person, Spirits (i.e. intellectual substances), Men,
human bodies, Organisms (consisting of material substances),
Continuants, and mere Individua. It is interesting to note
that the corollaries, which for the sake of brevity are given
above as derived direotly from the original propositions
obtained from the exposition of Locke's text, are themselves
completely consistent with the text of Ms account and are
verifiable there passim. Up till this point at least, the
material does not seem to have imposed linguistic inconsist¬
ency upon Mm «- unless there is something of this sort in¬
volved in corollaries J. & K. above, which is a question we
have yet to examine.
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148. Among these distinctions, one which we noted before
as being perhaps disturbing to accepted views wa3 that
between Man and. Person, demonstrated by the example of the
Prince and the Cobbler (para.142 above). Further to this
example, Locke observes (II.xxvii.15}: "The body too goes to
the making of the man, and would, I guess, to every one
determine the man in this case, t^herein the soul with all
its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man;
but he would be the same cobbler to sveyy one besides him¬
self." And the point here that there may be a great deal of
difference between what the Cobbler-embodied Prince may
experience of himself as Self to himself and what otner
people may experience of him as a person, leads as con¬
veniently to an important distinction we have to examine.
In the summary of our conclusions in the previous paragraph,
we spoke indifferently of the identity of "Self or Person"?
this distinction we have now to examine is that which Locke,
in the latter part of his account in Book II., makes
between Self and Person.
In 25 & "6 of Il.xxvii, having granted that it i3 more
probable than not that the consciousness of the same self or
person is annexed to one spiritual substance -- although
there is, on his shewing, no evidence whatever for this
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exeept, perhaps, that it would make the situation tidier
and more aesthetically pleasing (see B.H.I, of the Summary)
-- Locke goes on to remarks "This every intelligent being,
sensible of happiness or misery, must grant -- that there is
something that is himself, that he is concerned for, and.
would have happy; that this self has existed in a continued
duration more than one instant ..... amd may be the same
self, by the same consciousness continued on for the future.
.. .. In all which account of self, the same numerical sub¬
stance is not considered as making the same self; but the
same continued consciousness...... (and) anything united to
it by a consciousness of former actions, makes also a part
of the same self, which is the same both then and now......
(26) Per3on, as I take it, is the name for this self.
therever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I_ think,
/
another may say is the same person." And a convenient
illustration of what this distinction may mean is the hypo¬
thetical one we noted before of the migrant soul of the
Prince which became embodied in the Cobbler's body. If
this happened, we saw, the presence of the Prince's con¬
sciousness did not make "smother man", because, Locke says:
"he would be the same cobbler to every one besides himself•"
Sameness of consciousness, in other words, can only be known
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with1n that conaciousneas* What the (Cohbler)-PRINCE
experienced of himself as Self is quite a different thing
from what other conscious "beings experienced of the
COBBLER-(Prince) as Person -- and .yet, according to Locke*
the terms (BI-a-Prince"» Self, and "he-a-Cohhler!! • Person)
refer to the same thing. Likewise what I experience of
"me" as Self, is necessarily different from what other people
experience of 'me" as Person. To any other consciousness,
the identity of a Self can on'y 'be inferred from whatever,
visible to (i.e. contained within) the first consciousness,
makes up to that consciousness, the organic accompaniments
of a Person -- or, in less cautious terms, we can only infer
to oth'^r men's identical selves from the behaviour of their
bodies. But this does not mean that we merely have to go
back on the previous account and now say that, be the
identity or self what it may, the identity of person is
merely the same as identity of a man, or even of a human
body. For, Locke tells us, II.xxvii.26: "It ("person ) is
a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit
This personality extends itself beyond present existence to
what is past, on1y by eonsciougnees" -- i.e. not by con¬
tinuing identity of the body from which alone others can
infer to identity — "whereby it becomes concerned and
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acconntable; own and imputes to itself past actions" --
which others impute for quite different reasons -- "just
upon the same ground and for the same reason as it does the
present." And from this we see that our "forensic" term
is to apply5 as is quite proper in view of its derivationj
to a. being who is accountable for his actions, and account-
ability for action presumably means — remembering that
Locke refers the term to what 'another may say is the same
person" -- accountable is an inter-personal way e.g. as
before a tribunal. But, on the other hand, the identity
of this being who is accountable to a tribunal is located
in something which is utterly inaccessible to any tribunal
(less, perhaps, the final one) viz. its own consciousness.
A person's accountability is established by "his conscience
accusing or excusing him (ll.xxvii.22)" and what is not in
his consciousness is not in his conscience and, if it cannot
be revived therein, is no part of the person -- whatever
may be the evidence of other witnesses. And this obviously
presents a difficulty. If it is said, as by ueibnia, that
the identity of a person can be established by means other
than an appeal to the person's consciousness, in that for all
practical purposes, it can be established by external signs
e.g. fro1-" the parts of the organism, which would be sufficient,
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no doubt, for a law court, the answer is that all that, has
been established is the identity of a "human" body, and the
"practical purposes" which thi3 satisfies are quite beside
the point. What' is involved may b° more fully illustrated
y
by referring to Campbell Eraser's note on p.468 of his
edition, where he observes: "it is implied that a murderer
for example is not accountable for a murder of which his
organism was the instrument, if a consciousness of it, as
his own Y^-st act, cannot be awakened in him.' It follows
(unless conscious experience is ultimately indelible) that
any man who has forgotten t hat he committed a murder, did
not personally commit it. Who, in that case, was the
murderer?" And he leaves the question, presumably in in¬
credulity, rhetorical. But it is by no means unanswerable.
The murderer was the person who then occupied the organism
which was the vital instrument that performed the lethal act,
and which person no longer exist3 -- if consciousness cannot
(repeat, cannot) be awakened in the appropriate respect in the
person who at present occupies the same organism, even although
it may be abundantly established that it is_ the same organism.
Tf the present occupant of the organism cannot annex to his
consciousness the memory of the act, then, whatever any human
court may do in lieu, justice in the sense of retribution for
— —
the particular act, cannot he done until Resurrection and
Judgement -- which last consideration, of course, saves the
situation from Locke's point of view, since at final judge¬
ment (whatever we understand by that) there will he no
"fatal error". For anyone who cannot share Locke's con¬
victions, the conclusion must be that since the certain
identity of that to which the forensic term person applies,
i
cannot be established by anyone but the person, injustice
*
may indeed vary often be done, and that -- in default of a
latter day rectification of the case -- the world and our
experience of it is, however displeasingly, like that. It
may be, on the other hand, that it i3 very infrequently
that such cases really happen, but one does not have to be a
particularly voracious reader of the more widely circulated
sort of newspaper to be aware that a large number of defence
plea3 in processes concerning murder contain reference to
precisely such a complete loss of "pa3t experience" (as the
prosecution alleges it to be) from consciousness -- and the
readiness to make this appeal might suggest that these is
something in the common experience of mankind that gives
credence to Locke's account, however inconvenient it may be
for jurists. At the worst, after all, his account involves
no more than the admission that human justice is not very
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reliable, and since, on his view, it is ultimately cor¬
rigible, Campbell Eraser's incredulous leaving of Msr own
question unanswered might be interpreted as shewing a lack
of confidence in the competence of the final assize, which
is almost as unbecoming in him as in Berkeley. In other
words, Locke's account may not be true, but it is not so
improbable that it can be dismissed with an exclamation mark
and a rhetorical question. Locke himself provides, by the
'way, the prophylaxis, from a practical point of view,
against an outbreak of this deep amnesia, which seems to be
an occupational disorder among assassins, in his consideration
of the case of the blameworthy drunkard who, although not
astain conscious of what he did in his inebriation, is "justly
punished" because although the "fact" is proved against him —
in the forensic sense i.e. his organism was at least the
instrument of some malefaction -- lack of consciousness cannot
136 proved for him. If it is said that this is a weak
argument (with which assessment I agree) and that "proof" is
here a question-begging red herring, the answer lies in
yielding the point and observing that what is being discussed
here, in any case, are practical expedients for the use of
well9intentioned magistrates, with which, strictly* we have no
concern and which were, strictly, no concern of Locke's --
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although I suspect it may have been the Senior Civil
servant in Locke that led him to spend time on these
forensic consequences at the expense of others rather more
germane to his enquiry. It is indeed difficult to decide
lust how much importance Locke saw in this distinction, or
how far he may have followed out its consequences. The
distinction made in his statement: "Whenever a man finds
what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is
the same person" is, I think, a proper one, and it is, quite
certainly I think, a distinction. Professor Aaron says
(op.cit. p,141): "Ha identifies self with person; to myself
I am a self, to another a person." And, no doubt, he does
try to "identify" them, but it seems to me more important to
emphasise the distinction which is imposed on him in &he
attempt to do so, in the hope that it may clarify some of
the difficulties which Professor Aaron conceals in the second
part of his sentence -- the forensic sort of which we have
already looked at. Professor Gibson says (op.eit.p.116-117):
Locke treats 'self' and 'person' as having the same
denotation. The only difference in their signification is
a difference of point of view." and I am rather happier with
this phrasing; but the consequence of the distinction brought
1
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atoout "by the difference of point of view, seems to me to
need more examination than Locke, at least explicitly,
gives it* We are concerned to find what are the differences
"between the experience "I" have of "me" as 'Self, the experi¬
ence (if any) "I" have of "me" as Person, and the experience
any other Person can have of "me" as Person; that no other
person can have experience of "me" as Self, seems already
•sufficiently established. And I suspect that when this has
been done, we may find that "self" and 'person" have the
same denotation only because the mechanism of the language
to which we are confined (Cp. the Introduction to this
thesis) is such that it makes us refer to them together in a
way which makes misleadingly identical what is either diverse
or ""identical" in some odd but linguistically undifferentiated
sense.
I wish, however, to postpone the examination of these
question, which will represent the final form of our inter¬
pretation of locke's account, until we have considered the
account of the Self in Book IV.
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VII.
TIP ACCOUNT OF QUE KTOVLEDgB OF OUR OWE EXISTG1CE IIf BOCK IV.
149. There is, of course, no account of xersonal Identity
as such in Book IV. But there is an account, brief but
important, of our experience of what we are maintaining Locke
distinguishes from "person" i.e. "self", and it is contained
in chapter ix of IV. "Of Our Threefold Knowledge of Exist¬
ence." In this brief chapter Locke deals with our knowledge
of the existence of thing3, of the existence of God, and of
"our own existence'8, and both the brevity and the importance of
the passage on our knowledge of ourselves makes it desirable
to quote it in fulls (lV.ix.3) "As for our own existence, we
perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither
needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more
evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I
feel pleasure or pains can any of these be more evident to tae
than my own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that
very doubt makes me perceive <ry own existence, and will not
suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is
evident I have as certain perception of my own existence as of
the existence bf the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt I
have as certain perception of the existence of the thing
doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience
then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our
own exis'ence, and so an internal infallible perception that
we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking,
we are conscious to ourself of our own being; and, in this
matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty."
This is obviously a very different matter from the elaborate
and copious account of personal identity in xxvii. of II.,
but that Locke regarded it as of the first importance we can
gather from the fact that upon this he was prepared to rest
our knowledge of the existence of God. Having rejected the
"ontological proof" -- implicitly in the n^S3ay" and quite
explicitly in the subsequent correspondence with Stilling-
fleet — on the grounds that ideas, existing as such, are not
always evidence of real existence, "real existence" i.e. of
God, "can be proved only by real existence", and the real
existence which proves the existence of God is, as is
developed in x. of IV., the real existence of the Self.
150. That Locke should choose to give two such different
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accounts of what is generally supposed to be the same thing
or, even on his own account, two things so very intimately
connected as Self and Person, should not, in view of the
#
present interpretation, surprise us; for it only amounts to
the fact that he is drawing our attention either to the saipe
thing or two facets of the same thing by adopting two different
but apposite descriptions, in a quite characteristic way.
"he resemblance of this latter account, even to the examples,
to the celebrated passage in which Descartes enunciates the
"Cogito", has often been remarked. But this is no more than
to point out that here, for his specific purpose i.e. the
description of our experience of our Selves (as distinct from
our experience as persons), Locke finds Cartesian terms useful
and adequate — as he found, apparently, they were not in the
case of experience "as person". Although in one of his
leJters Locke remarks: "For having resolved to examine Humane
Understanding, and the ways of our knowledge, not by others'
opinions, but by what I could from my own observations collect
mjrself, I have purposely avoided the reading of all books that
treated any way of the 3ubiect, that so I might have nothing
to bias me any way , we know from his own testimony and Lady
sasham's, that to Descartes he regarded himself as owing "the
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great obligation of my first deliverance from the unintellig¬
ible way of talking of the philosophy in use in the Schools
in his time", and consequently, the reading of Descartes'
book and the considerable impression it made on him being
antecedent to his self-denying ordinance about other men's
books, it is not at all surprising that he should use Des¬
cartes' terms as the most appropriate and authoritative in
drawing our attention to this crucially important part of
our experience.
151. How what, we might ask, is the main difference,
apart from length and elaboration, in these two account of
our experience of ourselves which Locke gives U3? And it
i
seems to me that this difference lies in the way in which we
know, or are aware of, the Self -- which we tend to speak of
indifferently as the same thing, whichever sort of account we
are using. The question is, are these accounts used to direct
our attention to two different things in our experience, de¬
spite the fact that in common usage the same terms are applied
to them, or does each account in fact direct our attention to
the same thing? If it is urged that there is a strong case to
be made for saying that Locke identifies Self and Person, i.e.
tha "both accounts point to the same part of experience, it
must also "be remembered that the "same thing" is regarded
"by Locke at least from two different points of view, or in
two different aspects. And this means that, in terms of the
ground of the difference we noted, the question is whether
that which we "know1' in terms of this second account, is the
same as that which we "know" in terms of the account in
Book II.
152. In trying to answer this, we can note in the first
place, that in the acco nt in Book IY the knowledge we have,
of whatever it is, is "intuitive knowledge . That is to say,
the object o 3uc" knowledge is revealed directly, umnediated
either by an idea or the discernment of a relation between
ideas. Uor does this involve a contradiction, a3 might be
urged? for if we allege it does, then we are making oiper
again the sort of misinterpretation of Locke that we spent so
much time puttin " right in considering T.H. Green's criticism.
In the section on Locke's use of the term •'existence', we con¬
cluded that his account did not confine the class of existents
to ideas as natural facts, but included also two other orders
of existents viz. "things" and "minds", which were known
mediately by means of ideas in the various ways we then
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investigated; and here we are given something else, other than
ideas, which exists, or at the least a different way of de¬
scribing one of the things, other than ideas as natural facts,
which exists. Admittedly, for -J-«ocke, the term "idea" covers
whatever is discrirainable in consciousness. And here we
have come upon something discriminable in consciousness which
is said not to be an id~a. In face of this, we can either
dev lop Locke's usage in a way he did not choose, and say
that this, being discriminable in consciousness, is an "idea"
(in inverted commas) which is, as a matter of fact, different
from all other ideas — and this is quite harmless, if we
ake clear what we are doing -- since it is only putting one
limit on the use of a term, and such limits (as Locke is
quite clear) are purely arbitrary and are only convenient in .
■ referring to an experience which their adoption or non-
adoption does not in the slightest degree affect; but since
this involves us in saying "this idea" is a "real existent"
in a sense other than that in which every idea is a real
existent (as a natural fact), it would seera better to adopt
Locke's own more convenient method and say that this present¬
ation is non-ideal and s i generis.
If it is the case that wha were referred to in that
earlier account as ''minds" are again being referred to here
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differently, it means only that the term "minds" and the
sort of terras "being used in the present account, overlap,
and this is of no consequence provided that both sets of
terms turn our attention in the required direction; and if
this same thing, like some others in our experience, were
presented simultaneously through different avenues, the double
de3C iption would be required and would ce tainly be character¬
istic of Locke's method. It may be, on the other hand, that
the object of the intuitive sort of knowledge now being
spoken of, is different from the "mind" or "intellectual
substance" mediately known in and through every idea of
reflection.
153. In investigating this further, we should recollect
that every Perception and volition which is a constitutive
idea of our consciousness is accompanied by a discriminable
idea of reflection which is the perception of our perceiving
o willing; and that the accompanying ideas of reflection
have each, as one of their minimal concomitants, an imprecise
awareness of spiritual or cognitive substance. We should
note too that in this account in Book IV the occasions on
which we have the special sort of intuitive knowledge are
given as occasions of "thinking', "feeling pain or pleasure",
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"reasoning", 'doubting" etc., that is to say, occasions on
which <e have a perception present to us; so that Locke's
amended and amplified account is that when we perceive any¬
thing, in the widest sense, the self-c nsciours consciousness
of some particular phenomenon which we have, includes both
t .e imprecise, mediated awareness of the mind that thinks in
that moment of consciousness, as the spiritual substance
revealed In the idea of reflection whose object is the
particular perception, and the uwraediated intuition of the
existent self whose perception it is, and whose idea the
"accompanying" idea itself, is* and the question is whether
Locke is trying to tell us that the Self which is intuited
and the mind or spiritual substance which is kno^n mediately,
are the same thing. Further to this question we can note
that whereas the mediated awareness we have is, observably,
imprecise and obecur«, the intuitive knowledge is dessribed
as coming "not short of the highest degree of certainty." Is
it, then, that the latter is knox^ledge, as a different and
higher level, of the same thing of which we have an obscure
awareness at a lower level in the former?
154. I think the ans\<rer to this question is No. For one
thing, Locke's accounts both of memory and of spiritual
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substance are against sue an interpretation, and since it is
c ntended here that Locke does not gratuitously contradict
himself, we must try to find out whether this account in
Book IV necessarily contradicts these former accounts i.e.
whether it is indicating something in exoerience which is only
to be described inconsistently in language, or whether it can
be interpreted consistently with the other accounts -- which
I think it can. In our examination of the account of memory,
we found that when an id^a -- a perception of some kind —
is remembered, it is remembered together with the idea of
reflection which accompanied it, on its original occurrence,
as a perception of the perceiving; and that one of the
minimal concomitant ideas included in that idea, was one "of"
(i.e. revealing) thinking substance, and that this included
(concomitant) idea was also remembered; but that the thinking
substance which on the original occurrence was revealed, was
not itself revealed in the recollected idea "of" it (see para.
12*5 above); so that the identity of the "present" thinker
and the "past" thinker was not grounded in identity of per¬
ceived substances or of perceived i.e. presented and re¬
collected) "ideas of substance", but on the agreement, i.e.
identification, of what we called the "I"-qualification of
these ideas. And if the analysis is carefully rehearsed,
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we see that the "I'-qualification does not consist in the
revelation of the same thinking substance in a present and a
remembered. idea, but in the perception, as part of the present
instance if memory, of the same qualifications of the presented
and recollected "ideas of substance'' (t amselves concomitants
of the presented and recollected ideas of reflection); and
that qualification is, it now appears, that of "being the
particular idea of substance which w s an object (and part of
a more complex object) to the Self or "I" which was intuited
then and which is the same Self or "I" which is intuited now.
This is not to say that the Self or "I" which was intuited
then, is now, in the ores^nt instance of remembering, intuited
also as it was then, because remembering is not intuiting;
remembering consists in the perception of a certain relation
between ideas, but intuiting (as used here) means the ' nowing
of a real existent non-idaally. But what is involved is this:
thnh the Self or "I" which is intuited now, ualifie3 the idea
of thinking substance which is a concomitant of that idea of
reflection which is, in turn, The "perception of the pres nt
remembering", in such a way that it is seem to agree with the
rscollected idea of thinking substance, which is the concomitant
of th - recdlected idea of reflection accompanying the remembered-
perception. if, perhaps hazardously, w> try to make the point
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c! earer "by using a metaphor, we can say that in any moment of
c 'nsciousnesn which is an instance of remerab ring, the t->elf
or "I" which is intuited in that moment vas moments)
"puts its particular stamp apon the idea of thinking substance
which is part of it unavoidable perception that it is now
remembering, 30 that agreement can obtain between that present
idea revealing thinking substance or "a mind-'' and its
o >po3ite nu ber in the remembered complex, because the
latter ha3, in the past, "been stamped with the same par¬
ticular stampw» T is is to say that the Self which is the
object of intuition is not itself "remembered": what are
ra embered are ideas carrying the "marks which 'shew that
they were" objects to the same unique, intuited Self. The
Self intuited, is always the Self now. This means that a
S&lf may have as the contents of its consciousness, thoughts
and perceptions "thought by" and "perceived by different
minds (i.e. thinking or spiritual substances). But this
ire can hardly find startling, as it is no more than a re¬
statement of what, as we have already found, Locke tells us
about spiritual substance in its relation to the Self — in¬
cluding the fact that it is possible that it is the same mind
or thinking substance that is involved every time; but since
whether or not it is, is something we can never know either
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in perception, or by memory, oy, apparently, by intuition,
it must remain irrelevant. Consequently, since it is clear
from this further examination of memory that we can know that
the Self which is conscious now, and the Self which was con¬
scious then, are identical, but that we cannot know that the
mind which thinks now and the mind which thought then, are
identical, ws must conclude that, consistently with his
account of memory and spiritual substance, Locke is not
identifying the Self we know in intuition with the thinking
substance we are aware of in every idea of reflection. "Mind*
is the thinking substance whic Is present in ay moment of
consciousness and which makes it to be consciousness, but it
is not that which differentiates any moment of consciousness
and makes it specifically "mineor somebody else's. If
metaphors are again not too dangerous, we might say that
"mind i$ the 'medium" of all consciousness indifferently,
or is what provides undifferentiated consciousness as the
"matrix" from which unique personal consciousnesses emerge —
under conditions involving the presence of real existent
Selves.
155. It is possible that confusion might arise at thi3
point owing to the facts (i) that we have previously spoken
precisely of intellectual substance as being intuited at a
moment (see Corollary J. in the summary in para. 147 above)
and also, much earlier, of any ideafe "identity with itself"
being intuited at a moment i.e. 'within a specious present"
(see para.58 above), and (ii) that we now seem to be confining
intuition to the knowledge of something which is not intel¬
lectual substance. But that there is a distinction in the
usages that puts the matter beyond confusion, is surely
clear enough from the fact that Selves are being described as
real existent3 known directly (i.e. non-ideally), and spiritual
substances are being desc ibed as real existents known only
by and through ideas, and there is no need to confuse the in¬
tuition of an idea (perhaps revealing a real existent) with
the intuition of a real existent per se. The "intuition" of
an idea, as such, and of an idea's identity with itself —
including the idea "of thinking substance" -- is, as we found
in the section on the General Motion of Identity, a sort of
pe 'ce tion which is different from all other perceptions in
respect of its specie! relation to the mode of duration i.e.
it referred to perception in a "first order" duration within
"the soeeious present", or moment", or "instant". The
'intuition" of Self is not, apparently, so related to the mode
of duration, and it is not so because the Self, being non-ideal,
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is not (H.B.) subject to that mode. It i3 true that if
thinking substance is known (see Goroll.J.}» it is known
only by intuition at a moment, and that Self is likewise
known only by intuition at a moment, but the point we are
establishing is that the intuitions do not have the same
object. The Self that is intuited is not the thinking
spbstance or mind that is intuited at the same moment.
156, We observed that the main difference between the
account in Book II and the account in Book IV lay in how
"self" (used very loosely) is known, and by examining how
it is known, we have come a little closer to finding whether
or not what is known, according to each account, is the same
t ing or different. The investigation was undertaken
principally to help with establishing what the relation is
between "Self" and "Person", and as a result of it, it is
suggested that "Self" applies to the self we know immediately
and certainly in the present moment and only as it is in a
present moment. This is obviously not what we know in terms
of the first account, which iS of Person. Whatever other
relation exists, then, between a "Self" and the "Person",
they are related in being diverse, in that Self is known
22i£ in the res- nt, and Person is known only in consciousness
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extended "beyond the pcesent -- and this is so even if the
Self known in a present moment is the Self intuited on t .e
occasion of a perception which is a remembering of its own
actions or perceptions; because, a Self which is intuited
is always a "Sejf thinking , or a "Self remembering'1, or a
"Self doubting" and so on, and, consequently, if the Self
intuited happens to be, as in th~ example, a "Self remember¬
ing its past actions', it is, in effect, intuited as a "Self
being conscious of part of 'its own' Person", but it is still
intuited and experienced as it is now -- whatever (and however
Reflexive") the nature of the consciousness indicated by
the qualifying participle.
And from this w-■ can see that we have an answer to the
question that was raised incidentally in para.148 above viz.
w .at are the differences bet een hat "I experience of "me"
as Self, what "I : experience of "me" as Person, and what any¬
body else experiences of "me" as -Person? And the answer is
t .at th® difference between them lies in the fact that whai
I ■ experience of "me" as Self is something contained in a
non^urational mode of consciousness, while what "I" experi¬
ence of 'me" as Person is contained in consciousness in and
conined to the mode of duration, and in the fact that what
!I" experience of "me' as Self and Person is strictly confined
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tb "try" consciousness, while what anybody else experiences
of "me" as Person ("me" as Self "being inaccessible to him)
is confined to what he recognises in hi3 durational conscious¬
ness as "my" organic concomitants, which, in hi a recognising
of them thus and as such, are parts of what "he" experiences
of "him" as Person.
157. There is something else that mast be made explicit
in this connection — although I hope it will hare become
obvious from the preceding paragraphs -- and it is this:
although I experience what I call rryself (since language
still imposes this sort of usage on us) differently as Self
and Person, I can experience myself simultaneously, though
differently, as Self and Person. For* as above, although
my experience of myself as Self is non-durational, it occurs
on the occasion of a "being conscious, and if the content
of that "being conscious" is a remembering of what makes rae
Person (i.e. is part of the extended consciousness which is
the ground of my personal identity), then simultaneously I an
aware of myself as Self and Person. I have, then, simul-
taneous double-presentation of myself in experience; and
simultaneous double-presentation is riot (cp. the case of
"substance") a new phenomenon to us in our examination of
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Locke's account. But we must Be careful to note that the
simultaneous double-presentation in this case IS of Self-
and-Person as "myself51 and not of Self-and-"mind" as "myself"
(cp. paras 155-4 above.). Brora this we can see that Locke's
distinction between Self and Person made in xxvii. of II. and
reinforced by the account in ix. of IV., is quite consonant
with his original description of person which wa3 that "person"
is "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and re¬
flection, and can consider itself as itself, the same think¬
ing thing, in different times and places.... ", for the
"considering itself as itself, the same thinking thing" is
t 5e function of the intuited Self, and the "reason and re¬
flection" and extension to "different times and places" are
the functions of the Person constituted by the consciousness
(reasoning, reflecting etc.) which is the occasion of the
considering itself as itself". Likewise, this distinction
which is imposed by the double-presentation in experience,
s consonant with his suggestion: "Whenever a an finds what
he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same
person.", because, the consciousness which is the occasion
on which, intuitively, a man "finds himself" may be con¬
stituted in part by bodily sensation of and. from the organism
(his human body) annexed to the consciousness, and-of parts
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of the r st of the physical world as related (spatially etc.)
to t at organism; and this sensational sort of consciousness
is grounded in, and, through the relations the organism has
with other things, forma part of, a situation of which an¬
other may be conscious, so that the "otiier" has, as part of
hi3 consciousness, sensational and other awareness of the
same things which are Vnown by, and which constitute in part,
the first consciousness which is, itself, the occasion of the
(first) Self's being intuited i.e. what the "other" is con¬
scious of as the organic part of the first person is, in fact,
part f the personal consciousness which is the occasion of
the first Self1s being intuited; so t at when the first Self
t
"is found", the other, as it is quite proper for uocke to
say, finds what is, indeed, part of the same thing. And this
is to say no more than would be expressed, if we used politer
but less cautious ters, in the statement that when another
man sees my body, he is t en conscious of something of which
I am conscious too, and that this consciousness of mine is
part of what allows me to know syself (as Self), while his
consciousness of the same- thing allows him to know me as a
Person. Consequently, when Locke's various accounts are
explicated, they are seen to tally.
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There ia» I think, something more to be said about
the mature of what we experience as Self, and its relation
to Person, here distinguished from it; but I wish to




158. In this penultimate section I intend examining,
for a number of reasons, the criticism of Locke's view of
Personal Identity which, are contained In Butler's Disserta¬
tion "Of Personal Identity" appended to "The Analogy of
P-eligion ".
In the first place, Butler's reputation as s subtle
and sagacious moral philosopher lays on us the obligation
of examining what h^ has to 3ay; for in +he Introduction
to this Study v<e noted that Personal! Identity is of the first
relevance in 'Ithics, and here is an instance of a distinguished
moral philosopher explicitly examining the subject.
In the second place, it will be useful to review the
discussion as it has developed so far, and before drawing any
final conclusions; and an effective way of doing this is to
examine a cotaoendious criticism, answering it if possible.
Butler's Dissertation particularly recommends itself for this
purpose, for it is explicitly concerned with the topic as it
is discussed in the Ir:'ssay", it is of manageable bulk, and
its author keeps to the points that matter -- as we might
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expect of the only one of Locke's near contemporaries (with a
possible exception in Berkeley) who approaches his own in¬
tellectual stature.
Thirdly, despite his grasp of where it is that the
problems lie, and the trenchancy of his exposition, Butler
is i1luminatingly wrong on the two most important issues,
and is so in a way that emphasises how much Locke was in
advance of his successors in ways which are particularly
apparent in the study of Personal Identity.
And, finally, the failure of Butler's criticism shews
with an increased clarity, which is commensurate with the
critic's ability, that if Locke is to be read, then he must
be read entire and with an attention that is appropriate to
the patience with which he thought through what he says in
the "Essay" -- although even this precaution is not infallible,
as in the case of T.H. Green. For of all the philosophical
classics, with the exception periiaos of Kant's first "Critique",
"An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding" is the one least
c-pable of being condensed, summarised or anthologised. for
the beteefit of students or critics in a huryy. And it is
the one least safely read at second hand, for whatever Locke's"
"philosophy" was -- if we like to call it that, for he was no
Asystematiser -- it is most assuredly mot what, with surprising
*
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unanimity, the historians of philosophy tell us it i3. Well
night Locke exclaim to Edward Stillingfleet: "Truly, my Lord,
my hook hath most, unlucky stars.'", and seldom, we might add,
ha- a thinker suffered so much (See e.g. para.164 below) from
the quite original sins of his followers -- or from the sins
of those whom the historians of philosophy choose to designate
as his followers for the sake, presumably, of the tidiness of
their chroniele.
T"e must now turn to the examination of the points -- not
all of them against Locke — which Butler raises.
159. The first and most general point we may note is that
Butler was well aware of the importance of the question about
Personal Identity for temporal morality and for the mainten¬
ance of a faith that requires assurance of continued existence
after death. This is apparent from the first sentence of the
"Analogy" itself, wherein Butler, having noted as much, sends
^whoever thinks it worth while" to the discussion in his
appended Dissertation -- the suggestion being that all plain
men and good Christians can take it for granted that such
"strange difficulties" are unreal, nd that the author can
accordingly proceed with his .justification of G-od's ways to
men without further- attention to these subtleties. We might
i
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perhaps remark that there is about- this sentence, and about
the Dissertation a a whole, a tone which is not at all
characteristic of hitler at his best -- as in the Sermons.
There is an asperity and a touch of arrogance that re inds
us rather uncomfortably of Stillingfleet, despite the patent
difference in ability. It may bo, however, tha he is to be
forgiven this in view of the anxiety about a facile scepticism
(made manifest in the Introduction) which perplexed h£.B\in
his cure of souls c. 1736.
Turning to a more particular examination, we can note
that the noints he raises fall convenient™ into ten sections:
(i). In the first paragraph ("forks. 2d. Gladstone
p 387), h ving once again denigrat ed these "sir :ge perplexi¬
ties" and the "stranger solutions" of fered to them, he re arks
th- t although the attempt to def'ne Personal Identity, as in
the similar cases of similitude and. equality, "would but per¬
plex it", there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the
idea". And we can pause before-going any further to observe
that this at least is not directed against Locke, for Locke
/
makes no attempt to define, but most consistently confines
himself to describing "that we experience of our selves and our
personal identity. Anything which i ;nt be cabled "'definition1
in some more portentous sense than the issue of • plain.
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historical account, appears only in the hypothetical alter¬
native accounts which he considers for the purpose of shewing
their inadequacy. It is true that here and there he makes
such round assertions as that a person" is a thinking intelli¬
gent being", but that is only to delimit roughly* and in
intelligible terms, the sphere of discourse within which he
goes on to elaborate his description. And such description,
I ta>e it, is what Butler means by "ascertaining the idea".
having observed, then, that in his practice Locke does
not e t by introducing "strange perpl xities" in this re¬
spect -- i.e. by any attempt to provide a definition of an
impossible decree of nicety, we can go on to see what Butler',
own ac ount of how we "ascertain the idea" (which is a harm¬
less activity) consists in, and. how it differs from and cor¬
rects Locke's. And continuing in para.2 (the para, numbers
are tab-en fr m Gladstone's edition) Butler says: "lor as,
upon two triangles being compared of viewed together, there
arises to the mind the idea of similitude ..... so likewise,
upon co paring the consciousness of one's self, or one's own
er? vtence, in any two moment ■, there as immediately arises to
the *rf nd the idea of personal identity. And nothing, I
'o i d subreit, CO'' 1 d agree more closely with Locke's account,
"'his is, indeed, an admirable short statement of hi view
-253-
might well lis inserted in the text of the "hssay" as a
marginal heading. Butler goes on to point lis simile by
r9"narkin.g that just as we discern the similitude of the
triangles "so the latter comparison gives us not only the
idea of personal identity, hut also shows us the identity
of ourselves in these two moments? the present, suppose, and
that immediately past? or the present and that a month, a
year, or twenty years past." So that, here at least, Butler
is preac in- to the converted. lis account not only agrees
with Locve's hu-' shews that, pe.'fiaps independently achieved,
his view of the nature of memory is at lea t similar to
Roche's. His account differs fro: Locke's only'in "being
\
le3s adequate in that it does not take note of the errors
which, a- a natter of fact, can b" and are made in the making
of such comparisons; but, considering the scope and purpose
I
of the Dissertation, this, it might be said, is not a matter
for censure. On the other hand, had he appreciated that the
con equences of precisely the odd and anomalous cases are of
first importance in this matter, he might have found it prudent
\
at least t note them. That his view of memory, although
apparently the same in outline, is less adequ?„te than Locke's
-- at least as Locke's is according to exposition, which I
a ■ assuming to be correct -- will become apparent shortly.
160. (ix ). In those points he raises which I shall
include under our second heading, Butle • becomes rather more
for lidable. he writes: "But though consciousness of what
is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to our¬
selves, yet to say, that i makes personal identity, or is
necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, that a
pe son has not existed a' single moment, nor done one action,
but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects
on." And this, we can see, consists for one tuing# of the
objection, also entertained by Berkeley, which we noted be¬
fore viz. that the ground of Personal Identity cannot be
actual consciousness, for then I ara not now the person I was
te years ago unless I_ am now remembering rryself as I was
then. That this is not, in any case, Locke's view, we saw
before. But if we attend closely to Butler here, we can see
that not only does he reject actual consciousness as the
ground of identity, but also potential consciousness. In the
quotation above he implies that it cannot be grounded in what
»
ve can remember." (I think it unlikely that Butler'3 objection
contains any of the suggestion of his brother Bishop's. The
notion that the grounding of Personal Identity in potential
%
consciousness flight produce a situation in which "for aught we
know1 all persons are the same -- a view disposed of in
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para.125 above -- is, I suspect, r tier too fanciful for
Butler.) His objection to it, as a ground, seems to be
t it is in some way inadequ-.te. But if such extended
consciousness ay not "be t .e ground, what else is needed?
-utler admits that such consciousness gives us what experi¬
ence we have of Iersonal Identity, and if what constitutes it
is no' known in or fro i experience, then, provided it is at
all accessible, it roust be known by sore other means. It
canno be quite inaccessible, for ws have already beeh void
that "consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our
personal identity to ourselves'. What more he wants is
perhaps indicated i his next sentence, although the sequence
or '.is thought bet reen it and the preceding one does not
appear very close to me. He continues: "And one should
really t ink it self-evident, that consciousness of personal
identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal
identity; arty nor-: t .an knowledge, in any other ca ie, can
constitute truth, which it resupposss. ' Now, although it is
clear enough What Butler would he at viz. that we must have
soma a priori knowledge "of what con titutes" ersonal Identity,
this will not do as a conclusive demonstration that we must.
It is true that Locke himself is not "nice about terms", but
he is generally more liable to be accused of prolixity than of
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over-condensation, and consequently be does afford us the
opportunity of finding the import of his terms by observation
of his repeated usage. Butler, on the other hand and par¬
ticularly here, does not sufficiently indicate the import of
his terms. TM.3 tight .juxtaposition of "knowledge", "truth",
"consciousness", and "presuppose", together with the awe-
inppiring formula "it is self-evident", smacks of a later and
less honest style of philosophising than that which Butler
usually affects. The sentence, a3 it stands, may, for all
a
we know, be true according to some particular interpretation
of its terms which we are not given. But it is quite obvious
that Butler has Locke in mind throughout the Dissertation,
although his name is not mentioned till the next page, and we
are therefore interested in it only as it relates to Locke's
account, and in what it can mean in terms of that account.
Let us, then, examine carefully what Butler's assertion
involves. We note that he says: "... consciousness (of
personal identity) cannot constitute any more than
knowledge, in any other case, can constitute...." Prom which
we gather that consciousness and knowledge are equivalent
terms (which they certainly are not in Locke's account.)
lowever, if we take it that the Bishop, like Lockei is merely
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failing to be nice about terms, and assume that he meant to-
write "knowledge of" Personal Identity in the first place,
we see that his assertion is that knowledge of our Personal
Identity presupposes personal Identity and t erefore cannot
constitute it. But what of knowledge? According to
Locke — and any other usage is not relevant here — know¬
ledge consists (with some qualifications that do not apply
in this connection), in "nothing but the perception of the
connection of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy
of any of our ideas." Our knowledge of our -Personal
Identity, then, must consist in the agreement or disagreement
of certain of our ideas* Uow, leaving aside for the moment
the analogy with knowledge and truth "in any other case" con-
ta ned in the last clause of Butler's sentence, let us en¬
quire further into this specific sort of knowledge. Accord¬
ing to Butler's account, which we noted was at least super¬
ficially like Locke's, we found that we did, in fact, "as¬
certain the idea" of Personal Identity in a mode of conscious¬
ness which does, precisely, fulfil this requirement. We do,
according to Butler, ascertain an agreement between certain
of our ideas "upon comparing the consciousness of one's self,
or one's- own existence, in any two moments." So that
utler's assertion seems to be correct; for if "consciousness
of personal identity" consists in a sort of knowledge which
involves the relating together of terms in an agreement, and
the terms in this particular case are "consciousness of
«
one's ovm existence now" and "conseiousness of one's own
existence then", and if consciousness of one's own existence
involves the consciousness of x5er3onal Identity, then it
would seem that a consciousness which essentially involves
the perception of such a relation does, indded, presuppose
the terms of the relation; and Butler's objection'might
appear to st nd. However, before we abandon the position
to Mm, it might be well to ask a little about the terms,
and how we know, or are conscious of, them quite apart from
the relation between them. The terms are, of course, in
each case, "one's own existence". But one's own existence
is not an object of which one can have a sensory presentation
as now, and a memorial, visual image as then. Indeed, what
knowledge do we have of our own existence? According to
Locke -- end his account is the only relevant one here -- our
knowledge of our own existence is an immediate intuition of
the Self now. According then to Butler's schema, the terms
of the relation whose perception constitutes Personal Identity,
would have to be two immediate intuitions, one now, and the
other then. But an intuition can only be now, it cannot be
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then. One of the terms must therefore "be an intuition as
"then', but if the term is not an "intuition then", but
"what was an intuition then", it must be an idea; for if we
see the relationship, we must be aware of the terms, and if
w^ are aware of the terms, we must intuit them or have them
presented as ideas. Since one of the terms is qualified by
"then", it cannot be an intuition, and therefore it must be
an idea; for there is no third thing. From this we can
see that, according to Butler's schema, the perception of
relationship which constitutes our consciousness of I-'ersonal
Identity is the perception of a relation between ideas, and
these id as are in this particular case, as we have seen
before (and as it was open for Butler to see), ideas which
are seen to agree in being (a) present ideas revealing among
them thinking substance (see para.89) and carrying as their
WI"-qualification, the unique mark of being the ideas which
are the occasion of a certain individual Self's being intuited
now (see para.153), and (b) recollected or memorial ideas
containing among them the idea (an "opaque" idea -- 3ee para.
123) of having been "thought by" a thinking substance, and
carrying with them, as their "I"-qualification, the marks of
having been part of t e occasion, in the past, on which a
unique individual Self was intuited then. The relation
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perceived i3, then, a relation between idea3 qualified in a
certain way. So that, clearly, what Butler is saying, or
s ould be saying, is that consciousness of personal Identity
presupposes the occurrence of ideas in consciousness; and
there is no point on which Locke and he could be in closer
agreement. But, the circumstances being as described, the
consciousness which is made to be that of Personal Identity
■recisely by the perception of the relation between such
ideas, discovers Personal Identity, and does not presuppose
it; and by discovering it, constitutes it. It is agreed
that for there to be relation at all, there must be terras of
some kind, and it is self-evident that all relationship pre¬
supposes terms (of sore vind) to be related, and this, although
not the point at issue, would appear to be Butler's point.
But that the terras which constitute any actual individual
relationship must be of one specific kind e.g. that the terras
which are related in that particular relationship which by
being perceived -constitutes -ersonal Identity, ;uist be of the
specific kind which are direct, uamediated intuitions of
'one's own existence" is neither self-evident nor, as a matter
of fact, the case, nor indeed possible. According to Locke,
that "I" exist now as Self, is self-evident, but that I exist
now as a person who is the same person as was then, is
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discursively established, even although (psychologically
speaking) the discursive process is no more lengthy t an the
discerning of the relation between the '^"-qualifications.
If it is asked what it is that so discovers the person, the
answer is that it is the mind which thinks in me now and,
constituting !my" present consciousness, carried upon it the
mark3 of a present, but a-durational, intuition of a oelf.
This is in no way to say that the roind "creates itself I" by
"thin ing itself I", for that which mind so discovers in the
relation of the terms which is the content of present con¬
sciousness, is "well-grounded" in all the ways we have seen
(s e para.131 above). " ind (or einds), as we have found
(se* para.154 above) is the medium and vehicle of all con¬
sciousness indifferently and is that from, which personal
consciousness is emergent on the intervention of Self.
Consciousness, then -- even consciousness "of" Personal
Identity in the only possible sense, which is that of "con¬
sciousness which discovers it in and by the connexion of
ideas in it -- presupposes nothing other than consciousness.
We may grant to Butler that consciousness "of mind or thinking
substance" presupposes mind or thinking substance, since
without it3 presence there is no consciousness. But we have
had occasion to note on more than one occasion that conscious¬
ness of mind or thinking substance is quite a different thing
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from consciousness of Self or Person. If consciousness 'of"
Personal Identity, in this only possible sense, did indeed
presuppose Personal Identity, and if the terms of the re¬
lation were indeed direct intuitions of the Self -- which
they are not — then it would be impossible for there to be
a mi stake a out Personal Identity. Intuition cannot be in
error.. And consequently the unfortunate descendant of
Butler's patron would never have been able to be present at
Waterloo when he was not -- and he was; nor is his case
unique. From this we can see that, as was hinted before, it
is Butler's failure to notice the importance of the anomalous
cases and to include them in his rather too summary account
of how experience our own identity ("ascertain the idea®)
which leads hir to make this quite unsound objection, and to
neglect, or to examine only inadequately, the crucial question
of what "consciousness of personal identity" actually consists
in.
It might be illuminating to put this in another way viz.:
since the consciousness of Personal Identity is a kind of
knowledge consisting in the perception of an agreement between
our ideas, this knowledge, being of a particular existence
lone's own existence), cannot, according to Locke, possess
certainty, but is only highly probable; for no proposition
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that asserts a particular individual existence is certain,
certainty being confined to ^propositions wherein is ex¬
pressed the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas,
and their dependence on one another. Such propositions may
be universal and certa in (iV.xi .13)." And since the sort of
knowledge we are considering "is only of particulars", no
certainty can attach to it, since all other propositions are
matters of opinion or faith based on varying degrees of pro¬
bability, which Locke distinguishes from knowledge proper.
Uor, (ll.B.) does the special exception which Locke makes of
knowledge of Self and its relation to real existence apply
here; for that knowledge of the Self is not the knowledge
which is a perception of the agreement of ideaa, but is an
intuition, non-ideal, sui generis, and now; and it is
certain. So that we can se-, by the way, that here is a
further important distinction between the simultaneous pre¬
sentations we have of ourselves as Self and Person viz. that
the experience I have of "me" as Self expressed in the pro¬
position "I exist now as Self" i3 a matter of certainty,
whi e the experience I have of "me" as Person expressed in
tne p rposition "I am now the 3ame Person as I was then" is
very highly probable. Locke has, in any ca3e, implied in
ix* of IV. that absolute certainty of the existence of the
Self is confine^, to the present intuition.
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But to revert!, now, to Butler; we might credit him here
with toying with the notion, somewhat elliptically, that
there is, contrary to Locke's general view, cne sort of
synthetic judgement about particular existence which i_s
apodeictically certain viz. the judgement that the "now"
ideas and the "then" ideas which are the terms of the re¬
lationship which is he content of the consciousness being
discussed, are identical — and this is what would be involved
in his contention that Personal Identity is presupposed in the
consciousness that discovers it. Ve might then say that
Butler is attempting, however obscurely, to assert this
different doctrine, and so to correct Locke's account. But
on the other hand it i3 quite clear that Locke himself was
aware that there are synthetic judgements which, as cei'&ain
and "instructive", are exceptions to his general view, and
that he draws our attention less cumbrously to what Kant was
later to draw our attention to in his reflections on the
"synthetic a priori". (See IV.viii.8 which makes this clear
beyond, any doubt.) But tie point is that the proposition
-that expresses this particular relationship we are consider¬
ing is not one of those. And it is not 30 because the re¬
lationship is not the necessary consequence of the ideas
themselves i.e. the relation of identity between the "then"
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ideas and the "now" ideas doe3 not necessarily follow from
the nature of these id as, as it does, to use one of Locke's
exa pies, in the case of the necessary relations of "being
larger than" and "being smaller than" which obtain between
the external angle of a triangle and either of the opposite
internal angles, which relationships are the necessary con¬
sequence of the ideas that make up a triangle, but are not a
mere explication of the ideas that make it up qu§. triangle,
named as such. That, in the case we have to consider, the
relationship is anything but the necessary consequence of the
ideas themselves, can be seen from the fact that we can be in
error in relating sets of ideas together in this sort of
consciousness (see para.134 above) as, once again, in the case
of George IV. But quite apart from this consideration, if
we e amine Butler's assertion further, we see that he lias
himself betrayed any such defence of his objection by remark¬
ing, in the concluding clause, that the perception o^ this
particular relation which constitutes the kind of knowledge
we are considering, i3 the same as "any other case'1 of know¬
ledge i.e. by denying precisely, that this particular per¬
ception of relation is of a special kind. And this, I think
we may take it, disposes of t e most formidable-looking of
Butler's objections.
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It is perhaps to be observed again that, since he is
directing his shafts against Locke, Butler is either obliged
to use terras in the sane way as Locke, or to indicate toat
he is not doing so, and point out where Locke's usage is
V
wrong. Otherwise, if he tacitly adopts a different usage,
whatever the Dissertation may be, it is no criticism either
of Locke's account or of its implications. That to place
*
such an obligation upon Butler involves no anachronism can be
seen from the patient length at which Locke explicates his
own terms in the correspondence with Stillingfleet, and even
tries to explicate that Bishop's when he has to quote him.
161. (iii) The points which I include in this section
are those which Butler makes in telling us what that is of
which we have the sort of a priori knowledge he requires, and
which itself constitutes Personal Identity. And it is, we
find, nothing more novel or alarming than one continuing
spiritual substance. He chooses to express this view in a
paragraph which is nothing other than a denial that there is
any ground whatsoever of identity, other than sameness of
substance. In other words he qizite explicitly rejects all
Locke has to say about "organic" identity and thereby makes
clear that he is, unlike Locke, completely confined by the
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received metaphysical concepts of his day. That his re¬
jection of organic identity is explicit becomes clear from
his opening sentence (op.cit. p.389): n ... what makes
vegetables the same in the common acceptation of the word,
does not appear to have any relation to this (inquiry) of
personal identity......" And the example he uses in ampli¬
fication of this is of the same sort as that used by Locke
in xxvii. of II. viz. of the same tree which has stood in
the same spot for half a century, and which is spoken of as
the same tree although all its parts have altered many times.
But in this case, according to Butler, no identity is to be
found. It is only "in a 1oose and popular sense..... the
life and the organisation and the plant are justly said to
be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the
parts." But, he goes on to say, in a "strict, and philo¬
sophical manner of speech ..... the identity of these (any¬
thing or being) cannot subsist with diversity of sub¬
stance." How, this is not argument, but assertion. It
might be said that neither is Locke'3 account argument, but
description. And although this is true, the point is to be
made that Locke's description which asserts that the tree I
saw a a child and recognise again as a grown man has an
identity, is a better description than Butler's, which asserts
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that it hasn't. hat does Butler's assertion involve?
Surely that a continuant which I meet in the ordinary way of
experience and which I recognise and refer to as a vegetable
continuant, is, after all, no continuant at all. It is, on
t e contrary, a succession of different colligations of
material substances, the constituents of -/hie (colligations)
are in continual change, so that the colligations themselves
follow each other with such rapidity and are different one from
the other by, perhaps, such infinitesimal accretions, sub¬
tractions or substitutions that I do not observe their suc¬
cession. The fact that the colligations which occur in the
month of ''lay have visual qualities which are, or which provide
to me, the sensation 'green , and in October bave qualities
which are or provide the sensation "brown", and that they
continue to do so each returning '"lay and October, is either
contingent or it is the consequence of the Divine will which
makes the substances behave like that. Th^ fact that the
collected substances a e more numerous at the end of suc¬
cessive lustres in that the trunk of th-"- vegetable is f tter,
is presumably to be explained likewise. This might, granting
a proper omnipotence to God, be the case, if it were not for
the fact that it, leaves out of account one constituent of th
orcanism which c mot be talked away from our experience of it
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by "the strictest and -most philosophical manner of speech"
viz. its live££ness or vitality -- /hose discrirainable pre¬
sence us an indefeasible fact of experience. The growth of
a fir tree is patently not the same t ing a3 t' e growth of a
stalgmite, though they may resemble each other in shape and
both be "material substances"; nor is the withering of snow¬
drops at all the equivalent of the el ting of snowdrifts.
And if a strict and philosophical manner of speech asserts
that the;/ are the same thing, then it is an inadequate
manner of speech -- which uocke signally improved on.
Further to this, it is very noticeable that Butler confines
himself to the garden and, I think rather deliberately, avoids
the paddock and the kennels. The identity of animals is not
mentioned -- here, though it is very much in point. It is
clear that the identity of "brutes" perplexed Butler a great
deal, for although there is complete and perhaps significant
silence about them here, the matter is raised in the text of
the "analogy" itself in a passage where he has to hedge most
uncomfortably -- a passage which we shall examine more closely
in a little. 3ut meanwhile we should note that if Butler's
strict and philosophical view as expressed here is the correct
one, then, as Locke pointed, out with perhaps a little malice
both in xxvii of II. and to Stillingf!set, he, or anyone
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holding such a view, wili have to shew why the identity of
brutes cannot be maintained among their constantly changing
constituent substances, or he may be committed to locating
the identity, like that of men themselves, in spiritual
stance * And that, as we noted, settled the Cartesians —
as far as the necessary i- .utability of substance, either
material or spiritual, was concerned in its relation to ,
identity.. But in fairness to Butler we must observe that it
by no means disposes of him. If we now turn to the passage
of the "Analogy" where this matter is raised, at para. 1 of
Chapter I. (op.cit. pp.37-38) we find that in countering an
objection to his contention that, since the percipi^nce and
agency o' living brings can survive the loss or damage of
many of the mater al instruments and organs of that percipi-
ence and agency, there is a presumption that they can survive
the dissolution of the body entire, an objection which takes
'he form of saying that if the presumption holds in the case
of men, it must likewise hold in the case of beasts, Butler
*
says: "Suppose the invidious thing designed in such a manner
of expression" -- i.e. that animal3 having 3pirit and there¬
fore being immortal, may be capable of everlasting happiness
-- "were really implied ..... in the natural immortality of
brutes .... even this would be no difficulty. The
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natural immortality of "brutes does not in the least imply
that they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational
or moral nature."' In other words, though parrots, according
to Butler, may go to Heaven, that does not mean that they will
talk as sagely as Prince "aurice's or reflect on the error of
their former ways. And this means, as Gladstone remarks in
one of his few r "'levant note , that Butler disclaims any
doctrine of a rational or moral nature for animals, tout stops
short of disclaiming the argument for their immortality, as
i plied in a spirit distinct from body, He notes too that
Butler's friend Clarke was prepared to writes "Brutes for all
we know may become rational agents, as infants do. If not,
the system of the universe may require the future existence
of brutes, as it requires the present. And that Butler was
prepared to put himself in Clarke's tutelage in matters of
met ip'ysics, if not of morals, I conclude from the corres¬
pondence bet een them e.g. that of 1713-14 on "Self-Cxistent
Hubstance. "
It appears, then, that "Butler's rejection of Locke's
account of Organic Identity and replacement of it toy an
accou t in terms of sameness of substance alone as jf£round of
any i dent it;/, including that, of persons, involves him in
either of the alte natives: (i) that thos® apparent continuants
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which we recognise and refer to (if only in a "loo3e and
popular" way) as animal organisms are, in fact, like fir
trees and snowdrops, successive "but utterly distinct and
diverse colligations of material substances following each
ot ;er so rapidly that the succession is imperceptible (since
even if the difference between one colligation and another
is of only one "atom" or "corpuscle then, on Butler's
principle, they are distinct colligations and not the same,
and there can scarcely be a moment in which each one of them
does not alter by a scruple), and the order of their sue-
4
cession is by chance or direct interventions such that, if
the only specious continuant is an arctic hare, the properties
of its constituent substances change, e.g. from white to dun,
with an odd regularity, and the quantities of them change con¬
comitantly (and again rather oddly) with the presence or ab¬
sence of edible vegetation — which itself, of course, is con¬
stituted by merely other (such) succession: or, (ii) that the
same continuant is inhabited by the same sort of spiritual
or intellectual substance as inhabits persons, and thereby
has its identity, so that, on Butler's view, it would take its
chance, equally with men, of survival, bliss, or damnation.
how, from his readiness to admit that it is at least
possible that animals may have "spirit ', we can say for Butler
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that he was less subject to conceptual rigidities than those
of his contemporaries who accepted the unplausi and in¬
deed preposterous, Cartesian account of animals, but, also,
that he is still a. long way from emulating Locke's elasticity
of mind or accuracy of observation. Although the notion of
animals having souls and, perhaps, rational and moral facul¬
ties may be less repugnant to us than it'was to Dugald
Stewart (who was scandalised by Locke's repetition of the
story about the Prince's parrot, and who can obviously never
have loved a cat), as an account oi the identity of animals,
it is less plausible than L clee's and it is certainly not
susceptible of proof -- at l°a:;t undl we have the chance of
verifying Dr. Clarke's second hypothesis empirically. As an
account of '/hat we experience, it is inferior to Locke's, and
since Butler can offer nothing better than a dogmatic asser¬
tion in support of his contention that, in despite of all
experience, identity is confined to sameness of substance,
we are .justified, I think, in refusing the objection that
Personal Identity cannot be constituted by consciousness,
because it rust be constituted by the same substance.
Identity can be constituted otherwise.
162. (iv) In this fourth section 'e must consider what
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is not so much an objection to Locke's account as a plain
misrepresentation of what he says (op.cit. p.39l). Butler
writes, obviously with thete^t of the "'Sssay" open before
him: "The t'"ing here considered, and demonstratively, as I
think, determined, is proposed by Kr. Locke is these words
'Whether it' i.e. the same self of person 'be the same
identical substance?' And he has suggested what is a much
Jbetter answer to the question, than that which he gives it
in form. For he defines person ' a thinking intelligent
being* etc. and personal identity, 'the sameness of a rational
being'. The question then is, whether the same rational
being is the same subs+ances which needs no answer, because
Being and Substance, in this place, stand for the same idea."
Mow the answer to this is simply the direct negative that
neither here nor anywhere el so does Locke make Being, as
applied to something thinking and intelligent, the equivalent
of Substance, or of Substance alone -- as must be apparent to
anyone who reads him with even moderate attention. He does
not ®ven make them equivalent in his application of "being"
to animals. Repeatedly and at length- -- in all the ways we
have already noted, particularly in Section VI of this study,
which it would be as tedious as unnecessary to repeat over
again -- Locke makes the point, which Butler either ignored
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or was genuinely incapable of comprehending, that the
spiritual substance that thinks in any moment of conscious¬
ness, is not itself, or does not itself alone constitute, the
being who is conscious, any more than the material substance
that exists in any moment of an organism's continuance con¬
stitutes the being of the organism, which is to be located
rather in the organic function of, or carried out by, the
substance which is (in both cases) merely the medium or
instrumental concomitant of that to which "being" refers.
If the identical material substances which, when organised,
are in this way the "medium" of an organic Being, were, while
remaining the same material substances, not so organised,
then there would be no Being; and likewise the consciousness
which is the result of the thinking carried out by an in¬
tellectual substance, or various intellectual substances,
does not make up the consciousness of a "thinking Being" un¬
less the constituent ideas are something more than merely
the ideas possessed by this or that substance.
163. (v) Butler continues has contention that the same
elf or Person is the some Substance in a passage in which his
expression seems to me very confused indeed (op.cit.pp.391-2).
He starts by observing, quite correctly, that the ground of
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Locke's doubt about the continued presence of the same
thinking substance, is the fact that consciousness is not
continuous, it is not "the same individual action." But
we must note that Butler is quite wrong when he goes on to
attribute to Locke the opinion that "the consciousness of our
own existence in youth and in old age, or in any two .joint
sxxccessive moment.s, is not the 'sane individual action'."
.That our consciousness in youth and in old age is not, and
cannot be, the same individual action, is most certainly
Locke's view. Lor if it were, then it would mean that from
youth to old age a man had been continually conscious without
intermission of sleep or insensibility of any kind, or even
of a vacant mood. But that our consciousness is not the
same individual action in "any two joint successive moaents"
is most certainly not Locke's view. Provided that a suc¬
cession of moments of consciousness is unbroken, then on
Locke's view it is the "action" of the same thinking substance
which is the vehicle or medium of the ideas which constitute
that consciousness throughout its unbroken duration. But if
the continuity is completely broken, as by sleep or an¬
aesthesia, then when the "same consciousness" is revived,
there is no way of knowing tha+ the vehicle or medium is the
same -- and by "same" consciousness is meant only a conscious¬
ness
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which contains at the time of revival and thereafter, some
at least of the contents of the former conscious series as
revived ideas. If, again, he content of the consciousness
is so co pletely changed that between time T-l and tirae T-n
some series, there occur two moments of consciousness,
say, at time T-5 and tiwe T-9, neither of which contains any
idea in common with the other, then, without intermission of
complete insensibility, there is sue i effectual amnesia that
there can be no guarantee of the presence of the sane thinking
substance. But that this could occur in every two joint
successive moments of consciousness, Locke never suggests,
ind it is patently impossible; for if it were so then each
moment of consciousness would be isolated and we would have
no experience of dui-ation or continuants, and Locke most
assuredly never proposes anything so remot from our ord nary
experience. This is again a plain mis-statement on Butler's
part.
■tie goes on, as far as I can make anyt ing of his argument,
to suggest that t ere is something contradictory in saying
(a) that consciousness which is interrupted is not the same
consciousness (which is how he interprets Locke's "not the
same individual action"}, and (b) that such successive con¬
sciousnesses may have the sa *e object. Be puts it thus:
"And thug though the successive consciai snesses, which we
have of our own existence, are not the same, yet are they
consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object; of the
sane person, seff, or living agent.'' But what he fails,
once again, to do, is to enquire sufficiently into what is
involved in knowing at time T-2 the same obi ect as w :s know
at time T-l. If what I was conscious of at time T-l was the
Bishop of Durham's mitre when I -watched him being enthroned,
and at time T-2 th® same mitre when I remembered him being
enthroned, then at time T-l the constituent ideas of the
mitr® were pr e s entat i onally qualified, and. at time T-2 they
'ere memorially qualified. At time T-2 I am not conscious
of the mitre (the same mitre) in the same way as I was con¬
scious of it at time T-l. On the first occasion it revealed
among and through its ideas the fact that it was underlain
by material substance, while on the second occasion it is
presented as having been underlain by material substance when
it was formerly presented. l/hat Butler i3 suggesting is
/
that on each occasion I have consciousness of the "real
presence" cf the mitre — whereas, as ma'ter of fact, on the
second occasion X do_ not. When this . vs applied to the
matter of remembering "one's own existence" and not a Bishop's
mitre, it becomes very plain that this is nothing more than
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another version, even nore obscurely expressed, of the sort g
of argument we dealt with under heading (ii) above. For
whatj- on Butler's view, would be required, is, once again,
th it on en occasion of remembering my own existence, I should
have presented to me "myself then" -- i.e. my real presence
then -- and not what I do have presented, "Thyself AS I was
then." There is, then, nothing unintelligible in Locke's >
iccount, and still no excuse for equating the existence of
myself with the existence of a single spiritual substance,
which is the "same object" of successive states of con¬
sciousness.
164. (vi) Butlmr's next section begins with a sentence
that is perhaps better passed over in silence viz.; "Mr.
locks' s observations on this subject appear hasty." (.') The
objection here is avowedly not to Locke's own biews --
Butler's customary caution fortunately interposes at this
point in the Dissertation -- but to arguments which purport
to be devlopments of them. "UBien traced and examined to the
bottom", they amount, we are told, to this; "That personality
is not a permanent but a transient thing; that it lives and
dies, begins and ends continually; that no one can any more
remain one and the same person two "omenta together, than two
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guccessive moments cati "be one and the same moments that our
substance is indeed corrtin£ally changing; hut whether this he
so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose; since it
is not substance, "but consciousness alone, which constitutes
personality; which conscio\Jsness, "being successive, cannot
he the same in any two moments, not consequent'y the person-
a ity constituted by it."
It is as well that Butler frees Locke of any personal
responsibility for this, for if it purported to be an account
of his views, it would be hard to know where or how to start
to untangle such a wondeffully close web of misapprehensions.
We may note that there is one clause alone of the passage
w ich bears any relation to the "Vssay" viz.: "it is not
substance, hut consciousness alone, which constitutes person¬
ality.", and even this is dubious; for according to Locke it
is in conscicu sness alon° that we have any experience of our¬
selves as persons, and it is continued consciousness that is
the ground of our personal identity, but whether he would
assent, in view of what ise said in Book IV., to personality
(which is not in any cas° a term he is given to using) being
constituted wholly by consciousness of our personal identity,
is more questionable -- it would depend on what "personality"
referred to, since despite the confinement of pur knowledge of
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oxirselves as persons to continued consciousness, there is
al./ays to be remembered the awareness of the real existence
of our Selves. very other clause in the paragraph can,
without further exception, be directly negatived from the
text of the ""^s ay*. If these were indeed what purported
t be th"1 implications of Locke's view, then they were very
wrongly drawn. 'lad Butler himself been clearer as to what
■oc're's view is, he might have been able to point this out.
(vii) This section (op.cit. para.8. p.3:4) consists of
an arnumentum ed hominem directed against the sort of view
quotei above, and therefore not avainst Locke. We need only
note that Butler thinks, quit" erroneously, that it applies
to any view of the Self which does not make it an immutable
substance. The point of the argument is that since we act in
terns of a belief in a real continued self (which Locke never
tries to contravert) in this life, we should act in terras of
it n tegard to the next i.e. wa should be moral, and not make
an affected belief in the utter instability of the Self (which
Locke does not hold) an excuse for licence and irresponsibility.
Locke, I think, would concur.
(viii) The contention we have to aonsider in this section
is of mors interest and relevance (op.cit. para.9, p.394).
.Butler begins by remarking: r!Tt is not an id«a, an abstract
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notion, or a quality, "but a "being only, which is capable of
lif--^ and action, of happiness and misery." And the question
immediately arises as to what sort of "being" is meant here,
for although "in a loose and popular s°nse" this statement
might bn acceptable, a stricter and more philosophical en¬
quiry would require something less ambiguous. Is this
"being" a mind, and if it is a mind, is that to be considered
the equivalent of spiritual substance? or, again, is it a
"man'1 in the sense of an embodied spirit? But although such
questions might be legitimately raised, I think it is clear
enough that by Being, Butler means a particular individual
substance. This interpretation is borne out by his earlier
misrepresentation of Locke's usage of Being, and by his prior
assertion here that it is neither an abstract notion nor a
quality. Further.to this, we cm observe that from the long
arquraent in the text of the "Analogy" itself (op.cit. pp.25-44J,
that embodiment is, for Butler, not at all necessary to a
living Being. In his next sentence, too* he says: "How all
beings confessedly continue the same, during the whole time
of their existence" -- and. this smacks very much of substance,
"his -eing (- Substance) i3 spoken of here in terras that
suggest that it is a Self or Person; and indeed we have
already found mor*> than once that this is Butler's view.
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But if this view is correct, surely the last sentence we
/
quoted raises 3ome odd questions in relation to the identity
of an agent. Tf a Being (- Substance) has regained the same
. * ■*
.
for twenty years, as according to Butler it must, and, during
thai time, has, as a human Being, concomitantly with remaining
tho same as substance, been a model of moral virtue, and then
in the twenty-first year it takes to drink and makes a rake's
progress t' rough the other six deadly sins, does it remain
the same Being daring the next twenty years of vice as it did
through the twenty years of its virtue? It must: for "all
beings confessedly continue the same, during the whole time of
their existence." What, then, has changed? It must be the
>roperties of the substance that have changed, for if they
had not, then we wo Id not be able to tell the difference
between a vicious man and a virtuous one; and this is a dis¬
tinction on which we are all very certain that we can judge
with certainty. So t at, although a property cannot be
transferred from one substance to another (as Butler has
already told us, with an eye to Locke), it appears that the
same substance may have, successively, different properties.
So that the properties which constituted the virtue of the
virtuous Being are, merely, dif ferent fro*: those which con¬
stituted the vice of the vicious Being, but the Being is the
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same Being. And this explanation might see good enough,
until -:e ask the question: "To whom or what is the moral
responsibility for the Being's actions to "be imputed?" To
the Substance? or to the properties? Tt cannot well "be to
the Being which is the same individual substance, because
that would be to impute t'-o blame for the latter debauchery
to the very same and unchanged substance -s^s was formerly a
model of virtue, and if it is said that it is the "same"
substance but that it "has changed", then it must be asked
in what way a substance c-n change other than by having
diffei-ent properties, and if it is only the properties that
have changed (which is admitted), does not the substance
remain unchanged? And could we, in thai case, attribute
blame for present debauchery to a Being who is in no way
different from the Being we approved as virtuous? Likewise
if, after twenty years of depravity, the Being reforms (the
same Being) and spends its remaining twenty years in all
humility and repentance, to whom or what are we to impute
the moral approbation for this? To the same and unchanged
Substance which a few years ago was a scandal to all morality?
If it is said that these ques'ions are both sophistical and
metaphysically naif because, at might be said, substance apart
from properties is inane, and properties are nothing apart
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from their substance, then th" answer is that, plainly, either
the substance does not- remain the some when its properties
successively alter nd therefore it is not the same "during
the -/hoJ tine of its existence", or it does remain the same
and is therefore not affected by its properties which are,
or apparently may be, different and incompatible in their
succession. Tf it is said that it is not the "properties"
'hich a Substance has, as a Being, that wake it morally good
or evil, but some other thing e.g. "will" or "disposition"-or
something not a "property", then in that case the answer is
that, a "x er all, the Being is not a Substance, since Substance
is that which has properties, but is some other thing which
does not have properties but which has e.g. "will" or "dis-
>usiti©»* which, it might be said, are not properties. If
the first alternative is right, then the Being which Butler
regards as Self or Person is not the same Being, but a suc¬
cession of the^ (i.e. a succession of substances), and this
is not o conc'usion vhic would recommend itself to him, and
: s on° which he ri=b'?,0",0,1fps in ocke who, in fact, never
positively asserted it. [Co far from asserting that the Self
is unoer ain, in fact, by a succession of substances, Locke
even re-ar^s that it is "ve-y ^robable" that it is underlain
"by onq substance: his point is that this is not known, and is
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so far irrelevant.) If the second alternative is right,
then whatever nay have moral responsibility imputed to it, it
is not Butler's sort of Being -- unless the Being's agency
is uniform in kind i.°. that, there is no succession of pro¬
perties which are incompatible as those constituting virtue
and vice are incompatible. And this might be a way out of
the difficulty; for if every Beinv has from the time that it
begins to e"ist, one all-qualifying, over-riding property
either of "being depraved" or of "being ordained to grace",
then obviously the orobiera does not arise; for in the former
case its virtue could only be specious, and in the latter its
vice either unreal or licensed. But for anyone holding
Butler's view to take that way out, would mean that he would
have to go, for his moral theology, not to Canterbury (or
Home for that matter), but to the ruder climates of Geneva
or Edinburgh.
If, on the other hand, responsibility i3 simply not to
fee attributed to the Being which is a Substance, at all, be¬
cause it, tn itself, is affec+ed neither one way nor the
other by what it underlies, are we then to attribute moral
responsibility to a bundle of "loose" properties? Even if
we wished to, we could not -- if properties are nothirlg apart
from Substance.
-PP7-
If anyone holding Butler's "substantial" view of the
Self, were to fall back on the eschatological argument and
say: the Substance or Being is and re ains the same, and the
properties are different and often incompatible, but all is
still well, because fet the final judgement -- and that is all
that matters -- the Substance which is the Being will be re¬
surrected with all the properties it ever had, at once to¬
gether; so that the same substance will then come to Judgement
underlying all and every one of them simultaneously, however
incompaible, remote, or even mutually exclusive and contra¬
dictory they may be. And although, granted omnipotence, it
may be possible that, aftsr the Last Bay, the same substance
may have or underlie mutually exclusive and contradictory
qualifications, this might give a sober metaphysician pause
to think, and, it appears to that such a view would commit
Butler to the same 3ort of strange eschatology in which his
brother of Worcester involved himself, and which Locke
followed through so remorselessly in the second Letter. And,
we may note, Stillingfleet*s error arose from a very similar
misapprehension about the "same Self'.
If anyone holding Butler's view tries to avoid Stilling-
i
fleet_s sort of absurdity by saying that, at Judgement, the
same substance will not actually possess or underlie
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simultaneous],?» incompatible qualification3, but t.iat all
properties and qualifications etc# will be furnished to it
•from the record" i.e. will be revived in consciousness or
ue ory, then this i3 to sell the pass to Locke utterly, for
in that case rural identity, at least, is grounded in nothing
out consciousness.
The point of this particular disputation is to demon¬
strate that Butler is in his zeal for substantial identity,
betrayed into a neglect of what Locke realised was much more
important i.e. moral identity. t is curious to note that
Locke kept much more ste dily before him, and, in the event,
served much, better L..at he called "t ie great ends of ■ brality
and Teligioa" than did his ordained and. consecrated critics.
1
That, according to Locke's account -- ■' atever ay have been
the v .garies of hi3 self-appointed followers -- there i_c a
ioral agent to whom responsibility is inputet s but that this
is not a substance, or at least that it is not such that it
can helpfully be included in that concept with its notorious
rigidities and a biguities, is tie poi t of importance which
remains to be considered in the concluding section.
. eanwhile, to continue with the remainder of Butler's
contention in t is paragraph: — having established to his
e tisfaction that it is only a Being (in his sense) "which
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is capable of life and action", Butler goes on: "All these
successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions,
e-joyments, and.sufferings of.the same living being. And
they are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering
or forgetting: since remembering or forgetting mate no
alteration in the truth of past matter of fact." Or, in
other- words, continuity of consciousness has nothing whatever
to do with Personal Identity. It is, of cours", the appeal
to "matter of fact" that makes us pause her», for, on Lockets
view, such an appeal is an appeal to authority -- the only
authority. But what, in the situation described, could
"past matter of fact" meant All the evidence about past
matter of fact which we can have is, in the nature of things,
from our memory and from, the testimony 0" others relying upon
their memories. Admittedly, memory is, in general, veridical:
but, as matter of fact, memorial testimony can not only be
d;fferent but also flatly contradictory on what purports to
be past "matter of fact". If we suppose what in reality we
can never know, vis. that 0, man commits an ac+ of which he
lose, all memory, then, according to Butler, whether or not
i.t is the case that he con never remember it, the fact remains
that he did It. But how could we know that? Presumably we
would say it was past matter of fact, that he did the act, if
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all the people who "remember" being there, also agree in
"remembering that" he did it. But if his memory can so
betray him that he cannot remember that he did do it, why
may we not suppose that their me ories are liable to be
fallible in "remembering that" he did do it? (One has only
to reflect on the melancholy spectacle of the righteous of
a community rating through the biography of a scapegoat, to
bs a are of the frailty of even the most agreed consensus of
memory.) Y/=» presume thai a majority is not deceived (except
in the parenthetic case) because memory is, in general,
veridical? Poss'bly so; but if there were only one other
or only few other witnesses, the probability of error may
be equal on either side, or nearly so. If there are a great
many witnesses then we do tend to accept trie "fact", but we
most assuredly are not entitled to claim aertainty in doing
so. Por all practical purposes, agreement of memorial
testimony establishes "facts" about actions -- as in a law
court. But if this is all Butler means by "past matter of
fact" then the contribution he is making to the discussion is
no more helpful or acute than Leibniz's similar one. So that,
as it turns out, his appeal to matter of fact consists in no
more than his raising, and then begging, all the questions
about the distinction of Pan, Self, Person, and Body which
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issue in the forensic paradoxes we examined in para.148 above.
The identity of a living Being is, contrary to Butler's view,
much dependant on remembering or forgetting i.e. on continued
consciousness, both in himself and in others, since past
matter of fact is, Hire the -^eing's identity, confined to it.
165. (ix) In this section (op.cit. para.10. p.395) Butler
shews, as he has done before, that he is capable of attacking
the problem from the right side, and of following Locke's
account so far, but that he always diverges when Locke's
analysis goes deeper precisely by adhering to what we do
experience, without regard to accepted dogma. And every
time Butler stumbles, it is over the same thing — the Self
as Substance, which haunt his criticism as relentlessly and
inimically as "Simplicity" haunted T.H. Green's. He starts
with a good paraphrase of Locke: "'very person is conscious
that he is now the same person or self as he was as far back
as his remembrance reac'ss: since when any one reflects on
a past action of his own, ha is just as certain of the person
who did that action, namely, himself, the person who now re¬
flects upon it, as he is certain t at the action was at all
done." But I suspect that he was anraware of the importance
of the proportional relation as to certainty implied in the
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graramar of the latter part of his sentence. We are, indeed,
only just as certain that we are the same person now as then,
as we are certain that we did the action. And this, 'with an
emphasis he fails to give it, might contain the necessary
Qualification that although memory is generally reliable,
there seems reason to believe, if only farom conflict of
testimony, that sometimes it is not -- with important con¬
sequences as to identity. He goes on to over-emphasise the
certainty we have about our past selves from present experi¬
ence by writing: "Way, v-^ry often a person's assurance of an
action having been done, of which he is absolutely assured,
arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it."
And although this may be true and may in the majority of
cases be an instance of veridical memory, as an account of how
we know our own identity, whatever may in fact constitute it,
it is incomplete without the additional comment which, for us,
consists in conjuring up, yet once again, the instructive and
indefatigable shade of King George. It is his blindness to
the fact that he is over-emphasising in a manner that Locke
avoids, and is ignoring important evidence, that reinforces
'utler in his mistaken belief about Self and Substance. He
seems to have some sort of belief t :at since, when we remember
oi.ir past Self, re are remembering a substance, such memory can
nev^r be fallacious. Had he thought a little about the odd
c .sea of memory (as Locke did), his faith in the substantial
Self wight have been 3haleen. But, an it is, having shewn
that he has some insight into the situation, he g,as on in
the very next sentence to define the limitations of his
thinking in the most precise manner, riting; "And this he,
person or self, must either be a substance, or the property
of some substance. If he, if person, be a substance; then
consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness
that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the
property of a substance, still consciousness that he is the
sa e property is as certain a proof that his substance re¬
mains the same, as consciousness that he remains the same
substance would be.... 1 Upon this, I think, there is
not xing more that can usefully be said.
(x) In the concluding section Butler, almost perversely
shews again that on certain aspects of the problem, he can be
acute. He provides here, in fact, an excellent answer,
based on t ie general reliability of memory, to the sort of
objection we noted in para.116 above vis. whether, as Butler
puts it, "though we are th 3 certain we are the same agents .
now, which we were as far back as our remembrance reaches;
yet ..... (may we) not possibly be deceived in it?" He
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points out that if memory is not to toe trusted at all in
respect of the remembering of our own past, then neither is
it to toe trusted in any instance of deduction or reasoning
which invariably involves "the truth of perception toy memory".
And since arguments against the veracity of memory involve
reasonings which necessarily include the activity of memory,
it is ridiculous to try to prove its total unreliability toy
using it and presupposing its truth in the purported
demonstration.
But, again, having made an excellent point, Vie spoils
the effect of it by making it clear in the paragraph that he
regards "living beings, agevits, or substances" as equivalent.
166. From this, it appears to me, all .Butler's criticisms
of Lake, explicit and implied, fail without exception.
Their failure is to toe traced tooth to his inadequate under¬
standing of what is involved In remembering, and to the
rigidity of his adherence to the dogma that Self is Substance,
for which he cannot produce a reasoned defence. If he had
seen more clearly what memory involves, he might also have
seen that his position in regard to substance is untenable;
on the other hand the strength of his conviction taay have
inhibited in him the attempt to carry through a candid
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examination of memory of a kind more worthy of hi3 capacities.
Whether he did not read the "Essay" with sufficient care, or
whether he was simply incapable of seeing Locke's point about
the Self, it is impossible to tell. But sometimes it does
seem that he has simply not attended to what Locke was-saying.
On the other hand, it may not be easy for us to realise, by
an exercise of sympathetic imagination, how original Locke's
account may hare seemed in lust those places waere Butler
seems unable to follow it — unable to follow in the sense of
incapable of understanding it; likewise, it may be impossible
for us to "think ourselves into" the state of mind that was
apparently Butler's in regard to spiritual substance. The
conceptual habits we inherit, have had more than two centuries
to become adapted to the seismic disturbance which Locke
occasioned in the realm of that substance. But it is at
least clear that Butler is open to the charge of being
hampered by inadequate metaphysical concepts which he never
criticised, which was 'vhitehead' s much less justified criticism
of Locke.
If this scrutiny of the Dissertation leaves us with a
diminished admiration for Butler's penetration, it is to be
remembered that the point of view from which he tried to
• *■ * #3criticise Locke has, as a description of experience, much more
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to be said for it than there is to be said for those pur¬
porting "developments'' of Locke's position, carried out on
the lunatic fringe of "empiricist" philosophy, Which Butler
summarises in his sixth paragraph, and, to ny mind, at least
as much to be said for it as those other more reputable, and
much more skilful, developments of it which issued in
Berkeley's implausible idealism (which makes of spirit the
only substance), or the "atomistic" phenomenology of David
■lume which, as a description of what we do experience, is,
in comparison with the Aristotelian range and detail of
^ocke'3 account, a narrow and artificial production which
sadly belies the contemporary and singularly inappropriate
designation of it as "naturalistic". Tlven Butler, it seems
to me, does raor° justice to "experience" in the points he
touches on, than does 'Same who, however heterodox the sug¬
gestion, seems to be confined at least .as much as hira to the
"atomistic" formalities of an archaic metaphysics which is
only speciously rejected.
167. If it is said that neither Butler nor anyone else is
to be blamed for not following Locke's account because, in
this respect, as in every other, his exposition i3 quite
unsystematic, the answer i3 that if his "being unsystematic"
means that he refrains from forcing the result of his ob¬
servations and reflections into an ill-fitting straight-
jacket to make it presentable to received logical doctrine,
in the manner of Immanuel Kant, or, put othervd.se, that he
does not mar the fidelity of his transcription of experience
by imposing on it from without an unnaturally symmetrical
architectonic, again in the manner of -k-ant, or by over¬
simplifying its complexity by misdirecting attention to sense
experience solely, because of its fortuitous vividness and
constant accessibility, after the manner of Hume, then I think
that not only is it to be agreed that Locke is unsystematic,
but also that t is is to be marked to his credit, even if it
does require a greater effort from the reader.
•This is not in any way to impugn the value of Kant's
analysis of experience as such, and in despite of the forraal-
istic violence done it by its author, or to denigrate Hume's
expositorial brilliance (although it is perhaps to be re¬
marked that it is for the provision of a criterion of
technical accomplishment, rather than for any illumination
of our ordinary experience, that we rau3t be grateful to Hume),
it is merely to point out that their virtues, such as being
systematic in the one case and lucid in the other, which are
also their limitations, are not sticks which can be used for
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beating Locke with, simply because his virtues happen to be
quite other ones, and because he is perhaps le33 limited.
I say 1«ss limited because, using nothing but the
language of ordinary experience and thereby avoiding both
t .e perils of Kant's "private mint of words" and the re oteness
from common sense which is the c u&equ nee of that thinker's
excessive philosophical professionalism, Locke anticipates
him quite clearly in the most important points e.g. in draw¬
ing our attention to the existence in experience of what is
expressed in ampliatlve but certainly true propositions, in
giving an account of that necessary concomitant of any per¬
cept on of an existing thing, which consists in the con¬
stitutive compresence of the "ideas of" Duration, 'Extension,
and Substance in any idea or representation of a real existing
thing (as I have shewn in Section III), an account which has
t e advantage of Kant'3 in not banishing the real existent
so far into the Beyond, and in the account of the Self, par¬
ticularly in the crucially important demonstration that the
identification of the Soul with Substance is a transcendental
ill si on, and that the intransferability of consciousness from
a single substance is dogma only, and untenable. He is, too,
less limited than "aime in that, avoiding Hu' e's distortion by
simplification, by refusing to be put off by the incompatibility
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of his own various accounts with each other or with th¥_
requirements of "lo^ic" (language?) when what we experience
is at variance with what is logically required, he provided,
in advance, a prophylactic against the nescience which is
consequent on JIu e's account provided that, and only provided
that, its original "atomistic" analysis is accepted, by
tracing clear that in comparison with his own description,
such a description as Hume's involving such an analysis,
is a poor and inaccurate account of or whole experience.
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IX.
COIICLTJSTONt SPU AND T-:F 'TRSG1T.
168. In this concluding section we are to examine further
the distinction between Self and Person, and what it is in
experience that, as I maintain, we do recognise by this, and
what, if we are to reduce certain confusions and difficulties
of long standing, we ought to speak of ih terms of it. It
is a distinction upon which, I hare admitted, Locke did not
himself work sufficiently, in the sense -- only -- that he did
not- in any one place make an explicit enough statement of it,
although, as appears to xae, his whole account of this province
of our experience is in fact in. terms of such a distinction.
And it is the drawing of our attention to this distinction,
which is at least implicit, in all of his account, that to rqy
mind is one of the- respects in which the "plain historical
account" is most illuminating.
169. We hare found, so far, that the fiifference between
the manifests itself in the different ways in which we know
ourselves as Selves, and know (or are conscious of) ourselves
as Persons.
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What is known when I know myself as Person is constituted
by the discerning of a relation "between ideas. This relation
consists in the agreement of certain qualifications which
these ideas -- as presentationally and re-presentationally
modified -- possess; and the discerning of this agreement is
a function of the mind which "thinks in me now". The content
of this kind of sonsciousness is too, as we have seen, a
kind of knowledge discursively established., and it is highly
probable, but not apodeictically certain. We can, in other
words, be mistaken in the discernment of the agreement — or
so it seems -- and can as a result, in anomalous cases, dis¬
cern "ourselves to be" different Persons at different times.
The ideas which can thus be related in such consciousness of
being a .Person, are all those which can be presented to
"present" consciousness, and all those which can be re¬
presented to present consciousness as revived ideas, subject
to the conditions, and in the various possible series, which
we noted before (see paras 130-131 above).
This sort of consciousness necessarily involves duration.
It is an awareness of something, a Person, as a continuant i.e.
as something identical with itself in duration and with its
own successive appearances, and the act of apprehending that
this is so, is itself durational ~~ since it is discursive
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and involves the relating of id as whose identity with them¬
selves as psychic events and identity with each other as
presented and re-presented ideas 'of the same thing"» involves
duration "beyond the moment, or specious present."
On the ot-xer hand, when I know myself as Silf« I have a
direct intuition. What I then know is neither idea nor re¬
lation of ideas. Consequently, what the content of this
sort of consciousness may be, is something w ich, although
i ■■ ediately and clearly known, it may be hard, or even im¬
possible, to describe at all. And the reason for this dif¬
ficulty is not far to seek. e have at least oeen able to
say that what we know in such a case is neither idea nor re¬
lation of ideas, and since words are names for ideas, or for
the relation between ideas, there are, simply no words in
which t li3 can be described -- at least directly. Likewise,
what is known in this sort of consciousness is not durational,
nor, consequently, is the consciousness .itself in which we
know it* i.e. the intuition, durational. And this is, clearly
enough for something of the same reason as makes the content
of the experience ineffable viz. that, once agains what we
"now In and by this intuition is not idea or relation of
ideas; and that since, in the description of experience we are
accepting, duiration ins constituted by the succession of ideas
(see para.51 above), then where there are no ideas, there is
2.2 duration. Therefore, when T mow myself as Self, I know
my Self "now", and "how'1 only. Duration i 3 not a climate in
whica the 3ejf can 1ive. When the Self which is known"now"
becomes projected, as it were, into the mode of duration, then
it ceases to be the Self and beeomes part of the Person. And
this is so because an intuition cannot be remembered. The
object of sn act of remembering is a memorially qualified
idea (see paras 152 and 154 above). When consciousness of
Self, or self-consciousness, becomes durational memory i3
immediately involved i.el the relating together of "Self-then"
and. "Self-now", however brief the interval. And, as we have
seen, when I remember "self then", I do not have a "remembered
intuition , which is impossible, as one of the terms of the
required relationship, but a term which is "what was an in¬
tuition then" and which i_s now -- a me orially qualified
idea.
170. We might put this by saying that the Person is a
construct of. ideas and the relations between ideas, and it is
constituted by what the Self, known only "now", excretes from
the "now" into the mode of duration. And from this we can
see that there is one respect at least in which .aocke's
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account of "Self or ersonal Identity" is consonant with what,
in the Introduction to this Study, we called the 'con-
stynational view1'•
On the other hand, it is obvious from what has been
said about the Self, and our acquaintance with it, that
oche's account is equally consonant, with what, in the Intro¬
duction, we called the "Pure Bgo" theory. And frora this we
night properly conclude that, once again, the merit of Locke's
account is that it does not err by exclusion and partiality,
over-emphasising to distortion either side ox the matter,
since both accounts, however hard to reconcile, are needed
for an adequate account of 'experience. The present ex¬
position is intended to shew that they are not, from Locke's
point of view when it is properly interpreted, so irreconcil¬
able as they appear from either of the other views.
171. Since our knowledge of ourselves as Selves is non-
durational or a-temporal, and cannot be otherwise, we might,
if we chose, describe this state of affairs in rather awe-
inspiring language by borrowing Spinoza's phraseology and
saying that in knowing the Self, as we do know it, we "ex¬
perience our own eternity" - provided we are clear, with
Spinoza, that "eternity" is not "serapiternityM. But it
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might be safer, and more in keeping dth Locke'3 own practice,
not to attempt to use a-re-inspiring language, and. to note
instead that although the ways of knowing ourselves as Self
and as Person, are different ways of knowing, they always
occur together -- even if one is durational and the other not.
I do not know myself as Self alone, or as Person alone; I
know myself always as Self and Person. For, the occasions
on which the intuitions of Self occur, are occasions of
thinking, or remembering, or reasoning, or do bting, or, in
general, of being conscious. And when I am conscious, I am
conscious of ideas? ideas present to raind constitute con¬
sciousness. And when, being thus conscious, X have ideas, I
not only know that I have ideas, but also that "I" have them
(see para.89 above). In other words, the intuition of Self
does not occur without the occurrence of ideas which are its
occasions? but, likewise, when ideas occur in consciousness,
they are invariably accompanied by the intuition of Self. So
that, even although the intuition of Self is non-durational —
and,if we like, eternal in the non-sempiternal sense »- it is,
so to speak, "permeating1. It is in and thrcough all conscious
experience; for all consciousness which is durational involves
consciousness of Personal Identity, i.e. of the self as Person.
Because, for there to be continuity of consciousness at all,
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the ideas which i_n succession constitute duration, must be
linked together, as a succession, by the prceived agreement
of their "I"-qualifications, and to have the requisite "I"-
qualification they must, as we have seen, include re-presented,
minimal constituent ideas of tain "ing substance (the "opaque"
ideas referred to in para.123) which bear the marks of having
been the occasion of the intuition of a unique "I", agreeing
with present (minimal-constituent) ideas of thinking substance
i
likewise marked. And the durational consciousness, thus
acVii evsd, necessarily involves rememberings" and 'discarn-
inga , and all of these are accompanied by the intuition of
Self.
172. This part of our conclusion would, then, seem to be
that the Person is created by excretion of a "timeless" Self
into the mode of duration, or time. The Self, in other
words, -- and this description must still be cautious and
provisional for reasons that we shall shortly see -- creates
the ei'son. And if we paused her© to recollect what we have
learnt in our history of Philosophy, we mignt wonder if this
were not perhaps a strange conclusion to draw from the
writings of a thinker who is so often designated as one who
mads the "mind'' (which is at least connected with the Self*
and as far as most history of philosophy is concerned, is
synonymous with it) essentially "passive" - that which was
"impressed." from without. And the reflection is not alto¬
gether idle, if only because it makes clearer that the de¬
scription attempted above has been largely in the form of
metaphor, which may be misleading. There has been no choice
but to use metaphors, because what we are trying to talk about,
the Self, is not an idea, and we are compelled to make the
attempt to ta~k about it in a language which is solely adapted
for describing an experience constituted only by ideas. And
the result of this is that the attempted description, in its
form so far, might be mistaken for a mis-description which
has already been rejected viz. that the "I" creates itself
Iby "thinking itself I". But this is not so, -- for one
thing that formula ignores the distinction made within the
"I (or what is indifferently referred to by that pronoun) as
between the Self and the Person. That it is indeed not so,
we shall see from a further examination of the phenomena con¬
stitutive of the consciousness which is both of Self, and of
Person.
173. he have noted that it is occasions of a mind's being
conscious that are the occasions of the intuition of Self, en.
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intuition which, in being mad®, makes the consciousness of
that mind to he a personal consciousness. And, further, any
occurrence of "being conscious" involves the consciousness
of Personal Identity, if the consciousness is to he continuous
and it is continuous. In other words, if consciousness
extends frora time T-l, over time T-2, to time T-3, then the
person who is conscious at time 7-2 must "remember his being
*
conscious and of what her was conscious at time T-l", and the
person (the same person) who is conscious at time T-3 must
"remember his having been conscious and what he was conscious
of" at times T-l and -2, or at least, at time T~P, however
brief the intervals. This being so, we must observe again
what constitutes such consciousness. It is, of course, con¬
stituted by ideas, and it is connected together by the re¬
lation of ideasj and the connection is effected by the
agreement of the quali£ications of the ideas. If at time
7- a subject perceives something, an object, i.e. has ideas
of sensation, then those ideas of sensation are accompanied
by ideas of reflection, or an idea of reflection, which is
the perception of the pe ceiving; and these ideas of re¬
flection are Qualified or marked by the Self or I" of whose
intuition the** are the occasion; and the agreement between
the qualification or marking of the present idea with the
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qualification or marking of the ideas revived "from" time
T-l makes the consciousness continuous. But t ie point is,
that the agreement is between the ideas as malified, and
n it between the idaas p°r se. Por exa~o.ple, if in a situation
where there are a number of objects present, the subject
perceives a triangular object at time T-l, and a square ob¬
ject at time T-2, then his consciousness is continued not by
the agreement of t s triangular idea and. the square idea
( which do not agree) but by the agreement of their quail-
ficat1ons. So that the Self does not create the Person by
creating, or even choosing, the ideas vhich are the con¬
stituents of that consciousness which always involves con¬
sciousness of Personal Identity, it cr ates the relations
between the ideas -- however derived -- by making them agree,
or ,a' ing them agreeable, through being "its" ideas i.e. by
making them carry its specific mark. We should, then, amend
our metaphor and say that its "creation" is in 3ome respects
at least 'involuntary h whatever ideas occur, the Self marks
them as its ideas. But whether or not the Self has any
control over what the Person shall "consist of", i.e. what
ideas shall be included in the consciousness which constituted
Personal Identity, is something we have yet to consider.
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And, we must note, if the "I" were really to create itself
"I by 'thinking itself Ithen it would have to exercise
selective control over the ideas which constitute a Personal
Identity that is to say, over t ie ideas which constitute
al 1 consciousness.
174. The next question we have to consider, then, is what
is the source, or what are the various sources, of the ideas
which the Self varhs and annexes to the Person which is its
product and accompaniment, and does it itself have control
over them or their sources? We may begin to answer this by
noting, once again, that the ideas which constitute all con¬
sciousness can be divided broadly into two classes viz. ideas
of sensation and ideas of reflection. How we have noted on
at least two occasions before, and in important connections
(so paras.63-64 & 130-131 above), that ideas of sensation are
controlled as to the order of their succession by an order
outwith themselves viz. the order of "things". Over their
order, the mind, to which the things are ideally presented has
no control. ? is is true of idea' of sensation as presented
(or of things ideally presented), and to a lesser degree of
:• ch -ideas as re-pr°sented — in which latter case they are
presented at least in before-after sub-series consonant with
the original series of their presentation.
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On the other hand, as vaB observed likewise and in the
same place, ideas of reflection as presented are not so con-
%
trolled as ' o their succession by an order external to them,
but are controlled (as presented ideas) by the activity of
mind alone -- although as re-presented ideas t ley are, like
ideas of sensation, controlled by being subject to the order
of their original occurrence as natural facts. But in the
present they are not so controlled.
It seems, therefore, that t e ideas which occur in any
consciousness are in part pre-determined and in part not so.
In other words, the contents of any consciousness are partly
subject to voluntary control, located somewhere, and partly
not so. And this isrould appear to be a fair conclusion from
our examination of ideas, chiefly in terms of the account in
Book II*
If we turn, however, to chapter xiii of Book IV., we shai
find that this interpretation viz. that our knowledhe is
partly necessary and partly voluntary, is indeed consonant
with Locke's explicit view, and is verified in his text.
In IV.xiii.1. he writes: "But though a man with his eyes
open .in thelight, cannot but see, yet there be certain objects
which he may choose whether he will turn his eye3 to; there
ay be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses
i
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capable to delight or instruct him which yet he may, never have
the will to open, never taT"e the pains to look into." and
continuing in the succeeding paragraph: "There is also another
thing in a man's power, and that is, though he turns his eyes
sometimes towards an object, yet he may choose whether he
will curiously survey it, and with an intent application en¬
deavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it.,!
And these observations emphasise the voluntary element in
perception. If we are awake, our senses must to some degree
register those id»as which are present to us, but the ampli¬
fication and articulation of the content of our perception
is variable by the voluntary activity of the subject i.e. by
the activity of the Self as agent. To emphasise the other
side of the picture, i.e. the involuntary element in ordinary
perception, he goes on (ibid): "But yet what he does see, he
cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his
will tc see that black, which appears yellow; nor to persuade
himself, that what actually scalds him, feels c)ld. The
earth will not appear painted with flowers, nor the fields
covered with verdure, whenever he has a mind to it; in the
cold winter he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he
will look abroad...... All that is voluntary in our know¬
ledge is, the employing or withdrawing of any of our faculties
from this or that sort of objects And therefore, as far
as men's senses are conversant about external objects> the
mind cannot bjrt receive those id<°as 'hich are presented by
them, and be informed of the existence of things without......
For what a man sees, he cannot but see; and what Vie per¬
ceives, he cannot but Vnow that he perceives." As far, then,
as this chapter emphasises the passive reception of some
ideas in consciousness, it so far corroborates w i&t we have
already concluded from other parts of the "Essay viz. that
the order of ideas of sensation is controlled by the order of
existing things and tha+ nothing in or "behind" the receiving
consciousness controls that order. And this is the respect,
and the only respect, in which there is anything at all
accurate in the hoary libel that, for iOche, the mind in
consciousness i_s passive. But if looh again at the last
sentence of the quotation, we see that, even this degree 6f
inactivity is relative. For if a man perceives he cannot
but perceive that he perceives; and this perception of his
perceiving is a simple idea of reflection whose object is the
perceiving itself. And ideas of reflection are activities of
the mind which is conscious. Therefore even in passively
receiving the ideas which are dictated by the order of ex¬
ternal nature, consciousness is active. But it is not
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voluntarily active. It perceives because the ideas of
things are, in fact, presented to it, and that automatically
provokes the mind to action, but the action is determined.
"But, on the other hand, .even in the situation so described,
wherein the mind is provoked to involuntary action by the
successions in the external world, there may also be voluntary
action i.e. the consciousness may be enlarged by, for one
thing, further ideas of reflection whose occurrence is not
ordered by the ideas of sensation which are themselves
ordered by the order of things, but x^hose order is due solely
to "the activity of mind". That is to say, as in the pre¬
vious quotation, there may be the "employing or withholding of
any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects." For
example, by an exercise of will, either in or "behind" the
consciousness to which they are present, the id as of sensation
which are uncontrollably present in any moment may be extended
and articulated by the intervention of some agency, as in the
case of the opening of a book or of a drawer, or any other
purposive investigation.
175. But this matter of voluntary extension and re-arrange¬
ment of the contents of consciousness by the intervention of
an agent, requires' further investigation. If our experience
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can be modified by the exercise of "will", the question
arises, what has the requisite faculty i.e. the hill, and
How is it exercised*? When Locke speaks here, and at many
other places, of a 'man" doing this or that e.g. "looking" or
"turning his attention" or "haying the will to", he is ob¬
viously enough not speaking in terms of the distinction be¬
tween "man'' and "person'' and "self', bor is he using "nan" as
the zoological term applied to an organic continuant which
may be the organic vesture and concomitant of a TTind or Self
or Person... and so on. He is not, in other words, using
the term as precisely in this account of the voluntary element
in consciousness as he uses it in accounts wnic are directed
to the elucidation of quite other topics. In this case he
seems to be using it loosely and in the popular sense, and he
is quite entitled to do so in the attempt to produce an
intelligible account, not in this case of the "nature of man"
tself. but of the nature of some kind of consciousness.
He could just as well have used the i ^personal "one" or "the
subject" or "xbut he does not choose to do so, and the
fact that he does not, in no way makes hi3 account unintellig¬
ible, unless we are determined to misunderstand him. So,
the mere reference to the immediate text does not atiswer our
question: "What exercises the voluntary control? by producing
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the answer "a man", which, however true in a given context
and at one level of generality in description, is, as I say,
obviously inadequate for the further requirements of an
attempt to relate this account to the other accounts of Self
and I-erson.
175. To enquire further into the nature of the Will and
of what exercises it, w- must turn hack to the massive and
complex chapter xxi of II. "Of Power".
In giving a genetic account of how we come by the idea
of power in general, Locke observes (il.xxi.l) that in the
ordinary wajr of experience, the 'mind" remarks "t ;e alteration
of those simple ideas it observes in things without, and
(takes) notice how one comes to an end,and. ceases to be, and
another begins to exist which was not before; (and reflects)
a1so on what passes within itself ..... observing a constant
change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward
objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of
its own choice.
That is to say, certain changes in the ideas constituent
of" our consciousness are such that we ntelligibly describe
be to ourselves and toothers as being instances of the
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exercise of power over one thing(set of ideas) by another
thing (set of ideas) e.g. we observe the succession of ideas
which is intelligibly and co • amicably suraraarised in the
formula "Fire melts gold" or "this fire is melting that piece
ox gold", and would say that the "fire" exercised, some power
over the "geld'. Likewise there are other successions of
ideas, this time of reflection, which make us describe them
as powers which the mind has to make various sets of ideas to
follow each other in the course of various "reflective" and
"discursive" processes. Both of these cases are parts of
ordinary experience which we recognise as and call instances
of the exercise of power? but in the latter case we have,
because of the im >ediacy and vividness of the "feelings of"
exertion and direction (which are ideas too), a more positive
idea of such power voluntarily exercised. As Locke remarks
(ll.xxi.4): "I thought it worth while to consider here, by
the way, whether the rand doth not receive its idea of active
power clearer from reflection on its own operations, than it
doth from any external sensation."
177. This idea, or notion, or feeling of power, which
occurs in the part of our experience which c nsists in aware¬
ness of our own mental operations, is no other than that
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which we generally call experience of willing". Ve are, in
the ordinary way of things, aware of phenomena of the sort we
call "choosing to do", "making decisions", "taking deliberate
action etc.. "This at least" says Locke (ll.xxi.5) "I think
evident -- That we find in ourselves a power to begin or for¬
bear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and
motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of
the mind ordering, or as it were commanding, the doing or not
doing such a particular action. This power that the mind
has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the for¬
bearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part
of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular
instance, is that which we call the Will. The actual exercise
of that power, by directing any particular action, or its for¬
bearance, if that which we call vglition or willing."
This, then, is the sort of faculty or power -- intellig¬
ibly enough described — which can and does alter the contents
of a consciousness, by alteration and amplification -- what¬
ever it may be, ultimately, that exercises it. Uow, we are
engaged on this enquiry into agency for a dual purpose,
lirstly, to see how far we can progress in speaking intellig¬
ibly about the Self whose real existence is immediately known,
and secondly to find out what that is (whet er Self or Person
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or both) to which moral responsibility is to "be attributed
-- hich was found in the previous section to be problematical.
So far, we have found our something at least from Locke about
the nature of the "willing" which is the basis of agency.
But before we go on to enquire what it is that "wills", we
must examine the "willing" a little further. For, although
experience, i.e. all consciousness, is constituted by ideas
(and ideas are whatever is discriminable in experience), and
although we have found an intelligible account of the power
which, in a general sense, voluntarily alters soma parts at
least of the consciousness 1eaving, as we saw before, some
parts of it necessarily unaltered), we are, in a more par¬
ticular sense, concerned to examine further those parts of
experience which are specifically designated in the quotation
as the doing or refraining from "actions" — since "action '
is, according to the common usages we always start from, the
medium of agency, of agents, into which we are enquiring.
178. To obtain further illumination on this from Locke,
we must go on to the succeeding chapter, xxii of II., "Of
Fixed odes". According to Locke' "actions" are "mixed
.modes". But since this might appear a cryptic utterance --
i
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as we have not had occasion to refer directly to this part
of his account before -- we must pause to note that "mixed
modes" (as distinct, from "simple" modes, such as that of
duration) are "such ... complex ideas we mark by the names
obiigation, drunkenness, a lie etc which ... (consist)
... of several combinations of simple ideas of different kinds
.... These mixed modes, being also such combinations of
simple ideas as are not looked upon to be characteristieal
marks of any real beings ..... but scattered and independant
ideas put together by the mind ... (and they) are thereby
distinguished from the c omplex ideas of substances. (Il.xxii.l)2
Having found, then, which sorts of thing in our experience
are to be called Mixed Modes, and having observed from the
examples given that they are, as presented, such complexes of
ideas as those that constitute what is recognisable as an in¬
stance of "being drunk" or of "telling a lie" -- which are
indeed what would, in the ordinary use, be taken as involving
action, and that of a kind to which moral judgement could be
applied -- we can go on to see what Locke has to say about
actions" as mixed modes, more generally. In this connection
he writes in II.xxii.10; "It is worth our observing, which of
all our simple ideas have been most modified, and had most
mixed ideas made out of them, with names given to them. And
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tho3e have "been these three:- thinking and motion (which are
the two ideas which comprehend in them all action) and power,
from whence these actions are conceived to flow.... For action
being the great business of mankind ... it is no wonder that
several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice
of." And in the way of further concrete examples, he pro¬
vides as follows (ibid): "Let us examine any modes of action
e.g. consideration and assent, which are actions of the mind;
running and speaking which are actions of the body; revenge
and murder, which are actions of both together, and we shall
find them but so many collections of simple ideas, which,
together, make up the complex ones signified by these names."
And it is, of course, with Mixed Modes of the third kind -
-- those which are actions of the mind and body together —
that we are concerned in terms of the dual purpose of our
enquiry.
179. How, the fuller explication of the situation, thus
summarily described, which we require for our present purpose,
is this:-
Pirst of all (and once again), all experience is experi¬
ence of ideas i.e. all consciousness is constituted by ideas,
and by "ideas'' in Locke's sense that is not only as
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"picturesof" or "representations of". In the changing mani-
fold which constitutes our ordinary experience, these ideas
are presented either simultaneously within specious presents,
or successively, in such ways that they can be divided into
classes in terms of their differences, and these classes are
most udefully named as "simple" or "complex" ideas (which
division concerns their form), and as "ideas of sensation"
and "ideas of reflection" (which division concerns their
source); and ideas of either of the latter classes may be
j&s
included, as far as form is concerned, in either of the former
classes. Not only so, but ideas from both of the latter
classes, "of sensation ' and "of reflection", can be included
together in the class of 'complex" ideas (thereby forming
"ixed Modes). These classes of ideas and their possible
mutual inclusions (i), together with certain sub-classes of
themselves to which attention may be specifically directed by
being separately named for 3ome expositorial purpose, e.g.
"ideas of relation", "of substance" etc. (ii), and an intuitive
and unique awareness of the real existence of the Self (iii),
togetner with -- to complete the account -- a demonstrative
knowledge of the existence of God (iv), and a sensitive know¬
ledge of the existence of other "things", which supervenes upon
our having ideas of sensation and which is connected in the
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"given-ness" of thing-hood, in such ideas (v), in their sum,
constitute our experience -- according to Locke's account.
These form a series, the lower ideal limit of which is the
completely "simple" idea (as the episteraologists"atom") and
the lower practical or experiential limit of which is the
simple idea as the datum, presented as a set of irreducible
coifcomitants. And the upper limit, ideal and experiential,
of this series, is a consciousness of the subject as Self and
hereon, dependent upon God, and conversant about its natural
environment.
Now, among those constituents of consciousness thus
most generally schematised, there are sub-Glasses which in
discourse are differently named e.g., those 3orts of ideas
which constitute what we call "actions", or those sorts whicn
make up what we call "moral experience", and those that are
ideas which we call "our own volitions . And of these, the
sort we call "actions" are discriminated in consciousness as
complexes or patterns of what can simultaneously be dis-
cr minated as simpler" ideas from different sources. So
that, if, for example, that which I discriminate as an action
of my own, consists of what in discourse I call "breaking
open a locked box*', there will be present in the consciousness
constituting or containing the "action:i so named, successions
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of ideas of sensation whose sources are both objects outside
me — the "box itself, what it rests on etc. -- and ray own body
providing Mnaesthetic oorts of ideas of sensation, and also
ideas of reflection which are awareness of my relating to¬
gether the elements of the situation in my "calculations of
how to open" the "box, and possibly of my feelings of frustra¬
tion and impatience with the recalcitrance of the rsaterial
box, or of my expectations of what I am to find etc.. So that
the total action, like Locke's third class in the quotation
above, will contain, as does "rmirder", "actions of mind and
body together . And since many of the ideas present are
ideas of sensation, I know that my "body" is acting upon
"something" (the box), and both of them are objects existing
in t e world of nature. What we mean by 'action", then, is
the succession of ideas which shews to us our own bodies
affecting and altering other natural faodie3 -- and these
latter, of course, may be other "human" bodies. This sort
of succession is, however, different from the succession which
occurs when I do what in discourse I call "walking into a box
in a state of absent-mindedness and knocking it over and
breakng it". In this latter succession of ideas which shews
me my body affecting and altering another natural body, there
is lacking an element which makes the former succession
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s ecifically different. The difference consists in the
fact that in the former series there are contained ideas which
are of the sort we designate "ray own volitions". This aware¬
ness of "willing" is, as we have seen, in general an idea of
"power". It is discriminahle in the situation as an aware¬
ness that if "I" make my "body move in a certain way (if "I"
alter the suceession of certain of the constituent, ideas of
consciousness), this will he followed by certain alterations
in other of the constituent ideas over which "I" do not seem
to exercise the same control -- all this simultaneously with,
or shortly followed by, "wy" actually moving my body i.e. by
an alteration in some of the ideas and, consequently, by a
concomitant change in the ideas other than those "of" my body.
And this "act of will" issuing in "doing of the action" as
describees, as something discriminates in consciousness, so
far an idea. The remarking of this concomitant change in
two series of ideas seems to be all that we can provide, on
the analysis so far, in the way of description of the "doing
of an action". But it is not yet a wholly intelligible
account. What or which is the "I" that "does", is not
Sufficiently explained.
180. .ow, we have seen that id^ao of sensation have a
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source which is the world of things, and ideas of reflection
have a source which is the activity of mind. We have to
locate the source of those ideas which are ''acts of will"
altering the succession of the ideas constitutive of our
experience.
But before we turn to that enquiry proper, we must note
further that those Mixed Modes of the first hind described
e.g. ray "breaking open a locked box", very 5ften have yet
further concomitant ideas differentiating them from such other
Mixed Modes as my "blundering into a box and breaking it
accidentally". And these extra elements are discriminable
as ideas of approbations or disapprobation of the kind in¬
cluded in what we normally call our "moral experience" —
which does not mean that our ordinary moral experience is
made up only of feelings of approbation and disapprobation;
it only means that such familiar ideas are normally so
identified. Such ideas as these are normally presented when
the object of our consciousness is, or is partly constituted
by, a ?rixed Mode which is an action. Whether they are airways
present, as concomitants even of such actions as the accidental!
breaking of a box, is perhaps more doubtful, and would be a
subject for a more specialised phenomenological study. But
in certain cases they are vividly present as close accompani¬
ments of some such Mixed "Modes at least. — whether these are
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our own actions or actions done "by other people; for in
"both cases these are Mixed Modes, although the constituent
elements in the case of an action done by myself are very
different from thos^ of an action done by another. If I
watch a thief breaking open somebody else's locked box, I may
have ideas which are a sort of approbation of the technical
skills which he exhibits in doing so, together with other
ideas (probably very much vivider), which make up wp moral
condemnation of his action. How, this does not pretend to
be in any way an adequate account of our moral experience, it
is merely a passing but necessary reference to such familiar
experience, to remind us that the present enquiry is directed
to finding how the "I" who does things, i.e. how the "I" as
agent, is to be described, because we want to find out also
that to which moral responsibility is to be imputed. We have
begun by finding out how those things in experience which
manifest the presence of an agent -- a" least according to
the ordinary way of speaking -- are to be described viz. as
the Mixed Modes which are actions of the knd that are accom¬
panied by approval or disapproval of our selves or others;
and we are left with the problem of who or what "does'* What
is done in the manner described above. The questions con¬
cerning any discernible rule which the succession of such
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ideas of valuation adheres to, and their special content
which seems to hare as part of it what, for "brevity, we can
call an "ultra-subjective" reference and authority, and their
intimate relationship with the idea of power which is"willing,
are all questions to which Locke gives mature and lengthy
consideration, particularly in xxi of II., but they do not
v«jiuin,®ry actions". These questions are the materials for
a cognate but quite independent study of .uocke'o Moral Philo¬
sophy. We sight note, too, that an analytical account of
such actions, given, as above, in serial form, has a certain
appearance of artificiality, -which is due to the fact that
the intimate "connectedness" slnd immedi cy of the experience
of such Mixed Modes is inaccessible to this sort of language,
and is accessible, if at all, only to the language of the
What is the source of these ideas which are "acts of will"
which alter our experience by changing the order of the ideas
constitutive of our consciousness?
properly concern us here, since we are concerned merely with
n account of the form of those Fixed Modes.which are
poet.
181. The question, in the terms we usd before, now is 5
-339-
If we revert to the text of Locke's account in xxi of II«»=
we find that he speaks of "this power which the mind has thus
to order ..... or to prefer the motion of any part of the
"body to its rest .... is that which we call the Will."
Again in xxi.7. he says: From the consideration of this
power of the mind over the actions of the man, which everyone
finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity."
And as a preface to that passage, remarkably ''modern ' in tone,
in which he warns us against "being misled by the "faculty '
vocabulary into regarding ourselves as being inhabited by a
number of distinct agents each exercising its separate
"faculty", he observes that we do often talk of the Will as
"the commanding and superior faculty of the Soul." In para¬
graph 19 of the same chapter he has more of importance to
say: "I grant that this or that actual thought may be the
occasion of volition, or exercising the power a man has to
choose; or the actual choice of the mind, the cause of
actual thinking on this or that thing: as the actual singing
of such a tune may be the cause of dancing such a dance, and
the actual dancing of such a dance the occasion of singing
such a tune. But in all these it is not one power that
operates on another; but it is the mind that operates, and
exerts those powers; it is the man that does the action? it
is the agent that has power or is able to do."
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Hdw, these equivalent, and perhaps apparently confused,
usages of "man", "mind", and "agent", must give us pause to
think. On the face of it, Locke is saying that the Will is
a power possessed by the "mind", and that Agency i3 4 function
of a "man". But we saw recently (para.174 above) that in
t e case of "man ', Locke's usage is not uniform. Precisely
in this matter of agency, we found, his usage of an was ob¬
viously not the same as the usage he adopts in considering
''man" as an organic continuant or in considering the relation
of Man and Person. Here 1 license, I think, we must assume
that his usages are those of ordinary discourse and are with¬
out the precision which his own later accounts give them in
t
the consideration of other aspects of our experience. These
passages occur in xxi of II,, i.e. they are prior, as far as
the succession of parts of the account is concerned, both to
the consideration of Identity in xxvii of II., and to the
consideration of the intuited Self in Book IV. Consequently,
we cannot expect him, in this part, to take account of, and
make clear, distinctions he has not yet dealt with. If such
an anticipation were to be made the prerequisite of exposition,
then the exposition could never be started at all. In the
ordinary usage, to speak of mind having power, and of a aim
acting, is perfectly intelligible, and Locke is entitled to
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u"e the terms thus "popularly" for the purpose of giving an
intelligible accouht of the Idea of Power. But when we have
read Ms account in its entire$3r and reflect upon it, we must
be prepared to interpret each part of it in the light of the
others. In other words, we must be pre ared to interpret
his account of what it is for f a "mind" to will, and for a
"man" to act, in terms of his subsequent (or at least other)
accounts of "man" and "mind". The whole present exposition
"s no more than an attempt so to interpret his accoun# of
Personal Identity and the Self in terms of those other account^
of our experience which are relevant -- and this does not
consist, as we have repeatedly observed, in pointing out the
superficial dissimilarities, which is both very easy and not
very profitable.
It will therefore be useful and will obviate a tedious
repetition if, in starting to interpret this description of
the situations which involves voluntary action, we keep in
mind the Summary (given in para.147) of the distinctions
between, and inclusions and exclusions in diffeuent cases
among, "mind", "self", "man", "body" etc..
182. We have to consider, then, a situation described as
that in which "a man acts", and does so, and is able to do so,
because of a "power in his mind", which directs the notion
of his body. The power of the mind, then, is apparently the
ultimate source of action. Now "mind", as we have found, i3
that intellectual substance which thinks in us in any moment
of consciousness; and it is itself active. It can, for
example, relate ideas together, and by such activity it
creates and "alei continuous all consciousness. But the
activity it exhibits in relating ideas together, is not a
directive activity? for, as we have already seen, the only
ideas which it. can relate together, and which are presented
to it for relation, are those which are marked as the id-as
of a particular, intuited Self. Its activity is purely
cognitive. It is an activity which consists in perceiving
and uncerstanding, and not in doing in the senan of initiating
changes in the succession of experience of the sort which
shews us changes in the external world brought about by the
"action" of our bodies. It appears, th^n, that "mind" in
this sense cannot be the "agent" that Lock"- talks about.
Further to this, we know airsay that it is a cardinal doctrimf
of Locke's that whether the mind (intellectual substance)
which is in,or underlies, our consciousness st different
times, is the 3a.me mind, can never be known. If, then, the
Will is a power exercised by this sort of "mind", we can never
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know that actions have to ->en initiated and completed toy the
same agent. In other words, if the raind which is the medium
of consciousness at time T-l9 brings about, toy some means,
the existence of a "Taxed Mode (an action), and is tint the
same mind as similarly "brings about the existanc of another
such Mixed Mode at time T-2, then the same agent was not
responsible for the two actions, the consciousness of tooth of
which is nevertheless contained in one personal consciousness;
so that whatever is conscious at time T-2 blames or praises
itself for the action doree at time T-l which it did not per-
f form. If, as Locke says is not less than probable, it is the
V*
same intellectual substance that, in fact, underlies the suc¬
cessive states of a personal consciousness ieven although
this cannot toe known), then all the difficulties arise once
again "which we examined in the previous section on Butler's
■r objections. We saw there- sufficiently, I think, the in¬
adequacy of the account which tries to assimilate the Agent
to unchanging Intellectual Substance. And that Locke, just
as rmich as Butler, regarded Substance as the same throughout
its existence, we can see toy turning again to II.xxvii.28
where he writes; "Whatever substance begins to exist, must
during its existence toe necessarily the same." It was, I
suspect, an awareness of the consequeneesm for moral identity,
344-
of identifying Substance and Agency that made Locke so wary
of equating Self or Person with thinking substance. The
agent, then, is not an intellectual substance.
Nor, we may note, is it possible to say that the "man"
t
is the agent in any very exact sans w For a man is an animal
organism which is at the most a concomitant of a thinking
being. The only way in which a man, as_ such, can "act", is
when his material parts are the cause of changes in their
environment, and are so without reference to the consciousness
"in-' them i.e. when his material parts are the instrument"
(as contrasted with agent} which affects other material bodies
e»g. when "he" accidentally knocks something over and breaks
it. This can only be "involuntary action" or, more accurate¬
ly, "instrumentality". And it is not into the source of
this that we are now enquiring.
It seems, then, that " an" and "mind" can only be
"manners of speaking" about the Agent, which are legitimate
in that they are intelligible and succeed in drawing our
attention to what is involved in those phenomena of our ex¬
perience (Fixed l-odes) which are actions. I would go on to
suggest that it is necessary to use "manners of speaking"
about the Agent to whom moral responsibility can be imputed,
because the Agent, as I hope to shew, is the Self which we
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know "by intuition and about which, we have aeen, it is dif¬
ficult to say anything, and which is certainly not amenable
(not being an idea) to direct description in language. That
neither the "mind" nor the "body" noV the "man" is the moral
Agent, is evident; for the first is insuffuciently stable
(for all we could know), and the latter two are material
instruments to whose mere motion in itself (which is their
contribution to action) responsibility is not imputed. And
this elimination night itself be said to provide a presumption
t lat the Agent is the intuited Self, although, as we shall see
there is further reason to adopt this view.
183. To this suggested identification of the intuited
Self with the moral Agent, it might immediately be countered
that, so far, we have spoken of the Self rather as something,
itself passive, which is the object of the mind's activity.
It has been ppoken of as "being intuited" on such ar such an
occasion, or as being theob.ject of some active, but unspeci¬
fied "I's cognition. But this is only a matter of grammar
-- of the "voice ' of verbs and convenient verbal arrangement.
Ve could quite as well have spoken of the Self as manifesting
itself" (active) on such or such occasions, as of its "being
intuited" fjassive). But quite apart from the Consideration
of expositorial device -- which is no less (and no more) mis¬
leading in this case than in others — we can go on to 3ee
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how, so far from being completely passive, the Self must be
regarded as controlling action.
We can begin by noting that action involves duration.
Actions are Fixed "Mode3 whose elements succeed each other,
and must do 30, because among them is the idea of power (since
action is not "actionwithout volition), and the idea of
power essentially involves t 9 change (succession) of ideas
-- cp. Il.xxi.l. Since, then, action requires duration, we
cannot act unless we have continued consciousness. All con¬
tinued conscicu sness involves con3ciou m^3s of Personal
Identity, and, indeed, all continued consciousnesses 'constitute
Personal Identities, because the only way in which the mind
(in its cognitive activity) can relate ideas together so that
they form continued consciousness, is by rel ting in agreement
ideas which are "I"-qualified. Tola relating in agreement
which constitutes continued consciousness which is necessary
for there to he action, can only be carried out if the related
ideas are so qualified. The ideas are so qualified because
the Self which is intuited (or manifests itself) on the oc¬
casion of their occurrence "marks" them as 'its". Therefore,
by qualifying or marking the idaas which constitute s con¬
sciousness, the Self at least makes action possible. No
Self -- No Action. But this, so far, does not necessarily
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m&ke the intuited Self the Agent; it only makes it the
necessary pre-condition of agency. But we have to observe
further that those parts of the Mixed. Modes (actions) which
are particular modes of the idea of power, i.e. the volitions
involved, are ideas which are derived from the changes in
oufselves and the outer world —- op., again, Il.xxi.l -- and
the observation of such changes induces the expectation that,
given one set of ideas (those constituting the present stage
of the action), something else, different, will follow? so
that among the ideas constitutive of any moment which is a
stags in the difration of an action, there are included ideas
of expected, consequences (which will be "imaginative:! ideas)
and, presumably, of potential alternative consequences which
may be desired, and such imagined or expected alternative con¬
sequences may include ideas of changes in ourselves such as
the initiation of further movements of our bodies e.g. among
the imagined or expected consequences may be ideas of the
movements required of my body in "prising the box open with a
lever" or, alternatively, of those required in "splitting it
open with a hatchet". How, as the duration of the action
progresses, i.e. as the constituent ideas of the Mixed Mode
succeed each other (for duration is the succession of ideas),
the actualization of any of the potential and imagined con¬
sequences cannot be due to the "activity of raind", which is
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cognitive and concerned with the relating and not with the
selecting of "I"-quailfied. ideas, "but mist, as it semns to
me, he regarded as due to the marking of whichever of the
potential (and imagined) consequences ijs to he^ actualised,
by the Self, which thus permits the "mind." to relate the
consequence, which is thus actualised, to the preceding
ideas (which now "become memorial) in one personal conscious¬
ness. Choice, therefore, is located in the Self, The
Self is the Moral Agent.
184. The final form of our interpretation would, then,
appear to he that the Self which we intuit is the Moral Agent,
and the Person is the evidence for and against it -- in that
the identity of the (Self's) Person is constituted by a con¬
sciousness which consists of ideas which the Self excretes
(metaphorical) into duration. That is to say, the conscious¬
ness which constitutes Personal identity contains both the
actions and the passions of the Self? it contains as potential
memorial idea", all the ideas which have occurred over which
the Self has no control e.g. the ideas of sensation which it
has received by merely being in some particular place at soiae
p rticular time, and it contains also in the same way all the
ideas constituting the Mixed Modes which are its actions,
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over which it has had control and for which it is responsible.
This "Person'' is the inescapable accompaniment, product, and
e nsequvnce of the Self's activity in every "now"', and the
activity in every "now" is that of choice — even if the
choice is of "doing nothing". And this is indeed Locke1 a
explicit view. In II.xxi.24., he writes: "Considering the
vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another
every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives,
there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to
the will, till the time the# are to be done; and in all such
actions the mind, in respect of willing, has not a
power to act or not to act, wherein consists liberty. The
mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing..; it
cannot avoid some determination concerning them, let the
consideration be as short, the thai ght as quick as it wil,
it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking,
or it changes it; continues the action or puts an end to it.
thereby it is manifest, that Lfc orders and directs one, in
reference to or with neglect of the other, and thereby either
the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary."
Co that the Self, as "oral Agent, is, we should like to say,
in a "permanent state of decision"; but as scon as we try to
say this, a contradiction becomes appe.rent. There is,
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indeed, a contradiction involved even in saying t at the
Self ie an Agent: for, ace have said that duration is, as
it were, a. climate in which the Self cannot live? yet we also
wish to say that the Self is Agent -- and'agency requires
duration. Once again the contradiction arises and is in¬
escapable because language is adapted only to describe what
is durational, and the Self is non-durational (or is, in one
sense, eternal). This is not, as we have seen, the sort of
contradiction that would, have unnerved Locke, but since this
is an interpretation as well as an exposition of his views,
it may be as well to leave the contradiction less baldly un¬
reconciled, as his responsibility, and to find some formula —
and it is no more than another form of words -- such as the
proposition that the Self is the "ground of all agency, or
some such thing.
The Self, then, is neither organism nor consciousness,
neither body nor mind; nor is it the sum of them, nor is it
a meta-organism of physical organism and consciousness to¬
gether making some third thing which is not of the nature of
either or of their sum. Organism and consciousness are the
instruments by which it acts, and the source of the occasions
on which it is known. Itssexistence does not constitute a
"problem", for it is immediately known: we may choose to
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call it a ^mystery", because what it is ultimately, is in¬
effable. At most we can say it is the Agent; it is that to
which moral responsioilit-jr is imputed; it is that which is
subject to judgement. Put the judgement to which it is sub¬
ject. is one founded upon the -'Vidence which is the Person,
and is one which can only be made by a judge to whom that
Person is accessible -- that is, by the Conscience or by
God. Judgement of a Self in terms of human justice is the
judgement only of action in so far as that is the motion of
an organism, and, as such, it is it the best hazardous and
makeshift. And this consequence of Locke's account might
well provoke the reflection that in it ha gives startling
point to the scriptural admonition "Judge not, taat ye be
not judged", and the further reflection that, perhaps not
surprisingly, the implications of his view receive their
most succinct statement in the fourth Chapter of First
Corinthians Vv.3-5.
The "problem" was of Personal Identity, of the self as
Person. It is suggested here that Locke reduces the problem
and gives an intelligible account of the Person.
The Self and the Person "are experienced" together and
inseparably. The Self might well be called the Pure 3go, and
the Person i3 certainly a construct of ideas in consciousness,
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I am conscious of myself as Self and Person simultane¬
ously. I have a double-presentation ; of it (them), just as
I have a double-presentation of Substance, and of the self-
identity of anything I discriminate as "one". (Which means
that Locke's account, taken in its entirely, is coherent and
consistent.)
If we consider again the sort of problem that was
Raised in the Introduction to this Study e.g. that the
cognitive state which is the apprehension of the necessity
of the proposition "A is A", contains stages which presuppose
the knowing of something (the ^aw of identity) which is only
known as the issue of the cognitive state, we can see that
this is only a case of the double-presentation of A-as-it-is-
now in the manner in which anything "identical, with itself"
is presented under the curious conditions of experienced
duration.
It was suggested, too, in the Introduction, that some
way might be found of so enlarging our expression that some
of the problems" of Personal Identity might be avoided.
But to invent new and differentiating terms for Self and
Person, and new pronouns to refer, as the case might be, to
Man or Person, Self or ind, would be only, I think, to invent
new problems. The best recommendation we can obtain from
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our study, is that we should remember that the grammatical
subjects and objects of reflexive verbs do not have invariable
referents, and should try to keep in mind distinctions which
the language of ordinary discourse does not shew. For, in this-
matter of' language, which has not "been the least of our con¬
siderations, Locke himself says, in warning us against the de¬
ception of common words, but in defending their use: "It looks
ike too much affectation wholly to lay them by: and philosophy
itself, though it likes no£ a gaudy dress, yet, when it appears
in public, must have so much complacency as to be clothed in
the ordinary fashion and language of the country, so far as it
can consist with truth and perspicuity." -- and, with care,
such words as "I" and "self" still may do 30.
linally, if it is said that t is is too extreme an inter¬
pretation of Locke's views, and one which is too much at
variance with received accounts of British rhi1osophy and its
historical development, then rrgr defence of it would finally
rest on the fact that it is one which emphasises what must be
clear to any reader of the "Lssay" -- whether he makes this
sort of interpretation or not -- that for Locke the Identity
which was important, wa3 not the mental or organic Identity of
a Person, but the moral Identity.
